Privat institusjonsdrift i andrelinja i det norske barnevernet

Abstract

Norwegian statistics shows that the number of days of residence in private institutions are higher than in public institutions, and that the private commercial (for- profit) sector accounts for the majority of these days (Bufdir, 2020). This thesis focuses on why there are so many commercial private operators (for-profit) in the Norwegian Child Welfare Service and what value-based challenges this may entail. In the 1970s, as in many other countries, Norway experienced major political upheavals. The public sector received increasing criticism for being ineffective, bureaucratic, and large. In response to this criticism, the New Public Management reform emerged. Through competition and marked forces, NPM was intended to contribute to streamlining the public sector. An increased focus on ensuring that service is run as cost-effectively as possible has led to more operators and service providers participation in tendering procedures in order to provide competitive services to users. It may indicate that there are many private service providers in the Norwegian Child Welfare Service, and it may seem that there is a lack of capacity in the public sector and that they must therefore apply to the private marked to meet the need. The hypothesis is that it is lucrative to use private actors, and that can help to cut costs. It may also indicate that large private commercial (for-profit) providers are draining the surplus money out of the country, rather than using the funds in Norway back onto the services. Profits and large surplus may be a factor that motivates individuals to provide care services, but can this come at the expense of children’s opportunities to get the help they are entitled to?