

# Privacy-Preserving Deep Reinforcement Learning in Vehicle AdHoc Networks

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**Abstract**—The increasing number of road vehicles results in more fatalities and accidents. Thus, the manufacturing industry is working on driver safety to secure and safe transportation in Vehicle Adhoc networks. In addition, the mobile vehicles run in the geographical zone and communicate roadside units over the wireless medium with a certain radius. The Internet of Vehicles has become a new network type where vehicles communicate with the application over public networks. This results in an increase in data exploration and threats related to network security. We propose the deep reinforcement learning method to sensitize the private information for a given vehicle connect over Vehicle Adhoc networks, maintaining a balance between security and privacy through any sanitization process. Furthermore, we provide a set of recommendations and potential applications for the Vehicle Adhoc networks as use cases.

## I. INTRODUCTION

A Mobile AdHoc Networks (MANET) are a dynamic network technology that enables self-configuration, infrastructure-less, and autonomous [1]. Vehicle Adhoc Networks (VANET) is a sub-type of MANET, in which vehicle nodes communicate over the wireless network [1]. The vehicle node frequently joins and leaves the network due to topology changes dynamically, as mentioned in Fig. 1. The major components include vehicles, Road Side Units (RSU), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and infrastructure-to-infrastructure (I2I). Another significant difference between MANETs and VANETs is that the rate and type of vehicular nodes cannot be predicted

in advance that results in a progressive density of random, asymmetrical vehicles and mostly unknown [1]. With the implementation of IoT technology, VANETs evolve to become more dynamic, reliable, and highly flexible in solving those challenges. This results in advances in both applications and services known as IoV, short for the Internet of Vehicles. IoV infrastructure [2] is illustrated in Fig. 1. However, the advances always come with exposure to security concerns that impact the trust between the vehicle node and network. VANETs are generally restricted to a smaller scale than IoV. IoV has integrated vehicles connected over a global network where vehicular infrastructure and the Internet are connected, providing a collection of both applications and services for vehicles [2].

Moreover, the VANETs nodes frequently come and go from the network due to many constraints like tall buildings and the general inconsistencies within road networks. Simultaneously, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) seems not to be plagued by the constraints mentioned above [2]. The IoV provides connectivity with multiple services, functionality, and application; however, security and privacy are still issues, particularly regarding the vehicles used in public transports. We have seen that VANETs are an essential component for any Intelligent transportation system (ITS) as VANET's primary purpose is to provide safe and secure transportation for drivers and travellers.

VANETs have three primary purposes road safety, comfort, infotainment, and traffic management by using the transportation network [3]. The




Fig. 1: The communication method and overview of the VANET and IoV.

67 main goal of the safety application is to decrease  
 68 accidents and save lives. On-time warning messages  
 69 can be achieved by using the vehicular nodes in  
 70 the network. Some of the early warning messages  
 71 include a collision warning, a recommendation  
 72 about hazardous conditions, and lane change as-  
 73 sistance. Other traffic management applications of  
 74 VANETs include congestion avoidance or speed  
 75 limitation notifications. We can see that infotain-  
 76 ment applications can provide services that enhance  
 77 any driver's experience. Any of these infotainment-  
 78 based applications require Internet connections [3].  
 79 The primary goal of the VANETs is to make driving  
 80 safe and secure. Therefore, secure network com-  
 81 munication is vital. The critical nature of VANETs  
 82 becomes more vulnerable in the context and refer-  
 83 ence to both law enforcement and first responders.  
 84 Therefore, this research aims to address security  
 85 and privacy concerns for vehicular networks in  
 86 Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS).

87 The data traffic generated over the VANETs  
 88 connected over 5G networks is extensive. These  
 89 lead to the development of progressive technolo-  
 90 gies in data mining used for implicit information  
 91 discovery. Managers or decision-makers then use  
 92 the extracted and mined data to decide and update  
 93 policy. However, excess data open was concerning  
 94 in the privacy protection domain. Since data mining  
 95 is designed to look for patterns and valuable infor-  
 96 mation from data that may reveal sensitive personal  
 97 information, in turn, this may cause high-risk secu-  
 98 rity issues for trust in vehicular communication.

99 Mostly, researchers use heuristic and metaheuristic  
 100 approaches to sanitize sensitive information. Here,  
 101 we present the idea of using the PPDM issue with  
 102 deep reinforcement learning (Q-learning model [4]).  
 103 The proposed model takes the input states and pre-  
 104 dicts the actions. An advantage of this approach  
 105 is adjusting to fewer parameters and hiding sensi-  
 106 tive information by keeping the utility. The Q-learn-  
 107 ing model helps in the prediction process and can  
 108 achieve good generalizations. Our model discovers  
 109 instances dynamically and perturbs them to hide  
 110 information successfully without predefined rules. Also,  
 111 it dynamically maintained the utility of the data.  
 112

## 113 II. RELATED WORK

114 Security and privacy issues have been considered  
 115 a vital research area [5] with exponential data gen-  
 116 eration. The model-like  $l$ -diversity and  $k$ -anonymity  
 117 in data streams are utilized to make the process  
 118 anonymized [6]. The standard  $K$ -means algorithm  
 119 is used in the data privacy and sanitization process  
 120 [7]. The encryption and data utility is improved  
 121 with the proposed model [7]. These are a standard  
 122 method that is used in the fields of machine learning  
 123 (ML) as well as data mining. In a wireless medium,  
 124 network threats and attacks used radio commu-  
 125 nication broadcast technology in VANETs. This  
 126 data over wireless communication mediums must  
 127 be secure, or it can lead to unnecessary attention  
 128 for adversaries.

129 Private information of the user's vehicle must  
 130 be protected from the exchange of information in  
 131 vehicular nodes. Moreover, the control authorities  
 132 should preserve the driver's privacy while keeping  
 133 private identity [3]. Privacy concerning vehicular  
 134 networks should be a key component in VANETs.  
 135 Both forged and adversarial information broad-  
 136 casted in unknown vehicles may result in severe  
 137 repercussions for drivers and pedestrian well-being.  
 138 On the flip side, if a trustworthy safety message  
 139 may also be sent using adversarial information  
 140 using a component in a VANET, it causes delayed  
 141 and modified information. As a result, human lives  
 142 have server consequences. This means the security-  
 143 related legitimate and accurate information also  
 144 required the same security level over VANETs [3].

### 145 III. VANETS AND DATA SANITIZATION

146 To enable the communication for service and  
 147 application, VANETs include the application unit  
 148 (A.U.), onboard unit (OBU), and the roadside unit  
 149 (RSU). These RSU units are connected over the  
 150 Internet for services providing tasks. The applica-  
 151 tion units following, as shown in Fig. 1 are the  
 152 fundamental components of VANETs with a brief  
 153 description of each: The application units use an  
 154 application and handle the networking issues. The  
 155 A.U. coupled with OBU and communicate over  
 156 the wireless medium. The application can control  
 157 OBU [3]. The OBU helps connect the network  
 158 components among OBUs and RSUs in VANET  
 159 architecture using the IEEE 802.11p radio tech-  
 160 nology. Mainly OBU consists of different sensors  
 161 (i.e., wireless communication element), a central  
 162 control module (CCM), and an interface compo-  
 163 nent. The CCM provides the user interface to do  
 164 a resource command process (RCP) and contains  
 165 the memory to read and write operations using  
 166 the transceiver. Sensors data are usually processed  
 167 using the OBU; the proposed model is also de-  
 168 ployed here to hide the sensitive information. OBU  
 169 also provides the vehicles' geographical location,  
 170 Ad Hoc routing, data security, network congestion  
 171 control mechanism, message dissemination, and  
 172 I.P. mobility. The RSU is the fixed infrastructure  
 173 located on the road and provide wireless access  
 174 in vehicular environments (WAVE) or dedicated  
 175 short-range communications (DSRC) device. It is  
 176 based on the IEEE 802.11p wireless technology  
 177 to enable communications with vehicles on the  
 178 road [3]. The RSU also provides the access point  
 179 (A.P.) in wireless Ad Hoc networks [3]. The RSU  
 180 functionality includes infotainment, traffic status  
 181 sharing, safety message from central authorities  
 182 [8]. It also provides message sharing among OBUs  
 183 to extend communication, function as the gateway  
 184 for OBUs, and act as the data source to pro-  
 185 vide infrastructure-to-vehicle communications. All  
 186 RSUs (within a specific geographical zone) can  
 187 communicate and are interconnected. The trusted  
 188 authority is responsible for controlling TSUs. It  
 189 can process high computations and provide high  
 190 storage capacity. T.A.s aims to authenticate all the  
 191 vehicles and validated security relevant to vehicles  
 192 transmitting false messages. It also verifies digital

signatures and certificates. 193

194 Attackers used the false traffic emergency to  
 195 forge the signals [1]. This miscommunication way  
 196 has successfully become more effective when  
 197 hacker identification has become untraceable [1].  
 198 Therefore, there is a need to improve the security of  
 199 the communication. Data sanitization method was  
 200 introduced [7], where evolutionary-based algorithm  
 201 is utilized by optimization model. The method  
 202 first selects the key utility transaction and then  
 203 clusters them for hiding the sensitive information.  
 204 The rules-based approach is also used for data  
 205 privacy preservation [9]. The model used the  $k$ -  
 206 anonymous imprecise rules to compose the data  
 207 tables. The composed data is then used to protect  
 208 privacy ability. Vehicular sensors data are also used  
 209 for the motor torque based on the model prediction  
 210 [10]. The model is used to close the loop between  
 211 system engineering. The model output is used in  
 212 E-powertrain mounted vehicles. The privacy pre-  
 213 served call data record analysis (CDRA) is also  
 214 performed for the COVID-19 patients to control the  
 215 pandemic [11].

#### 196 A. Problem statement

197 PPDM for VANETs can be seen in Figs. 2  
 198 and 3 that represent the Road Side Units (RSU)  
 199 vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure  
 200 (V2I), and infrastructure-to-infrastructure (I2I), and  
 201 trusted authority (T.A.), respectively. The Intelligent  
 202 Internet of Vehicular Things (IIoVT) network RSU  
 203 and T.A. mentioned in Fig. 2. Both used different  
 204 OBU sensors to create data sent to the PPDM  
 205 algorithm shared via RSU and T.A. mentioned in  
 206 Fig. 2. Once the sanitization process is complete  
 207 and the data is stored, group anonymization is done  
 208 to hide any group information. This article uses a  
 209 Markov Decision Process for the sanitation process  
 210 as given in Fig. 3.

211 We can see the method as proposed in Fig. 3  
 212 and described in Algorithm 1. In step 1, the model  
 213 takes all its arguments as input. Next, the algo-  
 214 rithm extracts all of the F.I.s, or frequent itemsets  
 215  $F_{itemsets} = \{f_1, f_2, \dots, f_k\}$ . The F.I.s need to have  
 216 a support count value that can not be less than the  
 217 min support count value as given in (Algorithm  
 218 1, Line 1). Based on F.I.s, we select 20% of the  
 219 F.I.s for utility and data sanitization. We project

240 each item set to get instances  $Ins_{I.D.}$  from the raw  
 241 original dataset, as shown in (Algorithm 1, Line  
 242 1). Next, we can represent the states as a set of  
 243 instances  $Ins_{I.D.}$  as shown in (Algorithm 1, line  
 244 3). We initialize the  $Q$  table and simultaneously  
 245 set the exploration rate. Randomness is used in the  
 246 model based on the epsilon greedy policy given in  
 247 [12], from this each episode is updated as given  
 248 in (Algorithm 1, Lines 4-6). Action reward  $R$  rep-  
 249 resents change based on the action, State and next  
 250 State (Algorithm 1, Lines 10) and is then calculated  
 251 using a fitness function (Algorithm 1, Lines 7 to  
 252 13).




Fig. 2: VANETs communication with trusted units and others components.

$$\text{fitness}(s) = w_1 \times a + w_2 \times \beta + w_3 \times \delta \quad (1)$$

253 Using Equation (1), state fitness values can be  
 254 found. We only calculate fitness values for deletion  
 255 operations. To update the  $Q$  table, the Bellman  
 256 equation is implemented as shown in (Algorithm 1,  
 257 Lines 12 to 13). Every cycle sees the instance set  
 258 selected using random deletion points. Our model  
 259 gets trained using it and the length of the input  
 260 feature of  $Ins_{I.D.}$ , as well as the action (Delete/Not-  
 261 Delete), next State (if action = Delete), is only  
 262 used for Reinforcement Learning ( $R.L.$ ) as shown  
 263 in (Algorithm 1, Line 13). At episode end, our  
 264 model minimizes fitness value which in turn indi-  
 265 cates that the instance set (sensor data) needs  
 266 deletion for hiding sensitive itemsets as shown in  
 267 (Algorithm 1, Line 16). As mentioned in Fig. 3,  
 268 the training phase is done based on Algorithm 1. In  
 269 a recurrent neural network-based LSTM network -  
 270 one State represents the instances (vehicular sensors

271 data) with two actions (delete or not delete) that  
 272 results in another state is the union of the previous  
 273 and current State. It is noted that both decisions  
 274 lead to different fitness values depending upon the  
 275 set instances when deleted. Then, during privacy  
 276 preservation, Algorithm 1 trained network is used  
 277 for decision-making, leading to the fitness value.  
 278 The fitness value is used to calculate the side  
 279 effects of privacy preservation as mentioned in  
 280 Fig. 3 privacy preservation phase. Upon deletion of  
 281 certain item sets, the data has a specific impact for  
 282 each instance. The impact on each sample can be  
 283 calculated using the fitness function and represents  
 284 the quality of privacy preservation mentioned in  
 285 Equation 1 and Fig. 3 privacy preservation phase.

**State:** Let  $s = [p, h, b]$  : be defined as the set  
 286 of instances  $p \in \mathbb{R}_+^D$ , where we see that cost to  
 287 delete instances  $h \in \mathbb{Z}_+^D$ , as well as the remaining  
 288 instance after the sanitization process, is given as  
 289  $b \in \mathbb{R}_+$ , where  $D$  is the number of instances in  
 290 the projected datasets and  $\mathbb{Z}_+$  denotes non-negative  
 291 integer numbers.  
 292

**Action:** Let there be a set of actions on  $s$  i.e.  
 293 delete/not-delete. If the action is a deletion, then  
 294 and only then can it lead to the union of instance  
 295 in  $s_{t+1}$  and  $s_t$ . If action is not deleted, then the  
 296 union operation is not made. The action will result  
 297 in increasing/decreasing the fitness values as given  
 298 in Equation 1, where  $\alpha$  can be seen as hiding of  
 299 sensitive itemset ratio before/after sanitization, and  
 300  $\beta$  can be defined as the # of F.I.s before/after sani-  
 301 tization. Furthermore, we can say that  $\delta$  is defined as  
 302 the # of F.I.s that are present in sanitized database  
 303  $D'$  and were also previously infrequent in original  
 304 database  $D$ , where we see that  $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_3$ , are  
 305 known to be the relative importance of each side  
 306 effect, which is set at runtime by a user in the range  
 307 of  $[0, 1]$ .  
 308

**Policy:** We define that  $\pi(s)$  : is the method to  
 309 delete/not delete state  $s$ . We give the probability  
 310 distribution of  $a$  at state  $s$  as a policy.  
 311

**Reward:** Let us define  $r(s, a, s')$  as the the  
 312 change in fitness value that can occur only when  
 313 action  $a$  occurs at state  $s$  while arriving at new  
 314 state  $s'$ . In policy, if action is deleted, then and  
 315 only then is the fitness value calculated. If the  
 316 fitness value decreases, then the reward will be 10.  
 317 Otherwise, we set the reward to  $-10$ . The Bellman  
 318




Fig. 3: DSRL framework.

Equation is followed originally given in [12], where action reward  $a_t$  is in expectation  $r(s_t, a_t, s_{t+1})$ . We see that the discounted factor  $\gamma$  is returned only based on assumption. Our method's goal is to minimize fitness value at a given target time  $t_f$ . Our model's Markov property, which optimizes policy minimizing the function  $Q_\pi(s_t, a_t)$ . Using the optimization of fitness value while also considering the interaction with the environment, our policy is learned. A sample table for the State, action, and reward is mentioned in Table I.

TABLE I: A sample table for state, action, reward and fitness value.  $a, b, c, d, e$  represent vehicle sensors data.

States	T_ID	a	b	c	d	e	Action / Policy	Reward	Fitness Value
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	Delete	10	1
2	34	0	1	1	0	1	Delete	10	0.5
3	9	1	1	1	0	1	Delete	10	0.3
4	14	1	0	1	1	0	no Delete	-10	0.3
5	16	0	1	1	0	1	no Delete	-10	0.3

### 330 B. Deep reinforcement learning (DRL)

331 We proposed the LSTM based network, as men-  
 332 tioned in Fig. 3. The architecture input is sensors  
 333 input values, whereas the output is *delete* or *not -*  
 334 *delete*, making a binary classification problem. We  
 335 also proposed a windows-based time stepping. The  
 336 fitness value of the previous State and its predic-  
 337 tion is added as input features. As the vehicular  
 338 communication frequency is very high, we set the  
 339 windows time step to two. Therefore,  $(t+1)$  is used  
 340 with two previous  $(t-1)$  and  $(t-2)$  decision and  
 341 fitness values. In this way, a model can relearn the  
 342 complex patterns and try to achieve generalization  
 343 [13]. Model input is encoded item value, a previous  
 344 decision, and fitness value as the input vector. In

the decoder network, the *Dense* layer is added to  
 produce the output. The rectified linear unit *ReLU*  
 is used as the activation function in encoder and de-  
 coder network as defined as  $f(x) = \max(0, x)$ . To  
 avoid overfitting, the *Dropout* mechanism should  
 be adopted. The *Adam* optimization algorithm is  
 used as an optimizer, which very effective in the  
 training of LSTM.

### Algorithm 1 Deep Sanitization Reinforcement Learning (DSRL)

**INPUT:**  $D$ , OBU dataset, support threshold  $\varepsilon$ , percentage of sensitive itemsets  $P$ , state size  $S$ , episode size  $M$

**OUTPUT:** Minimize fitness value actions.

- 1: Select sensitive itemsets using  $P$  from calculated frequent itemsets based on  $\varepsilon$
- 2: Get the  $T_{ID}$  of the Select sensitive itemsets from  $D$
- 3: Select set  $S$  combination based on randomized set of  $T_{ID}$
- 4: **for**  $episode = 1, M$  **do**
- 5:   Take random decision  $\mathcal{N}$  for action exploration
- 6:   Receive output based  $\mathcal{N}$  on state  $s_1$
- 7:   **for**  $t = 1, S$  **do**
- 8:     Take action based on the  $\mathcal{N}$
- 9:     Execute (action  $a_t$ , observe reward  $r_t$ , state  $s_{t+1}$ )
- 10:      $R \leftarrow$  transition  $(s_t, a_t, r_t, s_{t+1})$
- 11:      $Train_{DRL} \leftarrow$  Input (action  $a_t$ , rewards  $r_t$ )
- 12:     Update Bellman Equation using  $\mathcal{N}$
- 13:     Update  $Train_{DRL}$  (action  $a_t$ )
- 14:   **end for**
- 15: **end for**
- 16: **Return**  $States, action$  and  $fitness_{value}$

## IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIRED OF VANETS

The vehicular network collects different data that includes sensors equipped with healthcare, smart city, and surveillance. Data fragmentation in dynamic VANETs is a challenge for practitioners. In the case studies [14], [15], the number of autonomous vehicles indicates the network breaches

361 through the communication system. Hackers target  
 362 the ECU program and try to compromise the ve-  
 363 hicle networks. As a result, the vehicle behaves  
 364 abnormally. This leads to solid communication  
 365 network security measures including intrusion de-  
 366 tection systems at the vehicle. Privacy preserved  
 367 method is considered for sensors communication,  
 368 frequent log reviews of mobile application and  
 369 servers [14]. If any vulnerability is detected, then  
 370 the vehicle owner and manufacture should be in-  
 371 formed before the attack. We proposed a data san-  
 372 itization process for VANETS component OBUs.  
 373 The function only shares limited data with other  
 374 components attached wirelessly. The deep learning  
 375 method is adopted to improve and learn patterns  
 376 of the sensors. We attempt to demonstrate that the  
 377 DQRL model can be sufficient to hide private infor-  
 378 mation while communicating. Sensitive information  
 379 can be removed on certain public data points by  
 380 using the sanitization process. The framework can  
 381 help users who want to hide information especially  
 382 for private events. The VANETs are equipped with  
 383 multiple sensors to read the data from the tem-  
 384 perature, humidity, camera, accelerometer sensors,  
 385 ultrasonic, proximity, and gas. These sensor values  
 386 are instrumental for a smart city to evaluate and  
 387 improve the transportation system. However, while  
 388 collecting the sensors points, private information is  
 389 also being processed to be vulnerable to the users.

390 **Data Safety:** Safety of the data among commu-  
 391 nication in public wireless connection is essentials.  
 392 Correct and on-time message delivery can be safe  
 393 and causes fatalities if the malicious nodes injecting  
 394 adversarial models result in misinformation. The  
 395 data security and privacy requirements highlight  
 396 this research that can be reduced using the proposed  
 397 model. Failure of the requirement can cause vulner-  
 398 abilities in VANETs. A proposed model can satisfy  
 399 security and privacy issues in VANET. **Integrity**  
 400 **and Data Trust:** The data communicated between  
 401 two parties should not be altered [3]. The content  
 402 should be non-modified and dropped [3]. Integrity  
 403 is violated when data is modified [3]. Detection  
 404 of such a mechanism should be adopted. **Authen-**  
 405 **tication and Identification:** All connected nodes  
 406 must be authenticated to ensure protected data  
 407 transfer. The unauthorized access must be blocked  
 408 to secure node communication and messages. Also,

the identity of the user should be preserved using 409  
 the proposed model. Therefore, a malicious node 410  
 prevented to be duplicating the identity of a genuine 411  
 node. Upon compromise, the malicious node might 412  
 delete the warning message; thus, the driver might 413  
 not respond according to instructions. Like Sybil 414  
 attack, the attack can be prevented by using the 415  
 unique I.D. mechanism [8]. Legal forensic evidence 416  
 to law enforcement agencies requires a strong au- 417  
 thentication process to avoid any adversarial attacks 418  
 [8]. The only vehicular node that authenticated 419  
 and authorized vehicles should access RSUs and 420  
 benefit from services the VANET [8]. **Availabil-** 421  
**ity:** The vehicular nodes should send and receive 422  
 messages even in an attack such as a D/DoS or 423  
 jamming attack [3] or under any malicious activity 424  
 [8]. For example, in a specific area, the server 425  
 cannot communicate in a very congested area due 426  
 to attacks. Availability required high bandwidth and 427  
 connectivity. The importance of availability arises 428  
 when some messages are delayed and not transmit- 429  
 ted in real-time. As a result, messages lose their 430  
 values (e.g., message about road conditions) and 431  
 might even be harmful (e.g., hazardous reporting 432  
 message) to the users in the network [8]. **Privacy** 433  
**and Confidentiality:** Vehicular and driver privacy 434  
 must be preserved even when the liable connection 435  
 is available. The proposed helpful model removed 436  
 the identity of the person to avoid identity theft 437  
 issues. The actual identity of the driver, vehicle, and 438  
 location should always be preserved. Only official 439  
 authorities can see the drivers and vehicle identity. 440

**Suggestions for Sanitization method:** During 441  
 sanitization progress, vehicular node data scala- 442  
 bility analysis should be done and information 443  
 required to be shared. Vehicle sensors data rela- 444  
 tionships within the vehicle. The dimension size 445  
 analysis (Number of sensors) should be performed 446  
 concerning the number of instances (sensors rate 447  
 of data). The modality analysis should also be 448  
 performed to analyze the model distribution. Out- 449  
 liers often decrease model performance [16]. The 450  
 noise and contamination (anomalies) analysis is 451  
 required to be considered [16]. The unbalanced 452  
 data distribution for DSRL results in underper- 453  
 formance. In particular, the following suggestions 454  
 should be considered. **Problem identification:** For 455  
 the VANETs application, the machine learning en- 456

457 gineer should identify the problem to be solved with  
 458 the sanitization process. **Client instrumentation:**  
 459 Some applications cache the vehicular sensors data  
 460 for the model's prediction. Data instrumentation  
 461 should be done for the interaction of the network.  
 462 **Simulation prototyping:** The model architecture  
 463 and hyper tuning should be tested using the valid  
 464 tested data [16]. The purpose is to carefully monitor  
 465 data distribution drift and its performance in the  
 466 simulated online production system. **Deep learn-**  
 467 **ing model training:** Different architectures should  
 468 be trained and tested to check adversarial attack  
 469 compatibility. The model should be optimized, and  
 470 hyper-tuned [16]. **Model evaluation:** The model  
 471 should be trained and tested under different tests  
 472 case. **Deployment:** For the deployment, the best  
 473 model configuration should be selected.

#### 474 V. CONCLUSION

475 We proposed a data sanitization model to hide  
 476 sensitive information. Our model can analyze the  
 477 OBU sensors and hide them using the RL method.  
 478 The method can adopt concerning the fitness func-  
 479 tion and gets the feedback reply integration method  
 480 to correct the wrong decision making. The time  
 481 series's additional features can also be employed,  
 482 including uncertainty, utility, frequency, and co-  
 483 occurrence.

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