



**Funding Classical Music: A Comparison of Norwegian
Public Policy and Practitioner Perspectives**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines ways in which public funding of the classical music sector is legitimised by the Norwegian public sector and by classical music practitioners working in Norway. The thesis examines public policy documents issued by public authorities on the three levels of government in Norway, and the funding rationales that are expressed in these. With regards to the practitioner perspective, the thesis is informed by 37 in-depth semi-structured interviews of classical music practitioners.

The thesis contributes to knowledge within the research area of cultural policy studies in three different ways. First, the thesis provides a new way of categorising funding rationales for the arts. This categorisation is built on a systematic review of the empirical material used in the thesis, and it is informed by formal requirements of typologies. The thesis finds that the funding is underpinned by three forms of rationales: Equality, collective well-being and the intrinsic value of art.

Secondly, the thesis contributes to knowledge about the relationship between public funding rationales for the classical music sector that are expressed by practitioners and by the Norwegian public sector, respectively. The rationales expressed by practitioners and public authorities are compared within the structure of a thematic analysis. The main themes of this analysis are the three aforementioned rationales: Equality, collective well-being and the intrinsic value of art. The interviewees generally expressed a stronger preference for the equality rationale, and a more spiritual conception of the intrinsic value of art, than the Norwegian public sector. On the other hand, the creative economy rationale, which is considered an important rationale by the Norwegian public sector for the promotion of collective well-being, was considered less relevant by the interviewees.

Thirdly, the thesis discusses possible interpretations of the viewpoints expressed by the interviewees and by the public sector. More specifically, the thesis discusses possible ways of understanding how some general worldviews might inform the interviewees' ways of legitimising public funding of the sector within which they are employed, and possible ways of understanding why the interviewees emphasised other public funding rationales than the Norwegian public sector does.

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That said, the responsibility for the thesis is entirely my own.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACN	Arts Council Norway
AP	Arctic Philharmonic
BPO	The Bergen Philharmonic Orchestra
BP	Budget proposal
CP	Cultural plan
GD	Government declaration
NBC	The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation
NNOB	The National Norwegian Opera and Ballet
OPO	The Oslo Philharmonic Orchestra
MC	The Ministry of Culture ¹
WP	White paper

1 INTRODUCTION

A paradox is inherent in the classical music sector.² On the one hand, there is the craftsmanship. It requires uncountable hours of practice to play like they do in the Oslo Philharmonic. On the other hand, there is vision and political passion. As one of the interviewees in this study put it, “[the politicians] should trust us, [because] we are extremely knowledgeable”. Without projecting too much into this quote, we might interpret it along these lines: “Just make sure our orchestra is well-funded by the public sector. We will know ourselves how to spend the money wisely”.

Estlund has formulated the rule of “knowers”, or epistocrats, in the following way:

If some political outcomes count as better than others, then surely some citizens are better (if only less bad) than others with regard to their wisdom and good faith in promoting the better outcomes. If so, this looks like an important reason to leave the decisions up to them. For the purposes of this essay, call them the knowers, or the wise; the form of government in which they rule might be called epistocracy, and rulers called epistocrats based on the Greek word *epistêmê*, meaning knowledge. (Estlund 2003, p. 53)

Not all practitioners in the classical music sector think of themselves as epistocrats. Many of them prefer to think of themselves primarily as craftsmen. As another interviewee warned: “Do not forget the craftsmanship in all this”. Most of them will agree that the expertise and wisdoms of classical musicians should *inform* cultural policy for the classical music sector, in one way or another. But the wisdoms of the artist are often intangible. As Kemp has pointed out, in the case of classical music, “(...) musicians often conceal the very thing that motivates them most highly, thus obscuring their *raison d’être* and rendering them somewhat enigmatic to others (...)” (Kemp 1996, p. 84).

The thesis examines the relationship between the views held by a core artist group, classical musicians, and the views expressed by the public sector, on the three different levels of government in Norway, when it comes to rationales for public funding of classical music.

Artists are an important stakeholder group within cultural policy (Throsby 2010, p. 23), and knowledge about the views of artists is valuable in the study of cultural policy rationales. Still, as Daniel observes: “(...) while there is a substantive body of literature relevant to the nature of policy-making as applied to the arts, research that explores the views of practitioners at the grass roots level is limited” (Daniel 2014a, p. 553). Woodis has made similar remarks: (...) “research in the cultural policy field is missing some useful and interesting discussions in largely omitting practitioners from its gaze” (Woddis 2013, p. 509). This thesis aims to make a contribution in this regard.

The thesis is informed by several disciplines within the social sciences, but it relies primarily on concepts from economics and sociology. The aim of the thesis is to contribute to *cultural policy studies*, which is a research area that is “heterogeneous and multidisciplinary” (Mangset 2010a, p. 48).³ In this introductory chapter, I first outline the research questions, the research design and methodology. I then briefly discuss the institutional context of the classical music sector in Norway. The classical music sector in Norway is heavily institutionalised. Having a grasp of the institutional landscape is therefore advantageous for the overall understanding of the sector. Finally, I present the basic economic and legal context of the Norwegian case.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions in this thesis are as follows:

- 1) Which public funding rationales are emphasised in Norway, by public authorities and classical music practitioners, respectively?
- 2) How should we *interpret* the differences between authorities and classical music practitioners, with regards to emphasised rationales?

Research questions is a somewhat neglected but important aspect of research. As White points out: “Few journals in the social sciences require authors to explicitly state their research questions and it is possible to finish reading an article without having a clear idea of the questions the researchers were trying to address” (White 2013, p. 215). Andrews has stated that research questions tend to “derive from contexts, or in response to a situation” (Andrews

2003, p. 5). The research question in this thesis is derived from such a context, namely the claim that some contemporary societal tendencies point towards an “end of cultural policy”, in its current form, in many European countries. This dramatic claim has been formulated in the following way:

1) it is not obvious that a sectorial cultural policy will persist in the future, 2) public cultural policy is facing legitimization crises in some countries, and 3) there is a need for further discussions on the rationales for public cultural policy. (Mangset 2018, p. 11)

Mangset further maintains that there are indications that cultural policy is failing to reach some of its main objectives.⁴ Mangset also explains that if the *aims* identified in cultural policy are not achieved, then public financing might become hard to defend. In other words, “a cultural policy regime that consistently fails to achieve its main objectives may, sooner or later, be exposed to a legitimization crisis” (Mangset 2018, p. 11). This problem is worsened by difficulties related to the formulation of policy aims in succinct visions (Røyseng 2004, p. 101).

As Kleppe *et al.* (2018) observe: “Globalisation has reached the field of music with full power (...)” (Kleppe *et al.* 2018, p. 66). Moreover, it is not obvious which roles European cultural expressions such as classical music should play in a globalised world (Mangset 2018, p. 6). Mangset therefore concludes that “there is a need for further discussions on the rationales for public cultural policy” (Mangset 2018, p. 11). This applies particularly to arts sectors such as the classical music sector. As Mangset observes, already Bowen and Baumol (1966) asked if live performances should not be considered “(...) an obsolete vestige of a handicraft economy” (Baumol and Bowen 1966, p. 377, Mangset 2018, p. 4).

Some researchers claim that policies for arts and culture are fragile. Gray claims that there are “endogenous weaknesses of these policy sectors in comparison with others” (Gray 2007, p. 211). According to Gray, cultural policy is therefore inclined to take a *contributory* position in comparison with sectors that are structurally stronger, such as urban development and social inclusion (Ibid.). Moreover, as Belfiore and Bennett put it:

(...) the arts occupy a particularly fragile position in public policy, on account of the fact that the claims made for them, especially those relating to their transformative power, are extremely hard to substantiate. (Belfiore and Bennett 2008, p. 5)

In addition, the arts face political-ideological opposition to cultural funding from political parties on the political right, and this also applies to the Scandinavian countries (Hylland 2011, Lindsköld 2015). There is therefore a need for research on legitimation of public funding of the arts, including the classical music sector.

The context described above is a motivating factor for the thesis. Moreover, in addition to the policy perspective, this thesis also takes the artist perspective into account. In the discussion on rationales requested by Mangset, artists have a natural place, due to their position as a *core stakeholder group* in cultural policy (Throsby 2010, p. 23). That is why the main research question in this thesis focuses on the views among artists on cultural policy, and how their way of valuing the arts compares with the way that the value of the arts is described in cultural policy documents.

As mentioned, there is limited knowledge about policy views in the artist sectors on *grass roots* level. Formally, artist organisations participate in policy making processes. In Norway, organisations such as *Creo*⁵ regularly comment on political issues (e.g. Creo 2018a, Creo 2018b), and these artist organisations are also regularly invited to participate formally in the policy making processes. Several research projects have been conducted on policy views held by cultural *elites* in Scandinavia (e.g. Røyseng 2006, Bjørnsen 2009, Johannisson 2006, Larsen 2016). Still, as Daniel (2014a) points out, more knowledge is needed on policy views on the grass roots level among artists. Some Norwegian grass roots level studies exist (e.g. Stavrum 2014a, Haugsevje and Christensen 2015), but these are rarely concerned with the *classical* music sector, which is the most powerful music sector in terms of public funding (e.g. Ministry of Culture 2017, Ministry of Culture 2018d).

Questions examining rationales can in principle be narrowly or broadly formulated. One might focus on *one* specific rationale for public funding of culture, or one might study rationales from an open perspective. Examples of the former include Bjurström and Hylland's study of *Bildung* as a rationale in Norwegian music policy (Bjurström and Hylland 2018), and Duelund's study of Nation building as a cultural policy rationale in the Nordic countries

(Duelund 2009). Open and comparative studies include Bennett's study of rationales in the UK (Bennett 1995). Correspondingly, the *stakeholder* perspective can in principle also be narrow or broad. One might study how rationales are viewed by a large number of stakeholder groups, such as artists, politicians, civil servants, political parties, audiences, cultural institutions, workers' institutions, the media etc, or one might study *selected* stakeholder groups and their values and opinions (e.g. Nijzink *et al.* 2017, Daniel 2014b).

In the analyses I took a *broad and open* perspective with regards to rationales, in the sense that I did not identify *a priori* which public funding rationales the thesis should explore. The rationales that I identified in the analyses were surely informed by preconceptions of cultural policy, but they were still largely data driven. On the other hand, I took a *narrow* perspective with regards to stakeholder group, by focusing on the classical music sector. This narrow perspective was primarily based on the centrality and importance of the classical music sector in cultural policy, but it was also induced by the necessity to limit the investigative focus. Hence, I refer *explicitly* to classical music practitioners in the research questions, as the identified stakeholder group.

Agee suggests that researchers should “avoid leading questions based on assumptions or a particular world view” (Agee 2009, p. 444). Both the *formulations* of research questions and the *research process* should be open. Correspondingly, Belfiore argues for cultural policy research that is genuinely explorative (Belfiore 2009, p. 354). This should also include “genuinely open-ended research questions” (Arnestad 2010, p. 111). According to this research strategy, research questions should be formulated in such a way that the reader is left with no doubts that the research process itself has been open. The reader, after having read the research question, should be certain that the researcher has in principle been open for all possible research results. I tried to keep not only the *research process* open to any result, but also to keep the *formulation* of the research questions themselves as open as possible.⁶

1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

I distinguish between methodology and methods. Kothari defines methodology as “a way to systematically solve the research problem” (Kothari 2004, p. 8). In other words, methodology involves the overall research strategy from the beginning to the end of the research process. By contrast, research methods are “those methods/techniques that are used for conduction of research” (Ibid., p. 7). Tennis makes a similar distinction:

Methodology is the combination of epistemic stance and the methods of investigation. Methods of investigation, what I will call techniques, form a practice that carries with it the knowledge needed to have a result faithful to the chosen epistemology. (Tennis 2008, p. 107)

In other words, research methods are *components* of methodology, but not the only components. With regards to techniques and methodological choices, I examine these in Chapter 3. But since methodology is concerned with the *overall* process of inquiry, it is necessary to reflect on methodology already in this introductory chapter. Methods and methodology are inextricably connected, however. Some choices of research methods also involve methodological choices. For example, a choice of *grounded theory* as method not only involves choices of *techniques*, but also involves a choice of *methodology*, i.e., the choice has consequences for the whole research process. Correspondingly, studies that rely on selected *a priori* theoretical systems might be influenced by these systems not only in terms of *techniques*, but on the methodological level as well. Therefore, some of the reflections on methodology in this introductory chapter will be further addressed in Chapter 3.

Cultural policy literature in Norway is well-developed, from a historical and theoretical point of view. On the other hand, the literature addressing artists' views on cultural policy, is limited, both in Norway and internationally. In such a case, where prior knowledge is limited, the most productive strategy is often to use *emergent* methods. This is why I have used thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998, Braun and Clarke 2006, Maguire and Delahunt 2017), which allows for emergence of themes. Still, the thesis is also informed by previous conceptions of public funding rationales. The choice of a pragmatic emergent

method has consequences for the methodology and structure of the thesis, and I will illustrate this by contrasting the methodology with grounded theory on the one hand, and theory-driven studies on the other.

Within the type of emergent method that is arguably the most *principled* of them all, grounded theory, researchers are advised to deliberately abstain from evaluations of the literature, *before* a research project is conducted. The empirical material is thereby incumbent in the structuring of the process and the publication (Dunne 2011). But grounded theory has rarely been used in the study of cultural policy. One of the reasons for this might be that grounded theory projects *a priori* search for a *main concern* (Glaser 1965, Glaser and Strauss 1967). What this means, is that grounded theory assumes that it should be possible to formulate the conclusion of a research project in the form a *main concern*. But from our knowledge about the complexities that surround cultural policy, and the contemporary role of artists, it does not seem *a priori* clear that it is indeed possible to formulate a conclusion in the form of a *main concern*. In addition, there is also another problem with grounded theory, in that studies based on grounded theory tend to avoid *a priori* defined research questions (Bryman 2007, p. 6). In this research project, the research questions were formulated from the very start of the project.⁷

Conversely, in studies that are primarily informed by *a priori* use of highly abstract theory, it is difficult for the researcher to assess the relevance of the theory to the research questions asked. In some cases of grand theories, it is, as Bryman has pointed out, “difficult to make the necessary links with the real world” (Bryman 2012, p. 21). That is a problem. Notably, in cultural policy studies, researchers commonly use approaches that are close to real world experiences. As a subdiscipline, cultural policy studies is not only concerned with abstract concepts. It is also frequently motivated by a curiosity about policy making in a more practical and empirical sense.⁸

The thesis is structured around the two research questions. Chapter 4 addresses research question 1, and Chapter 5 addresses research question 2. With regards to research question 1, I use thematic analysis, because thematic analysis allows for a more *flexible* emergent approach than grounded theory, and because it allows results to be presented with

clear empirical references. As Braun and Clarke point out: “Through its theoretical freedom, thematic analysis provides a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data” (Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 78). What this means, is that the researcher does not need to fully accept the theoretical underpinnings of grounded theory. Thematic analysis relies on induction, but the method does not require the research results to be presented as one specific *main concern*, which is the goal in grounded theory. In addition, the researcher does not have to accept one or more grand theoretical systems or concepts as *a priori* relevant to the research questions that are addressed. Thus, the thematic analysis approach (Boyatzis 1998, Braun and Clarke 2006) provides us with theoretical flexibility.

When it comes to the role of theory in analysis, Gray has pointed out the following:

Unless analysts are working from a purely inductive perspective (if such a thing were possible), their work will always be underpinned by a range of theoretical assumptions that will structure the questions that will be asked, how they will be asked and the shape of analysis that would be required to answer them. (Gray 2010, p. 217)

Gray further maintains:

The extent to which induction actually escapes from an underlying theoretical basis can be debated and whether the ‘facts’ can simply speak for themselves has yet to be convincingly demonstrated. (Ibid., p. 227).

This means that it is not possible to conduct research in a way that is “purely” inductive. Research requires an *active* researcher. The empirical analysis never starts from a *ground zero*. As Dey has put it, there is a “difference between an open mind and an empty head” (Dey 1999, p. 251). I therefore discuss some of the most *fundamental* aspects of cultural policy and the artist views in Chapter 2. These are preconceptions that many cultural policy researchers will relate to. Still, some theoretical concepts are introduced *a posteriori*, during the analyses themselves.

In addition to the strategy of using thematic analysis, I also take a *comparative* approach. In order to get an understanding of the viewpoints presented by artists in the study, these views are contrasted and compared with viewpoints embedded in cultural policy. I examine the ways in which cultural policy is currently described by Norwegian authorities

on the three levels of government. This comparative approach allows us to understand artists' views on cultural policy, and it allows us to find new ways of interpreting cultural policy itself. When it comes to research question 2, I address this question through conceptualisations and abductions.

1.3 INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Within cultural policy studies, the rationales behind public funding of the arts are often identified in *general* terms. This means that they apply to arts institutions *across* the spectrum of artistic activity. Consequently, as Belfiore and Bennett (2007a; 2009) have both observed and criticised, societal benefits from *different* forms of art are often perceived, from the view of political authorities, to be *commensurable*.

Still, the various sectors vary considerably, in terms of how artistic production is organised. One of the characteristics of the classical music sector, is the relatively prominent role that is played by major *institutions*. We might say, with Becker (1982), that although individual composers and soloists contribute significantly to the sector, the classical music art worlds are dominated by *collectives*. An extensive overview over these collectives is not possible within the confines of this thesis, but I will provide a brief overview of some major institutions within the classical music sector in Norway.

From a public funding perspective, broadly speaking, the most prominent institutions within the classical music sector in Norway are the Norwegian National Opera and Ballet (NNOB) and the seven professional symphony orchestras, one of which is institutionally integrated in the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), the public service broadcaster in Norway. The predecessors for these institutions were the music societies that were established in the late 18th and early 19th centuries by businessmen who were able to import classical music culture from the European continent to Norway. These music societies were generally closed. The performances were mainly for the members, although a few performances were also made available for the general public (Dahl and Helseth 2006, pp. 19–20). Many of the musicians and singers were amateurs from the bourgeoisie, but some were professional city musicians, employed by the public sector, or they were travelling

independent virtuosos making a living as soloists. The societies gave priority to *contemporary* classical music works, while music from earlier times was considered out of fashion (Edwards *et al.* 2001, pp. 335–348).

Notably, when the music societies were established, they were not *professional*. There is an important distinction between *institutionalisation* of the classical music sector, and *professionalisation* of the same sector. For example, The Bergen Philharmonic (BPO) has identified 1765 as its inception year (Edwards *et al.* 2001, p. 233), while The Oslo Philharmonic (OPO) was formally founded as late as in 1919 (Johnson and Levin 1994, p. 25). For an external observer, this might seem peculiar. But in terms of professionalism, the orchestra that was founded in Oslo in 1919 was a completely different form of institution than the one that was established formally in Bergen more than 150 years earlier. During the 19th century, even the leading higher music education institutions in Europe consisted of a mixture of students, where only some of them aspired to professional careers, while many considered themselves amateurs (Weber 2000). Correspondingly, the main Norwegian orchestras only gradually developed into professional institutions during the 19th century, with a clearer distinction between amateurs and professionals (Dahl and Helseth 2006, p. 113). This reminds us that even though an orchestra such as BPO has a long formal institutional history, its history as a *professional* institution is much shorter. Another fact worth noticing is that even though both of these orchestras are presently officially considered *equal*, in the sense that they are both defined as *national* cultural institutions (e.g. Ministry of Culture 2018d, p. 72), OPO has since its formal inception been *de facto* defined as the *primary* symphony orchestra in the country, measured by national funding. Consequently, OPO has arguably played a role as one of the most prominent orchestras in Europe during the recent decades. The institutional status as a national orchestra might be symbolically important. But it is the public funding that *emanates* from this national status that allows the orchestra to repeatedly conquer the international classical music scene.

Bureaucratically speaking, there is a blurry line between the classical music sector and sectors such as theatre and dance. In the national budget proposals, orchestras and theatres are institutionally classified under the category of *Music and performing arts* (Ministry of

Culture 2018d, pp. 70–76), although theatres and music institutions clearly produce forms of aesthetic material that differ significantly from each other. What these institutions have in common, though, is that their core activity is *live performances*. Moreover, in recent years, some of the orchestras have become more ambitious within the areas of choir music and opera. For example, in Trondheim, the local orchestra's name was changed in 2018, from *Trondheim Symphony Orchestra* to *The Trondheim Symphony Orchestra and Opera* (Ministry of Culture 2018d, p. 73). Consequently, the term *music and performing arts* fits well to describe its activity, as an institution that does not only perform *instrumental* music.⁹

The opera scene in Norway is dominated by NNOB, which has a national mandate. It has a professional opera choir with around forty-five singers, a dedicated orchestra with around one hundred musicians, and a dance ensemble. In addition to NNOB, there are ten regional and district operas throughout the country, some of which are connected to the symphony orchestras, while others are independent. They constitute a heterogeneous category of institutions that include limited companies, foundations and cooperatives (Berge *et al.* 2016, p. 20). Most of these are funded both by the state and by their respective counties and municipalities. In addition, with regards to the vocal music scene, professional voice ensembles such as The Norwegian Soloists' Choir and The Edvard Grieg Choir are also supported by the state.

The church is an important institution for the classical music sector. Although the Norwegian church is institutionally independent, it is still supported by the state, represented by the Ministry of Culture (Plesner 2017, p. 22). One of the benefits of this support, is the ability of the church to employ church musicians across the country. Church musicians work as organ players during ceremonies, and conductors of local amateur choirs, and thus form a significant part of classical music life in many communities. According to Stavrum (2015), there are more than 900 church musicians working around the country, and the many churches and organs constitute significant performance resources. Stavrum has also estimated that annual state support to church music far exceeds the state support to OPO (Stavrum 2015, pp. 180–181). Much of the repertoire that is performed by church musicians through organs and choirs can reasonably be considered *classical* music.

Counties and municipalities also support classical music institutions on an annual basis. While the state significantly funds symphony orchestras in regional centres such as Bodø, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Tromsø and Trondheim, counties and municipalities supplement the state funding. In addition, some regions and municipalities employ district musicians, who form ensembles, and who often have both performance and teaching responsibilities in local cultural schools as part of their positions. The financing of these ensembles is predominantly regional. In the special case of Northern Norway, the regional musicians are funded according to a model where the state covers 75 per cent and the region covers 25 per cent of the expenses (Ministry of Culture 2018d, p. 71).

Finally, the music academies around the country are important producers of concerts for the general public. Their main aim is to educate musicians, and they are thus not funded by the Ministry of Culture, but by the Ministry of Education and Research (2003, p. 367). The Norwegian Academy of Music in Oslo dominates the landscape of higher music institutions, and the academy regularly offers student concerts that are open to the general public. Student concerts are also offered by the other educational institutions, most notably by the universities in Bergen, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Trondheim and Tromsø, and by Barrat Due Institute of Music and Oslo Academy of Arts in Oslo. The latter is currently the only institution that offers dedicated opera education.

In conclusion, the Norwegian classical music sector is heavily institutionalised. A person who is enrolled into a municipal cultural school at an early age might continue in a specialised music high school, then audition for higher music education, and subsequently audition for a position as an orchestral musician, choir singer or district musician. One result of the public funding of such a strong institutional landscape, is that the labour market for classical musicians is significantly more stable than for other groups of artists (Mangset 2004, Arnesen *et al.* 2014).¹⁰

1.4 ECONOMIC CONTEXT

It is easier to legitimise public spending on culture in times when there are available funds for the public sector to spend. Norway currently finds itself in a privileged financial situation,

compared to many other European countries. Most notably, Norway has *The Government Pension Fund Global*, which has mainly been built up by incomes from the petroleum sector during the recent decades. The Parliament has decided that the expected real return from the fund can be spent by the state (Ministry of Finance 2001, p. 7). There are no specific sectorial restrictions. The funds can be spent on the arts, or they can be spent on other areas, depending on the continuous priorities of elected state level politicians.

However, the fact that funds are *available*, is rarely accepted by the general public as a valid argument for public funding of the arts, in and of itself. As Røyseng (2004, p. 101) points out, few ministers of culture in Norway have been able to escape criticism for lacking a cultural political vision.

Some recent media examples illustrate the point that Røyseng makes. Three weeks before the general election in Norway in 2017, a journalist criticised the minister of culture for lacking a plan and a vision for arts and culture. The critique was presented in a debate broadcasted on radio and TV by the NBC:

(...) But cultural policy is about so much more, or it should be about so much more than the *financing* of cultural life. And it is here that I miss a *why*. (...) why it is the case that we have a state financed culture, at least in part, in Norway, if we do not also think that it should be used for something, that it should enrich our debates and that cultural life can be invited to participate in a larger discussion about where Norway is going and what we are doing (...) Look in your own ministry (...) to cultural life. They [workers in the cultural sector] represent the best that we have of Norwegian values (...) I miss a minister of culture, but also other cultural politicians, by all means, who want to be part of the somewhat scary debate of putting into words what we want with an active cultural life and what we hope to achieve with it (...). Culture is not something that we have, culture is something that we must *want to have*. And I miss a will and a real cultural policy. And a word that I rarely use, but which I need now (...) I actually miss a vision. (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation 2017)

Clearly, politicians and their voters *do* have reasons for funding arts and culture through public budgets. If they had no such reasons, they would not have chosen to fund arts and culture in the first place. But as demonstrated by the quote above, *financing* is not in itself accepted as a form of *legitimation*. The quote is an example of the claim that politicians with responsibility for the cultural sector should look to cultural life for ways of legitimising cultural policy. When it is claimed that *the best of Norwegian values* can be found in *cultural*

life, this can be interpreted as a suggestion that the values from cultural life should be used in practical cultural policy. In other words, according to the quoted journalist, politicians should consult artists in the policy-making process.

A related example is a newspaper article from 2015 in which a representative for the Socialist Left Party suggested that cultural policy should become more *content*-oriented, and less money-oriented:

We should present a program before the election that not only concentrates on higher grants, but which also contains new and different ideas. A new direction can also, in a better way, legitimise the fact that we spend more money. (Aftenposten 2015)

One of the backgrounds for this statement was that the center-left coalition that governed the country between 2005 and 2013, had significantly increased cultural spending (Arnestad 2012a, 2012b). In the underpinning political program, increased cultural *spending* had been defined as a political aim in itself, with the declaration that at least one per cent of the national budget should be spent on culture (Government declaration 2005, p. 61, Government declaration 2009, p. 62). One interpretation of this form of policy formulation is that it reflects a *sedimentary* form of budget growth, where principled and ideological decisions are avoided, and where an incremental strengthening of existing institutions and measures are preferred. There is no strong vision. Henningsen observes a tendency where cultural policy “does not develop through transformations of existing measures and structures, but by a slow rise over time” (Henningsen 2015, p. 39).

This interpretation of recent cultural policy as *sedimentary*, is also partially supported in *The Culture Report*, a large report submitted by an expert committee to the Ministry of Culture (MC) in 2013, and in which two major developments were identified. Firstly, the report concluded that national music policy after 2005 had concentrated on the continuation of a long-term strategy to build and strengthen the *large* national and regional orchestral institutions. Hence, it was concluded that cultural policy after 2005 to a large extent was characterised by doing *more of the same*, although with *more money* (Ministry of Culture 2013, p. 225). Secondly, and in parallel with this *sedimentary* development, the report

observed that the recent decades had shown a considerable increase in the political legitimacy and funding of *popular* forms of music (Ibid.).

This popular music legitimacy was demonstrated in 2008, when the ministry published a dedicated white paper (WP) on what they called “rhythmic music” (Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs 2008).¹¹ An equivalent dedicated WP for the *classical* music sector has never been published in Norway. But the sedimentary development that Henningsen points to, and the overall Norwegian privileged financial situation, seems to have allowed the classical music sector to grow steadily in public budgets, *in parallel* with the increase in the cultural significance of the popular music sector. Hence, it has seemingly not been considered necessary for the classical music sector to engage in controversial debates around the musical-aesthetic content that is *de facto* being supported by the public sector through funding of classical music institutions. Their public funding has not been threatened by the political rise of the popular music sector. However, as Vestheim (2004, p. 98) concludes, it is “hard to imagine a cultural policy that does not take a stance when it comes to aesthetic and cultural values”. The public sector implicitly makes aesthetic judgments through its funding decisions. Hylland and Bjurström (2018b, p. 2) make the same point, and conclude that cultural policy, in the cases where cultural policy deals with the arts, must negotiate between politics and aesthetics. What this aesthetic element entails, is that although the classical music sector in Norway is embedded in a context of relative financial privilege, this privilege only represents a form of alleviation from legitimation debates. The Norwegian financial privilege does not provide a long-term *political* fundament for the aesthetic privilege of the classical music sector.

1.5 LEGAL CONTEXT

The Norwegian classical music sector is to some extent embedded in a legal system. Most prominently, from the perspective of cultural policy for the classical music sector, this legal system is constituted by the *Act of Culture*, the *Norwegian Constitution*, and the *Arts Council Act*.

The *Act of Culture* (Lovdata Foundation 2007) declares that the state, the regional counties and the local municipalities all have separate and joint responsibilities for the facilitation of cultural life. It is a general law, and it does not provide specific instructions on which *forms* of culture that the citizens should have access to. But the *Act of Culture* is referred to in a high number of cultural policy plans that have been produced on regional and municipal level after 2007, when the Act was issued by the national parliament. According to Hylland (2012, p. 4), the use of the concepts *quality*, *professionalism* and *diversity* in the Act is particularly interesting. The reason is that these concepts were frequently used on regional and municipal level even *before* the Act was issued, but through their use in the Act, he concludes that these concepts were given “another level of legitimising weight” (Ibid.).

The *Act of Culture* is an act that declares that counties and municipalities have certain responsibilities within the cultural sector. Observers might therefore assume that the *Act of Culture* is an instrument used by the state to reduce the autonomy of the counties and municipalities within cultural policy. But this is disputable. As one county points out:

Even though the Act of Culture contributes to the legitimation of public cultural policy, it should also be called “an act of possibilities”. It is not defined *what* would be considered a sufficiently broad specter of cultural activity, or *what* is meant by a diversity of cultural expressions”. (Buskerud County 2015, p. 11)

The term “act of possibilities” in this quote reflects limitations when it comes to the instructional power that the Act offers to the state. The Act is perceived, by counties and municipalities, as a legitimating tool for local and regional spending on culture, but it is not perceived as a top-down tool that reduces regional and local autonomy.

The “Act of possibilities” formulation is also used by the *Norwegian Cultural Forum* (2009, p. 6), which is a national organisation coordinating regional and municipal cultural administrations. Their use of the term “Act of possibilities” confirms that local and regional cultural administrations across the country rarely see the Act as reducing the autonomy of municipalities and counties, in defining their own cultural political priorities. On this background, an official state-commissioned report submitted in 2013 suggested that the Act of Culture “must be equipped with regulations that turn it into an active tool” (Ministry of

Culture 2013, p. 21). Subsequently, the ministry declared that it might “strengthen” some of the regulations in the Act (Ministry of Culture 2018a, p. 91), presumably by making these regulations more specific, and thus reducing the autonomy of the regions and municipalities. However, at the time of writing, the Act is still formulated in a general way, leaving it up to the local and regional governments to define their cultural political priorities.

When it comes to the *Norwegian Constitution* from 1814, this has, in Article 100, the formulation “There shall be freedom of expression” (Lovdata Foundation 2014).¹² This is an article that might be regarded as relevant to all the arts sectors, including the classical music sector. It is stated in Article 100 that “it rests on the authorities of the state to facilitate open and informed public discourse” (Ibid.). This article has been relentlessly contested, with discussions on the principles of freedom of speech. The article has been relevant for the cultural sector, for example in questions about cinema censorship (Dahl and Helseth 2006, p. 144), confiscation of fictional literature (Hansen 2011), blasphemy and religion (Schmidt 2002). The arts contribute to freedom of speech, but some oppose the notion that the arts should have complete freedom in their contributions. In the case of the classical music sector, however, the sector is predominantly considered to contribute in a *positive* way to freedom of expression. There are few controversies surrounding the classical music sector, in terms of Article 100.

The *Arts Council Act* states that Arts Council Norway (ACN) should “stimulate the diversity of contemporary art and cultural expressions, and contribute to the creation, conservation, documentation and accessibility of art and culture” (Lovdata Foundation 2013b, §1). The state supports ACN, which in turn funds music institutions and individual musicians. The support that ACN provides, is predominantly *project* support (Arts Council Norway 2018, p. 132). However, project support might also be awarded to projects that are organised by institutions that are already supported by the public sector on an annual basis, which means that the project support might strengthen existing institutions.¹³

In addition to these acts, which have been issued at state level, it is also possible for counties and municipalities to issue regulations, although they rarely do so within the cultural policy sector. One exception to this is Oslo Municipality, which has issued two relevant

regulations; a regulation regarding project stipends for arts and culture (Lovdata Foundation 2010), and an equivalent regulation regarding project support for the creative industries (Lovdata Foundation 2013a). However, what Oslo Municipality declares in these regulations, is comparable with what other municipalities do in other ways than through legislation. For example, many municipalities simply state the criteria for cultural grants on their webpages. The differences between Oslo Municipality and the other municipalities is therefore only on a *formal* level. In other words, Oslo Municipality has turned into *legislation* what most of the other municipalities also do, in terms of grants to cultural projects.

All the acts and regulations mentioned above make statements that are related to legitimation of public financing of cultural institutions and projects, and which might in some cases have direct relevance to the classical music sector. There are also other legal documents that are relevant from the perspective of cultural policy, although not specifically from the perspective of public funding rationales. For example, there is a dedicated act on intellectual property rights of cultural works, the *Cultural Work Act* (Lovdata Foundation 1961). This is an important piece of legislation for cultural workers, but it says little about *rationales* for public funding. Another important act for cultural workers, the *Education Act*, has an article that states that all municipalities should, by themselves, or in cooperation with other municipalities, “offer music and cultural school education for children and youths, organised in cooperation with schools and cultural life” (Lovdata Foundation 1998, §13-6). This regulation has considerable relevance for the *employment* situation of many cultural workers who also engage in performances of various kinds, although the act is not directly relevant for the *legitimation* of these performances in themselves.

In a wider context, cultural policy is also influenced by the electoral system legislation, and by the fact that Norway has three political and administrative levels. The electoral system is regulated by the *Constitution* (Lovdata Foundation 2014) and the *Election Act* (Lovdata Foundation 2002). Notably, the *Constitution* declares in Article 59 that all political parties that receive at least four per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections are entitled to seats in the Parliament (Lovdata Foundation 2014). Seats on all levels of government are distributed according to St. Laguës’ modified method, using the divisor series 1.4, 3, 5, 7, 9

etc., and the members of parliament are elected as representatives from their respective counties (Lovdata Foundation 2002, §11-4(2,3)). In practical terms, this method has created a political landscape with a relatively high number of influential political parties. For example, between seven and nine political parties have been represented in the Norwegian Parliament after 2000. Cultural policy is therefore often based on agreements between three or four political parties.¹⁴

1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE

Chapter 2 is a partial account of the preconceptions and expectations that I had with me in the empirical analyses. This chapter implicitly answers questions such as: What do I know? What do I not know? How did music policy get here? How have researchers conceptualised music policy?

Chapter 3 is a review of methodological choices that I made in the research process, and a review of how the research methods were used to inform the analyses. This chapter aims to answer questions such as: How can we possibly get to *know* how artists and authorities legitimise public funding of the classical music sector? How should we *order* the themes that artists and authorities bring up as relevant in their legitimisation of funding rationales? What role should we attribute to *theory* and *values* in our *analyses* of these rationales?

The heart of the thesis is Chapter 4, which is a thematic analysis of my research findings. Chapter 4 does two things: It aims to give an answer to the primary research question, and it provides an impetus for the conceptualisations and abductions in Chapter 5, where the secondary research question is addressed. Chapter 4 provides a thematic analysis of the ways in which artists and governmental authorities legitimise public funding of the classical music sector. It aims to answer questions such as: What is the *relationship* between the ways in which artists and authorities legitimise public funding? What do classical musicians think about the way in which *authorities* legitimise public funding of the classical music sector in Norway? Are there differences in the rationales expressed on the different

levels of government? How does *my* thematisation relate to how researchers have thematised cultural policy rationales before me?

Chapter 5 is an attempt to make sense of some of the findings in chapter 4. Some of the findings in Chapter 4 were not *immediately* comprehensible. I therefore tried to make sense of them with conceptualisations and abductions. Chapter 5 addresses questions such as: Why did the interviewees in this study legitimise public funding of classical music in a way that differs from the way in which public authorities legitimise this funding? How should we conceptualise the ways in which the values that the interviewees expressed differed from the values that are expressed by public authorities through cultural policy?¹⁵

Chapter 6 sums up the thesis and discusses some of the complexities in the findings. Chapter 6 also identifies potential avenues for future research on policies for the arts, while simultaneously underlining that we should be sensitive to possible differences between the arts sectors when it comes to practitioner perspectives. Furthermore, the chapter recommends investigations into cultural policy making that shed light on processual and aesthetic aspects that this thesis only touches on.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

“One must systematically discard all preconceptions”, says Durkheim (1982, p. 72). That is difficult. Our preconceptions and expectations guide what we tend to look for. Prejudice is always with us (Gadamer 2004). Furthermore, as Lakatos puts it “there are and can be no sensations unimpregnated by expectation” (Lakatos 1978, p. 15). Alasuutari has made the same point: “Hardly anyone would start out a laborious qualitative inquiry without any preconceptions about the ‘field’ or the nature of the phenomenon of interest to the researcher” (Alasuutari 1996, p. 375). Thus, if a person spends much of her time studying the work of a specific theorist such as for example Weber, it is likely that her analyses and interpretations of the social, economic and political world will be coloured by Weber’s theorisations. If I first read Weber’s work on the rational and social foundations of music (Weber 1958), I might become more inclined to view *other* social phenomena as rationalisation processes as well.

The same is true with cultural policy. Anybody doing research within cultural policy, will start her analyses with a set of expectations which might be plausible to varying degrees. It is impossible to account for all of these, because expectations have no clear borders. Thus, a review of expectations will inevitably be selective. That is a challenge. However, it is possible to identify some expectations that are more central than others. Not all expectations are equally prominent.

In this chapter, I review literature on challenges that the classical music sector is currently facing, in terms of production and consumption.¹⁶ I do so by reviewing influential theories, and their potential policy consequences. In the same way as in most in other European countries, Norwegian authorities seek to address these challenges through public arts funding.

Next, I examine how the rationales for public funding of the arts have been *evolving* in Norway. Although some rationales seem to persistently inform cultural policy, some major developments can be identified. I also discuss *typologies* of rationales that have been

suggested in the literature. Typologies are paramount to our understanding of the relationship between cultural policy rationales.

I then turn to the artist perspective. I discuss the role of artists as potential experts within cultural policy, their influence in the policy-making process, and their views on cultural political priorities. The relevant literature on these topics can be divided into two different categories. The first category of publications covers discussions on the roles of artists in the development of cultural policy. The second category covers the policy views and priorities that are prevalent among artists, and within artist communities.

The overall aim of the chapter is to present the most central expectations and previous research results that are relevant to the research questions asked in the thesis. These expectations might have influenced my own analyses, consciously or subconsciously. To paraphrase Lakatos (1978, p. 15), they have probably “impregnated my expectations”.

2.1 CHALLENGES OF PRODUCTION

Researchers have identified some major trends and challenges of production that face the classical music sector, and which have made the sector dependent on public support. If we look at historical overviews over cultural policy in Norway, one aspect that they have in common, is that many of them emphasise the role of the *cost disease* in the performing arts (Mangset 1992, pp. 34–37, Vestheim 1995, p. 162, Dahl and Helseth 2006, p. 270, Kvarv 2014, pp. 189–192, Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 79ff.). The “cost disease” is a term that is used to describe the trend whereby institutions within *labour-intensive* industries face higher increases in costs than institutions within *capital-intensive* industries, due to difficulties of automation in labour-intensive industries. The perspective of the cost disease has had a significant influence on the way in which performing arts institutions are approached by cultural policy studies.

The background for this high level of interest is that the principles behind the cost disease provide a technology-based understanding of *why* it is that performing arts institutions are facing continuous financial challenges. The cost disease is a term that applies to all labour-intensive industries, and it is a *general* challenge for the public sector and welfare

states (Ferris and West 1996, Bates and Santerre 2015, Andersen 2016, Andersen and Kreiner 2017). The cost disease has therefore been studied within a range of areas where the public sector is a main provider.¹⁷ When Baumol and Bowen introduced the concept, however, it was with *specific* application to the performing arts (Baumol and Bowen 1966). Their main focus was on symphony orchestras and theatres.

While for example computer production has largely been automated, and thus seen a continuous increase in the output per employee, automation is more difficult within labour-intensive industries such as health and the arts. Consequently, while companies producing computers can continuously reduce their costs, due to the declining number of employees required to produce a unit, the costs within labour-intensive industries such as health and culture cannot be reduced correspondingly. The *cost disease* is thus characterised by the inability of an industry to reduce costs through automation, and this inability forces the companies within the industry to charge high prices. As Baumol, one of the authors behind the concept, puts it in the title of one of his books, “(...) computers get cheaper and health care doesn’t” (Baumol 2012). If it is assumed that the wages of musicians or actors develop in congruence with other professions, then the costs of performing arts institutions will increase more than in an *average* firm. The reason is that the average firm relies more on capital and less on manual labour, compared to a performing arts institution. Hence, if a performing arts institution would like to avoid requiring their audiences to cover the rising costs through increased ticket prices, then an *income gap* will inevitably be the result. The *disease* that Baumol and Bowen refer to, is therefore a consequence of the impossibility of automation in the performing arts.¹⁸ Workers in performing arts institutions cannot be replaced, as easily, by technological substitutes, as workers in other forms of production. Another consequence of varying degrees of labour-intensivity in different sectors, is that the general employment will increase in labour-intensive industries, including the performing arts (Baumol 1967, pp. 417–420). This is demonstrated in practice by dramatic increases in artist populations (Heian *et al.* 2012, p. 52). Sustaining large artist populations requires public funding, and thereby also requires *rationales* for public funding.¹⁹

Although the financial situation is generally better for Norwegian classical music institutions than for their counterparts in many other countries, that does not mean that the situation is without problems. The *cost disease* is prevalent in the classical music sector, due to the labour-intensive production within classical music institutions, and this also applies to the Norwegian case. In particular, the major institutions have experienced a considerable increase in the *pension* costs during the last decades. This is not a surprise, when we take the cost disease into consideration. For example, a report from NNOB states that the pension costs increased *six-fold* from 2004 to 2014 (The Norwegian National Opera and Ballet 2015, p. 119). The annual report for 2017 from the same institution (2018, p. 22) showed that the pension costs alone, far exceeded the *total* incomes from ticket sales, thus constraining the artistic possibilities of the institution significantly. The combination of relatively low tickets prices on the one hand, and continuously increasing costs of production on the other hand, leads to an increasing income gap. In Norway, the public sector covers this gap. When the gap increases, the public sector increasingly also needs cultural policy rationales, in order to legitimise public funding.

At the time when Baumol's and Bowen's book was published (Baumol and Bowen 1966), economic thinking had for a long time demonstrated the vital role played by *technology* in economic development. Baumol's and Bowen's observations thus followed an already established way of thinking. As Marx noted:

Modern industry never looks upon and treats the existing form of a process as final. The technical basis of that industry is therefore revolutionary, while all earlier modes of production were essentially conservative. By means of machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it is continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of production, but also in the functions of the labourer, and in the social combinations of the labour-process. At the same time, it thereby also revolutionizes the division of labour within the society, and incessantly launches masses of capital and of workpeople from one branch of production to another. (Marx 1990, p. 617)

Moreover, these processes, according to Marx, continuously threaten to make the worker superfluous. As Baumol (2012) shows, and as could be predicted based on the quote from Marx above, the *proportion* of people working in sectors such as health care, will tend to increase, due to the aforementioned difficulties of automation in labour-intensive sectors,

relative to *other* sectors. In this respect, Baumol and Bowen's (1966) descriptions of the problems within the performing arts were not new. Based on the quote by Marx above, the *cost disease*, coined by Baumol and Bowen (1966), could be expected.

However, Baumol and Bowen's diagnosis of the performing arts was new in another way. Scholars such as Marx did not think of the production of arts as just *any* form of production. To talk about an *economics of the performing arts* would be an oxymoron, from Marx' point of view. As Markus has pointed out, Marx was "deeply embedded in the humanist aesthetics of German Idealism" (Markus 2001, p. 3). This is why Marx thought of the arts as *exceptional* in terms of their mode of production (Beech 2015). By contrast, Baumol and Bowen (1966) treat the performing arts as "any industry". That was a relatively new approach. They treated the arts as a product comparable with any other product. They used data that had been available for a long time (Besharov 2005, p. 414), but the radical choice of Baumol and Bowen was to analyse these data within the theoretical framework of economics, and not within an exceptionalist framework. As Baumol and Bowen themselves explain:

It should be pointed out that the authors of this volume are economists who, despite their personal interests in the arts, felt strongly that such an investigation should be conducted as dispassionately as possible, and that it should be carried out much as one would study any industry beset by monetary problems. We did not undertake to discover a panacea which would promise to cure the arts of their financial ills. Rather, we hoped to be able to specify objectively the alternatives facing the arts and to describe their costs and the burdens they require society to shoulder. (Baumol and Bowen 1966, p. 4)

Hence, while they were clearly concerned with the economic future of the performing arts, Baumol and Bowen's perspective fundamentally treated the arts as "any industry". The inclusion of the arts in the standard framework of economics entailed that the value of the arts should be defined by the sovereign purchasing decisions of consumers. The challenges of production described in terms of the cost disease, were thereby accompanied by a non-exceptionalist view of the arts. Clearly, this approach might be considered a befoulment of the arts. As Caust puts it,

The discourse needs to acknowledge that the arts are different and that this difference should be celebrated, rather than ridiculed. Governments need to be reminded again

about why they are involved in the arts and what their role is in that transaction. By wanting to control, manage and rationalise the arts sector, governments are in danger of perverting the very practise of art itself. Thus future communication about arts policy and practice needs to be initiated by artists and arts workers in their language and imagery, rather than within the context of the economic / managerial jargon currently in vogue. (Caust 2003, p. 62)

But economists have responded to this concern by explaining a way to “stop worrying” and to “love economics” (Bakhshi *et al.* 2009). They claim that the *exceptionalist* position, which is expressed in the quote by Caust (2003) above, is contradictory, in a policy perspective. Their point is that if art advocates want the public sector to fund the arts because of the *intrinsic value of art*, which is promoted in the exceptionalist view, then this *intrinsic value* must be accounted for in public budgeting:

There is a contradiction between the plea that the intrinsic value of art should be *accounted for*, and the idea that it [the intrinsic value of art] is *beyond accounting*. If art really is beyond valuation, there is no point complaining that it has been valued improperly. If it really cannot be assigned a value, it cannot sensibly also be argued that policymakers can properly take this value into account. (Bakhshi *et al.* 2009, p. 15)

Hence, according to Bakhshi *et al.* (2009), if the exceptionalist view of art should be taken seriously in a policy perspective, it must be *quantified*. The way of quantifying, is to measure the *willingness to pay* (Hansen 1997, Noonan 2002, Thompson *et al.* 2002, Throsby and Zednik 2008). The reason why art lovers should love economics, from this perspective, is that factual studies that include quantifications of the *willingness to pay*, tend to show that the total amount that the public is willing to pay, *exceeds* the amount that the public sector factually spends on culture (Throsby and Zednik 2008, p. 11). Hence, from a utilitarian economics perspective, it might be optimal for the public sector to support arts institutions, and thus cover the income gap of arts institutions such as symphony orchestras.²⁰

In conclusion, performing arts institutions such as symphony orchestras face continuous challenges due to their reliance on handicraft-based production. If the general public wishes to keep tickets prices at a low level, the public sector must cover the income gap. In addition, the challenges of production highlight the controversies surrounding the arts, in terms of exceptionalism. There is a divide between those who simply wish to reduce *market failure* on the one hand, and those who wish to support the arts due to their presumed

intrinsic value on the other hand. In that sense, the challenges of production caused by the “handicraft economy” of classical music are met with two antagonistic legitimising strategies: The willingness to pay strategy and the exceptionalist strategy. The antagonism between these legitimising strategies is still important in the study of public funding rationales for the arts.

2.2 CHALLENGES OF CONSUMPTION

When it comes to the consumption aspect, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Mangset claims that if the public sector is unable to reach central policy goals with regards to cultural access and cultural engagement, it is likely that this will result in legitimisation crises (Mangset 2018, p. 11). Research on cultural taste has become important within cultural policy studies. This significantly applies to music. As Savage puts it, music is “an unusually polarized cultural field” (Savage 2006, p. 163). But as we will see, the research literature on musical consumption rarely provides us with clear-cut *policy* recommendations. On the contrary, the relationship between *knowledge about* musical taste on the one hand, and *cultural policy measures* on the other, is complicated.

While Baumol and Bowen’s descriptions of challenges on the production side have become a natural point of departure for many analyses of challenges of production in the performing arts, Bourdieu’s studies about cultural taste hold almost an equally prominent position when it comes to political challenges on the consumption side. As Røyseng has pointed out, “it is hard to overestimate the influence and importance of the work of Pierre Bourdieu in cultural policy studies” (Røyseng 2010, p. 68). Prior notes that it is “(...) nowadays rare to find a study of musical taste that does not start with or evoke Bourdieu’s ideas” (Prior 2011, p. 127). One of the reasons *why* this is the case, is that there a widespread conviction that Bourdieu’s analyses of *correspondences* can inform cultural policy, and lead to development of better policies. Bourdieu’s claim is that there is *correspondence* between the degree to which individuals hold *power*, and the degree to which they consume *legitimate* forms of art. As Bourdieu observes:

The closer one moves towards the most legitimate areas, such as music or painting, and within these areas, which can be set in a hierarchy according to their modal degree of legitimacy, towards certain genres or certain works, the more the differences in educational capital are associated with major differences (produced in accordance with the same principles) between genres, such as opera or operetta, or quartets and symphonies, between periods, such as contemporary and classical, between composers and between works. (Bourdieu 1984, p. 14)

Furthermore, Bourdieu identifies *music* as the art form that to the highest degree is a marker of distinction between those who possess power and those who do not. In other words, people with power tend to listen to some genres of music, and people without power listen to other genres. Bourdieu claims that it is a common opinion that insensitivity to music represents a “particularly unavowable form of materialist coarseness” (Ibid., p. 19), and that musical taste is revealing due to its rootedness in the “most primitive bodily experience” (Bourdieu 1993a, p. 104).²¹ He also claims, based on his surveys, that economic elites and cultural elites tend to depart, when it comes to musical choice. The choices that we make with regards to cultural consumption are largely unconscious, and they are acquired by slow familiarisation (Ibid., p. 66). Dominant classes are familiarised with the legitimate forms of art, such as legitimate genres within classical music. It is predominantly their family background that provides them with this aesthetic familiarisation. Through this familiarisation process, they accumulate what Bourdieu calls *cultural* capital (Bourdieu 1986).

Bourdieu’s publications have had a significant intellectual footprint in Norway, where many studies have been conducted, using his conceptual framework (Rosenlund 2001; 2002; 2009; 2017, Hovden and Knapskog 2014, Jarness 2015; 2017, Flemmen *et al.* 2018). These studies confirm the *patterns* showed by Bourdieu, although with modifications. Cultural inequalities are persistent. That is also why the challenges of ensuring equal engagement with the art forms that are supported by the authorities, seem to be persistent (Danielsen 2008, Mangset 2018).²²

Bourdieu’s studies have been nuanced in various ways. For example, some researchers claim that cultural distinction is not primarily reflected by the consumption of specific cultural *genres*, as Bourdieu found, but by the *amount* of cultural consumption across the cultural spectrum (Peterson 1992; 1997; Peterson and Kern 1996). Another study finds that that it

is not the *classical* music audiences that are dominant, as Bourdieu claimed, but the “pop scholars” (Bellavance 2008, p. 212), i.e., individuals who prefer *new* music, but who demonstrate highly intellectual and refined logics of distinction in their enjoyment of this new music. Still another study claims that it is the ways in which cultural forms are consumed that is at the core of the cultural hierarchy (Savage and Gayo 2011). According to this study, traditional consumption of classical music is not associated with cultural dominance. Another study finds that hierarchies are demonstrated by how cultural categories are constructed *discursively* (Ollivier *et al.* 2009), which is another modification of Bourdieu’s initial framework. Other researchers maintain Bourdieu’s original framework, and conclude that classical music consumers are generally socially dominant. As Atkinson puts it,

(...) what appear to be ‘omnivorous’ musical tastes amongst dominant and dominated agents turn out, on closer inspection, to be rather spurious and, furthermore, generated in a way thoroughly in line with the original Bourdieusian conceptualisation of the classed roots of listening tastes. (Atkinson 2011, p. 170)

But while these studies might support or contest Bourdieu’s findings, they *all* aim to convey power relations and cultural hierarchies that are, to use a formulation by Prior, “glossed in accounts considered post-Bourdiesian” (Prior 2013, p. 191). They are spin-offs from Bourdieu’s work, in one way or another. These researchers draw a complex landscape of power relations, dominance and cultural inequalities.

From the perspective of cultural policy studies, a central question is how to *deal* with inequalities and hierarchies stemming from patterns in cultural choices, particularly if the goal is to pursue an *egalitarian* oriented form of cultural policy. When Mangset asks whether we now face “the end of cultural policy” (Mangset 2018), it is these aspects that he most significantly refers to. Dubois has suggested the following four elements as logical *political implications* of the sociology of taste, based on Bourdieu (2008):

- 1) Since the act of visiting museums (and by extension any cultural institution, and by extension again, access to culture) is determined by previously acquired dispositions that render such a visit thinkable or not, an efficient democratization policy should target these social dispositions.
- 2) Since the ability to understand and appreciate art is not innate but based on codes that enable understanding and appreciation, a democratization policy should aim at providing these codes to the social groups who have not acquired them.
- 3) Reciprocally, since the meaning of art is not necessarily given in the content of works

of art, pedagogic support is required through explanatory panels or guides in the cultural venues themselves. 4) Since the sacralization of culture leaves out ‘profane’ agents, a cultural democratization policy should de-sacralize and humanize cultural institutions in order not to intimidate the visitors and to make them feel at ease. (Dubois 2011, p. 498)

These measures, which Dubois has interpreted and extracted from the writings of Bourdieu, seem reasonable, in the light of demonstrated patterns in the cultural acquirments of taste. However, the connections between taste formation patterns on the one hand, and political measures on the other, are not as straightforward as they might seem. If we attempt to make use of Bourdieu’s findings in policy development, questions arise. Some of these questions deserve a brief examination.

First, a question can be raised about the well-being of the individual, related to the policy measures suggested above. For example, in the Norwegian case, as Rosenlund observes in one of his studies of the Stavanger region, the city has changed dramatically, and has become “embedded in the most international, capital-intensive and technological industry there is” (Rosenlund 2017, p. 9). Hence, there is clearly a high number of citizens who have experienced a corresponding increase in their private income and wealth. At the same time, these citizens might not find themselves on top of the *cultural* hierarchy. For example, although they might have seen a dramatic increase in their economic capital, their consumption of the most legitimate forms of music might be limited. According to the policy measures summed up by Dubois (2011), and quoted above, the public sector should help these citizens master sophisticated cultural codes. But from an egalitarian perspective, it is not clear that the public sector should support economically privileged citizens to master cultural codes. On the contrary, from an egalitarian standpoint, one might argue that the public sector should *abstain* from financing the cultural experiences of economically privileged citizens. If the new rich Stavanger citizens do not bother going to the concert hall, why should cultural policy bother trying to attract them to the concert hall?

Secondly, there is a question related to which cultural expressions are supposed to be at the top of the cultural hierarchy. As demonstrated above, there are numerous theories on the relationships between power and music preferences, and some of these theories question the notion of high and low art. One might ask how the dominant classes decide on which

cultural expressions they use to communicate distinction. According to Bourdieu and Passeron, they do so arbitrarily (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, p. 5). Bourdieu and Passeron believe there is no intrinsic aesthetic logic behind the musical choices of the dominant classes. In other words, the classical music works that are considered culturally legitimate by the dominant classes, do not derive their legitimacy from their intrinsic aesthetic characteristics. What this cultural arbitrariness means, is that the suffering of the dominated classes has no connection with the aesthetic value of the musical works that they do not familiarise themselves with. In Bourdieu and Passeron's (1990) conception, since the music of Bach or Beethoven is not inherently of higher quality than less legitimate forms of music, the dominated classes do not miss out on anything, aesthetically speaking. It is worth noting, however, that Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) do not present to us the empirical material that underpins their arbitrariness assumption. One researcher has also claimed that Bourdieu's thinking adheres *a priori* to a high-low conception of art which is, in itself, *embedded* in the Kantian tradition that it aims to critique. As Bennett puts it: "Bourdieu's own politico-aesthetic project (...) is no less reliant on the Kantian heritage it apparently disputes" (Bennett 2011, p. 532). The question is thus which *sources* the conceptions of high and low in cultural expression should be derived from. They can be derived *a priori* from Kantian aesthetics, or they can be derived from empirical investigations. But as Bennett (Ibid.) points out, it is not clear how it could be demonstrated, by use of *data*, that for example Bach's music is at the top of the musical hierarchy, in terms of cultural capital. This relationship between dominance and the aesthetic material represents another confusing element in the relationship between Bourdieu's studies on the one hand, and potential practical cultural policy consequences on the other. If the music of Bach is not inherently aesthetically better than any other music, then why should cultural policy bother trying to attract the dominated classes to the concert hall? Is there any point trying to attract them to the concert hall if they do not miss out on anything anyway, aesthetically speaking, by spending their time otherwise?

Finally, a question can be asked about the practical possibilities of attracting less privileged audience groups to legitimate forms of culture, *if we assume* that such legitimacy is possible to demonstrate by data. As Hylland and Mangset (2017, p. 395) observe, it seems

to be *immensely* difficult to change the cultural choices of the Norwegian population. Is a situation where different demographic groups are roughly equally represented in the concert hall even remotely achievable?

In addition to these questions, which can be derived from the cultural policy literature itself, there are also questions that can be asked from the perspective of *aesthetics*. Bourdieu's studies are based on a Marx-informed understanding of cultural taste, which is that cultural taste is dependent on material conditions. One critic of Bourdieu, Zangwill, claims that Bourdieu thereby commits the *some-all fallacy*. Zangwill refuses to accept the claim that cultural choice is completely socially conditioned. With regards to the artist, Zangwill states: "To some degree his [the artist's] choices are autonomous, even if the options among which he chooses are not up to him" (Zangwill 2002a, p. 209).²³ The problem, according to Zangwill, is that some theorists, including Bourdieu, seem to be of the conviction that *all* cultural choices are socially determined. For example, in the case where Norwegian medical students express their love for classical music (Skarpenes 2007, p. 543), it might be asked whether this cultural choice is exclusively a result of strategic positioning in a social and cultural hierarchy, or whether it is the result of medical students' cognitive dispositions that *both* lead them to medical school *and* to classical music. In the *some-all* perspective that Zangwill criticises, the latter possibility is *a priori* ignored.

In summary, studies of cultural taste have provided cultural policy studies with two valuable sources of knowledge, namely *data*, and suggestions of theoretical frameworks to *understand* these data. Data continuously demonstrate correspondences between cultural choice and social status. Moreover, as DiMaggio and Useem point out, "there may be formidable barriers to any efforts to open up the arts" (DiMaggio and Useem 1978, p. 195). Still, as we have seen, studies of cultural taste rarely provide clear-cut answers to practical cultural political decision-making. The data shows that privileged social demographic groups are frequent attenders on classical music concerts, but the data cannot be used to show that these groups increase their power through this attendance. Consequently, it is up to policy makers to decide *how* the available data, provided by Bourdieu and others, should influence cultural policy objectives.

2.3 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF RATIONALES IN NORWAY

The previous sections have provided a brief review of overall challenges that apply to the classical music sector in general. These challenges will represent important preconceptions for most cultural policy analyses. In the present section, the focus turns to the historical dimension of cultural policy rationales in Norway. The way that the history of cultural policy is written, might influence the lens through which we analyse cultural policy. It is therefore necessary to explicitly examine some main trends and developments.

The literature tells us that there has been a considerable historical development in the reasoning behind public funding of the arts in Norway (Billing 1978, Mangset 1992 Vestheim 1995, Dahl and Helseth 2006, Kvarv 2014, Mangset and Hylland 2017). A reasonable starting point in the Norwegian case is 1814,²⁴ when the Norwegian Constitution was established, and when Norway joined Sweden in a political union. Norway gained a much higher degree of autonomy in the union with Sweden, than what had been the case under the Danish rule. According to Dahl and Helseth (2006, p. 27), this transition represented a shift from an aristocratic and royal cultural policy, governed by the king in Copenhagen, to a democratic one, within the Kingdom of Sweden-Norway. The independence from Denmark in 1814 lead to a need for the establishment of a nation that would not only be *politically* independent, but which could also be *culturally* independent.

The transition away from the Danish king after 1814 was accompanied by a cultural marketplace less regulated by the state. The Norwegian state primarily viewed the performing arts from a *legal* perspective, not from a public *funding* perspective. Previously, musical life had been regulated by the state, in the sense that only musicians hired by the authorities had been allowed to offer their services. This applied both to services that they provided to the public sector and to the private sector. New regulations in 1839 lead to a complete liberalisation of the music market (Selvik 2005, pp. 253–254). This liberalisation paved the way for new opportunities for musicians. However, the liberalisation also meant hard times, because public funding of musical life remained modest throughout the 19th century. Billing

concludes that state policy was in fact both rather passive and random all the way up to 1945 (Billing 1978, p. 102).

Dahl and Helseth point out that among Norwegian *scholars* in the 19th century, the value of the arts was widely recognised. This also applied to music:

The fact that music had a strongly character developing function, was recognised by the scholars of the time. Plato's thoughts about the refining aspects of music was an important source of inspiration. Good music was thus something that all citizens should have access to. In addition, music was [thought to be] contributing to the development of identity, and was therefore [considered] an important element in the emerging cultural nation-building. (Dahl and Helseth 2006, p. 40)

However, these ideas rarely found their way into *policy*-documents issued by the public sector. In the cases where there was a political agreement on the need for public funding of arts institutions, the decisions were usually made *ad hoc*.²⁵ They were rarely made with reference to rationales that had been identified in advance, in a principled manner. As underlined by both Vestheim (1995, pp. 23–24) and Mangset and Hylland (2017, p. 68), the time between 1814 and 1945 was characterised by the founding of a significant number of important cultural institutions. In addition, in the 1930s and 1940s, ideological tensions were reflected through certain cultural political publications and programs (e.g. Mowinkel jr 1935, The National Socialist Party 1934). Still, as Mangset has put it, public support of culture before 1945 often represented “rescue operations for cultural institutions in economic difficulties” (Mangset 1992, p. 119).

Although some main philosophical ideas on the values of cultural expressions such as music were relatively well-known in the 19th century, as we have seen, most of the literature on cultural policy in Norway concentrates on the period after WW2. As Mangset and Hylland note, it is a widespread opinion that this is when the *real* history of cultural policy in Norway starts (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 44). A major reason is that, after WW2, the public sector became much more *deliberate* in its governance of the cultural sector than it had been before. In this respect, Norway followed international trends. Bennett observes that in the UK, cultural policy after WW2 became inextricably related to the more *general* principles underpinning the development of the welfare state (Bennett 1995, pp. 211–213). Vestheim

makes a similar observation. He concludes that there was a heavy reliance on *planning* in the development of the welfare state after WW2, and that culture became a part of the general welfare state planning in western industrialised countries (Vestheim 1995, p. 168). Within the classical music sector, the national opera was established in 1959 (Kangas and Vestheim 2010, p. 160), and during the period after WW2, the major symphony orchestras started receiving state funding. A possible way of looking at the historical development of cultural policy in Norway, is therefore to regard it as a development from *aristocratic* cultural policy before 1814, via *laissez faire* and *ad hoc* cultural policy from 1814 to 1945, and further to a significantly more *deliberative* and *planned* form of cultural policy after 1945.

With regards to cultural policy rationales in Norway after WW2, Billing calls the period from 1945 to 1975 a period of *democratisation*, characterised by attempts to make so-called high culture accessible to as many as possible (Billing 1978, p. 102). This policy mirrored French cultural policy during the same period (Vestheim 2010, Dubois 2012, Martin 2013). In French cultural policy at the time, museums of fine art played a vital role (Malraux 1974). As a parallel, Goehr concludes that the classical music sector also developed into a sort of *museum*, although an imaginary one:

Since music was a temporal and performance art, its works could not be preserved in physical form or placed in a museum like other works of fine art. Music had a problem. It had to replicate the conditions of the plastic arts and, at the same time, render them appropriate to its temporal and ephemeral character. Music resolved the problem by creating for itself a ‘metaphorical’ museum, an equivalent of the museum for plastic arts – what has come to be known as an imaginary museum of musical works. (Goehr 1994, p. 174)

In practice, what this meant, was that within the framework of cultural democracy, there was a defined repertoire of music that was considered culturally legitimate, and which the public sector sought to disseminate. An example of this cultural democratic strategy, in the Norwegian case, was the founding of *Concerts Norway* in 1968. This was an institution whose aim was to make music of the highest quality accessible. Illustratively, the first official concert of *Concerts Norway* was arranged in the very north, almost as far away from Oslo as possible. The repertoire consisted of “works from an established canon of classical music, together with pieces from composers from the twentieth century” (Hylland 2018, p. 5).

Billing concludes, however, that the objectives of this strategy of cultural democratisation were not reached, which was why the focus shifted to a period of *decentralisation* from 1975 and onwards. This shift also mirrored corresponding trends internationally (Billing 1978, pp. 104–105). Applied to the music sector, what this shift entailed, was that cultural hierarchies between musical genres were downplayed. Musical *participation* became a more important political objective. In principle, while the overall objective within the strategy of cultural democratisation had been to recruit audiences to the imaginary museum of canonical musical works, the primary objective within the cultural *decentralisation* strategy was to encourage the citizens to play or sing whichever repertoire they preferred. While the “French” model entailed a top-down form of cultural policy, the decentralisation perspective mirrored an anthropological conception of culture. As Williams put it, “culture is a whole way of life” (Williams 1989, p. 7). Correspondingly, applied to classical music, Eagleton has remarked that “The idea of culture as an organic way of life belongs to ‘high’ culture quite as much as Berlioz does” (Eagleton 2000, p. 24). In principle, the decentralisation strategy followed this view, in a socio-cultural turn within “the new cultural policy” of the 1970s (Larsen 2012).²⁶ Participation in a local amateur choir or brass band was now politically considered equally valuable as attending a classical music performance. Popular forms of music became part of cultural policy.²⁷

From the 1980s and onwards, economic rationales for public funding of the arts become more prominent, in what has been referred to as “the instrumental turn” (Bonham-Carter 2017, Gould 2018). According to Mangset and Hylland, this development reflected the continuous battle for resources between different political sectors. In this battle, *numbers* were essential (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 143). The numbers might for example reflect effects that cultural funding might have on employment, tourism or export. Some researchers criticised the analytical methods in economic studies within the cultural sector already in the the 1990s (e.g. van Puffelen 1996), but the economic rationales still continued to influence cultural policy after the turn of the century. The political prominence of the economic rationale has been reflected by a vast number of research reports published on the topic (e.g. Haraldsen *et al.* 2004, Karlstad 2005, Løyland *et al.* 2007, Kvidal 2009, Haraldsen *et al.*

2008, Hansen *et al.* 2010, Espelien and Gran 2011, Gran *et al.* 2016). Many of these reports have been commissioned by the public sector. In that respect, the economic rationale in Norwegian cultural policy mirrors the rationale internationally, where the economic rationale is also significantly underpinned by research reports (e.g. Myerscough 1988, Sternö and Nielsén 2012, SGS 2013, EY 2014; 2015, Chung *et al.* 2018). The production of these reports underlines the role of “evidence” in cultural policy after the instrumental turn.

While the above illustrates some trends and developments, we can also make two important additional observations. First, despite the identified trends and developments, there is also a considerable element of *stability* in Norwegian cultural policy rationales. It is not the case that one rationale is simply replaced by a different one, from one decade to another. We might identify some developments, as shown above, but the rationales also influence cultural policy in parallel. For example, as Mangset and Hylland observe, the idea of democratisation of culture was not really confined to the period between 1945 and 1975 (Mangset and Hylland 2017, pp. 68–69). The democratisation rationale might have seen a peak during those years, but arguably, democratisation of culture was also an important rationale before and after that period. In addition, it might be argued that the overall policy aims within the “new cultural policy” largely survived the “instrumental turn” (Vestheim 2018, p. 119).

Secondly, Norwegian cultural policy has had a stronger *national* component than cultural policy in other countries, and this national component of cultural policy has co-existed with other rationales. The relationship between national and international cultural values is an important cultural political conflict dimension. This dimension is of significant relevance for the classical music sector. As Mangset and Hylland point out:

(...) [a] challenge for the national cultural policy can be found in discussions about recruitment to prestigious institutions, such as operas and symphony orchestras. Is it the case that a Norwegian symphony orchestra or a Norwegian opera should have a minimum of Norwegian performers? A minimum of Norwegian repertoire? For example, there have been discussions about the Stavanger Symphony and the Bergen National Opera, that resemble discussions about football teams that buy foreign players. How important is it that these institutions have Norwegian-born performers? Regardless of opinion in these discussions, it seems as though a certain minimum of cultural political nationalism or protectionism is difficult to avoid. (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 311)²⁸

In summary, before WW2, Norwegian cultural policy had a high degree of *laissez-faire* and a high degree of *ad hoc* decisions. After WW2, we can identify periods of democratisation of high culture, decentralisation of culture, and later, economy-related rationales. But on the other hand, as Mangset and Hylland point out, the national dimension represents an example of *continuity* when it comes to the rationales for public cultural funding (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 69). The historically major rationales of cultural policy have also largely existed in parallel.

2.4 TYPOLOGIES OF RATIONALES

Bailey states:

The fact that classification is ubiquitous in our everyday life does not mean that it can be taken for granted or that classification efforts cannot be improved. In fact, because classification is so ubiquitous, it is relatively easy to overlook it. I thus wish to close with a strong plea for researchers to help end the common neglect of classification efforts by never taking classification for granted, and by always striving diligently to improve the construction and use of our typologies and taxonomies. (Bailey 1994, p. 83)

Typologies direct the ways we think (Marco and Navarro 1993, Bailey 1994, Satija 1998, Bowker and Star 2000, Boyne 2006, Lehnert 2007, Durkheim and Mauss 2009, Collier *et al.* 2012, Tennis 2008; 2016). Typologies are therefore vital analytical tools. As Foucault shows, the activity of organising knowledge, in the form of typologies and classifications, is core to the history of knowledge development (Foucault 1970, pp. 125–165). In the social sciences, typologies are used to analyse a range of topics, such as types of political systems (e.g. Almond and Coleman 2015), policy types (e.g. Champney 1988), education objectives (e.g. Bloom *et al.* 1956) types of innovation (e.g. Pavitt 1984) and types of social action (Weber 1947, pp. 115–118). Typologies of cultural policy rationales have also been proposed, although primarily in *implicit* ways (e.g. Bennett 1995, Vestheim 2007, Belfiore and Bennett 2008).

Typologies are about connections and relationships. For example, if I claim that Norway should have a cultural policy because cultural policy builds the Norwegian nation, *and* because cultural policy ensures equal access to cultural events, then how are these rationales related? Do they both belong to a common and higher class of rationales? Or are

these rationales different on a more *principled* level? Our answers to such questions influence the way we analyse empirical material. In other words, our *preconceptions* about ways of *classifying* cultural policy rationales, are likely to inform and colour the way in which we analyse cultural policy.

Typologies can take different forms, and we will not examine all the intricacies.²⁹ But one aspect is fundamentally important: In a typology, as Marradi points out, “Types must be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive” (Marradi 1990, p. 129). Marradi illustrates the principle of mutual exclusivity in an example:

If type X is ‘secularized and receptive political systems’ and type Y is ‘centralized and aggressive political systems’, type X and type Y cannot belong to the same typology, because an actual political system might be classed in both types. (Marradi 1990, p. 143)

In principle, it should only be possible for a political system to belong to *one* type of political system, in a typology of political systems. Correspondingly, it should only be possible to assign a statement within cultural policy to *one* type in a typology of cultural policy rationales. The principle of joint exhaustiveness requires that it should be possible to assign all statements that argue for public funding of culture, to *one* such type in the typology. If these two ideal requirements are met, a typology is typically considered a good and useful one.

The requirement of mutual exclusivity, applied to cultural policy analysis, entails that in principle, it should be possible to assign a policy measure to *one* specific category of cultural policy objectives, without at the same time assigning the same policy measure to *another* category of objectives. For example, if we assign a cultural policy measure to a cultural policy rationale of increasing *national prestige*, then the national prestige that was achieved by this policy measure, should not be intrinsically *correlated* to the achievement of *other* political aims. The requirement of joint exhaustiveness, on the other hand, means that in principle, we should be able to assign *all* policy measures to at least *one* of the categories of policy objectives within our typology. If we are able to identify policy measures that cannot reasonably be assigned to *any* category, then the categories in our typology are not jointly exhaustive.

A widely used typology within cultural policy studies is the dichotomy consisting of *intrinsic* values on the one hand, and *instrumental* values on the other. Intrinsic value can be defined as “the set of values that relate to the subjective experience of culture intellectually, emotionally and spiritually” (Holden 2006, p. 14). A related concept is *cultural* value, “a multifaceted concept reflecting qualities such as the aesthetic, symbolic, spiritual or historical values attaching to a particular item” (Throsby 2010, p. 20). The concept of intrinsic value is perhaps best understood in the perspective of its counterpart, *instrumental* cultural policy, which is when public cultural funding is used “as a means or instrument to attain goals in other than cultural areas” (Vestheim 1994, p. 65). Instrumentalisation of cultural policy is associated with a focus on measurement and evidence in public policies for the arts (Power 1997; 2000, Belfiore 2004, Blomkamp 2014). In a wider perspective, the instrumentalisation of cultural policy has been interpreted as a consequence of an increasing influence of neoliberalism (e.g. Hall 2011, McGuigan 2005; 2016).

The dichotomy of intrinsic and instrumental rationales was used in a PhD thesis by O-Kyung (2010), who analysed cultural policy in the UK. What this shows, is that the intrinsic-instrumental dichotomy has *de facto* been used as an *a priori* theoretical tool. Still, there are major problems with this dichotomy. There is an interpretive problem represented by the fact that authorities rarely use the term *instrumental* in the description of their policies. That is because instrumentalism is not perceived as a rationale in and of itself, but a *means to an end*. Secondly, if we make the conclusion that a specific cultural policy is *instrumental*, then we have still not answered the question of which policy objectives this policy is aiming to achieve. This is a point that has been formulated by Rosenstein as follows:

Policies are oriented toward goals that are achievable and will help to solve that problem once achieved. In general, policies are conceived as being instrumental; they are formulated in order to get something done. However, precisely what it is they are going to get done is not always obvious and must be understood within a broad context of political, historical, cultural and administrative factors. (Rosenstein 2018, p. 14)

Vestheim has illustrated this succinctly by pointing out that in a *political* perspective, cultural policy must always be *for* different groups of citizens (Vestheim 2007; 2008). For example, if the public sector aims to support the development of aesthetic sensibilities through cultural

policy, then that is a type of instrumentality, in the same way as for example social or economic instrumentalities. Consequently, when we aim to identify what it is that a government aims to get done, it is not so illuminating to conclude that a policy is *instrumental*. As Røyseng remarks: “When the concept of instrumental cultural policy can include so many, and widely different initiatives, it is worth asking how useful the concept is for analytical purposes” (Røyseng 2016, p. 160). Hence, the intrinsic-instrumental dichotomy is not very helpful in addressing the research questions of this thesis. The intrinsic-instrumental dichotomy is most frequently employed in value-laden analyses of cultural policy, which are further discussed in Chapter 3.³⁰

In a different form of approach, Bennett has suggested that rationales for government support for culture can be categorised into six recurring *themes*, namely *laissez-faire*, national prestige, economic importance, the civilising mission, market correction, and a theme that he calls “post-war reconstruction and the welfare state” (Bennett 1995, pp. 203–213). Although the British case used by Bennett is not directly transferrable to Norway, it might be argued that some, or all, of these themes are relevant in the Norwegian case. Still, Bennett’s suggested typology of rationales is problematic. Most importantly, Bennett does not use the term *rationales* in the meaning of *funding rationales*. Instead, as demonstrated by the themes he identifies, his typology includes a heterogeneous group of concepts. National prestige, economic importance, civilising mission and correcting the market are all *rationales*, in the sense that they are potential reasons for the public sector to fund the cultural sector. But on the other hand, *laissez faire* is not a rationale for government support of culture. *Laissez faire* is the *opposite* of a rationale. It is a rationale for the *absence* of public funding, most frequently proposed by *opponents* of a large public sector (e.g. Smith 1998, Friedman and Friedman 1962; 1990, Hayek 2005).³¹ When it comes to post-war reconstruction and the welfare state, Bennett observes that “the role of the state in culture is inevitably linked to much broader political principles” (Bennett 1995, p. 211). This is a reasonable interpretation, in the sense that the engagement of the government in specific sectors, such as the cultural sector, might be legitimised by *general* welfare considerations, not considerations that are *specifically* connected to the policy area in question. It also

corresponds with the developments in Norway after WW2, as we saw in the previous section. But this should be considered a *general welfare*-related rationale, and not a *cultural policy* rationale.

Although Bennett makes some observations that are also relevant for the Norwegian case, it is only four of the six *themes* that he identifies, that can be considered *rationales* for government funding of culture. It should be underlined that Bennett does not claim that his suggested typology represents an attempt to create a typology of cultural policy rationales where the themes are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Rather, his six themes can be considered a historical overview. Hence, although Bennett's examination of rationales identifies themes that are *relevant* in cultural policy, these themes do not together constitute a typology that can be used as an *a priori* theoretical tool for an empirical analysis of cultural policy rationales.

In another potential theoretical tool for the analysis of cultural policy rationales, Belfiore and Bennett (2008) examine seven *social impacts* of the arts. They consider the position of the arts in policy to be fragile, because it is hard to prove what they call the "transformative power" of art (Ibid., p. 5). They present an overview of eight social impacts of the arts. These social impacts of the arts are *corruption and distraction; catharsis; personal well-being; education and self-development; moral improvement and civilisation; the arts as a political instrument; social stratification and identity construction; and finally, autonomy of the arts and rejection of instrumentality* (Ibid., p. 40-190). However, as they make clear, these social impacts are derived from claims about the social benefits of the arts from "about two and a half millennia" (Ibid., p. 35), which means that their perspective is much wider than a discussion about social impacts as rationales for *public* engagement in the cultural sector. Consequently, from the perspective of this thesis, it is not clear how a government can legitimise public funding of the arts, by referring to the identified categories. Clearly, the benefits that are presented might be viewed as *relevant* among public authorities, but Belfiore and Bennett's overview does not provide an *a priori* theoretical typology that can be used in analyses of cultural policy rationales.

In summary, as the brief examination above has shown, previously suggested typologies of cultural policy rationales are not *systematic* forms of knowledge organisation in the forms that were described by Foucault (1970, pp. 125–165). None of them discuss classification with regards to the requirements of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories (Marradi 1990). Researchers have rarely been *systematic* in their typological suggestions. The most prominent potential typologies that have been proposed, all have limitations that prevent them from taking an *authoritative* role. While a biologist might be able to assign plants and animals to taxonomies, there exists no authoritative typology that we can use to assign expressed cultural policy rationales to. My own typological suggestion, which is based on the empirical material of the thesis, is outlined in Chapter 4.³²

2.5 ARTISTS' ROLES IN CULTURAL POLICY MAKING

When it comes to the role of artists in cultural policy making, it is not entirely clear which role we should assign to them. They have voting rights,³³ so we might approach them as political participants as regular voters. They are also professional performative experts (e.g. Dahl 2017), and perhaps “expert listeners” (Adorno 1976, p. 179). However, in this thesis, interviewing artists is an implicit acknowledgment of the potentially *political* relevance of the knowledge that artists can be expected to possess.

In Plato’s view, philosopher rulers knew best. As Sharples puts it, Plato’s view was that “there is simply no point in consulting anyone else” (Sharples 1994, p. 52). The contemporary role of experts in the policy making process is however a contested one (e.g. Turner 2001, Estlund 2003; 2008, Holst 2012, Hammersley 2013a, Brennan 2014, May *et al.* 2016, Christensen and Holst 2017, Bhatia 2018). Dahl (1989) has examined four arguments *against* relying on experts in policy-making. They might be considered basic preconceptions of how to approach experts in the policy making process, and I will use them as a starting point for discussing expert roles. Dahl’s (1989) arguments have been summed up by Holst and Molander (2017) in the following way:

- (1) (...) one cannot know decisively who the knowers or experts are as this is continually and reasonably contested (...)
 - (2) (...) all political decisions have moral dimensions and (...)
 - (3) (...) there is no moral expertise (...)
- (3) (...) experts are subject to bias and make errors

(...) (4) (...) one cannot know whether the knowers act on the basis of their knowledge or on the basis of some interest or commitment that may conflict with the aim of investigation. (Holst and Molander 2017, p. 237)

Artists' knowledge might take different forms. Their knowledge might be empirical, or it might be tacit or sensuous (Polanyi and Sen 2009, Kjørup 2006, Schindler 2015). From the perspective of this thesis, we should reflect on three main aspects, when it comes to the roles of artists in cultural policy making. First, their roles as potential *experts*, secondly, the *descriptive* or *normative* nature of this potential expertise, and, finally, the relationship between *ideology* and *self-interest* as motivating factors behind their policy views.

We might, in general, attribute political authority to practitioners within *any* sector. For example, we might attribute health policy authority to people who work within health professions (e.g. Antiel *et al.* 2009, Tilburt *et al.* 2013), or educational policy authority to people who work within educational professions (Croll *et al.* 1994, Jongmans *et al.* 1998). On the other hand, western democracies rely on *researchers* who can provide *evidence* (e.g. Bogenschneider and Corbett 2010, Head 2010 Owen and Larson 2017). Hylland and Mangset (2018) seem to hold the view that cultural policy *researchers* constitute the *main* group of experts in cultural policy making in Norway.

Whoever the experts are, we might consult these experts in cultural policy matters that are descriptive and/or normative. In the descriptive model, researchers provide facts and interpretations; subsequently, politicians decide how to convert these facts and interpretations into normative policies. The distinction between the normative and the descriptive might, however, not always be trivial in practical policy making. Decisions with ethical or normative elements might get conflated with technical decisions. As a case in point, Habermas (2009, 2012) has criticised the European Union for treating questions that he claims are *political* in nature, as if they were *technical* issues. Problems might be political, even though they might *seem* technical.

Pedersen (2014, p. 547) has suggested that experts are *not* in a position to provide any answers to *normative* questions. For example, according to this view, if researchers provide evidence for a causal link between carbon emissions and global warming, scientists should still not be in a privileged position to decide on the degree to which this fact should

induce specific *policy* measures. The analogy of this view, in the perspective of cultural policy, would be that researchers, despite their expertise, should not have a privileged position with regards to normative cultural political issues. For example, social scientists might empirically demonstrate social inequalities in the classical music sector. But how to respond to these inequalities politically, is a normative question, not a technical one.

In the Norwegian case, we can make two observations. First, researchers seem to have a stronger position as experts in cultural policy making than artists do. According to Hylland and Mangset,

(...) [the relations between knowledge production and policy production] has, or should have, a specific form of relevance for the field of cultural policy research. (...) This relevance is due to (at least) two fundamental points: (1) The fact that cultural policy is a value-driven, legitimacy-needing and epistemically insecure form of policy. (2) The fact that cultural policy research and researchers to a large degree are combining ground research with applied and commissioned research, making a lot of cultural policy researchers both analysts, critics and evaluators of, and contributors to cultural policy. (Hylland and Mangset 2018, p. 166)

In other words, Hylland and Mangset are of the opinion that the role of experts should at least not be *less* prominent in the case of cultural policy, than in other political areas. On the contrary, they seem to be convinced that policy making should be more *extensively* informed by experts in the case of cultural policy.³⁴ In particular, they mention the role of researchers as experts.

Secondly, when it comes to the relationship between the normative and the descriptive, the role of researchers seems to be unclear. For example, it is not entirely clear whether Hylland and Mangset believe that the role of experts should be confined to *descriptive* issues, or whether they are of the opinion that experts should also have a prominent role in *normative* cultural political questions.

In some cases, we can observe explicit calls for researchers to take *normative* political positions. For example, *The Culture Report* explicitly calls for a *research based* method for assessing cultural quality (Ministry of Culture 2013, p. 49). A method for assessing cultural quality must clearly be based on *normative* considerations. There is no way in which cultural quality can be assessed in an *objective* manner within a secular state. In other words, what

the report is doing, is to call for the researcher experts to support policy makers with the researchers' views on *normative* issues.³⁵

In a similar way, we might reflect on the potential roles of professional classical musicians as cultural policy experts. Clearly, they are experts. The question is what *kind* of expertise we can reasonably attribute to them. Their professional expertise is an aesthetic form of expertise, and not a political one. Yet, it is not clear that this form of expertise can be conceptually separated from the political. As Hylland and Stavrum point out, when aesthetic expertise finds its way into expert committees, such as in an arts council, we might still consider this expertise a *political* one (Hylland and Stavrum 2018, p. 69). Conversely, it is hard to imagine a cultural policy that abstains from making any kind of aesthetic and cultural judgment (Vestheim 2004, p. 98). Consequently, we might reasonably claim that both researchers and professional artists are cultural policy experts, in some way or another.

One way of looking at the negotiations between artists and the political sphere, is in the perspective of *corporatism*. Hughson and English (2001) have observed that in the case of The Arts Council of England, what seems to be promoted is a form of “cultural corporatism”. What this means is that the arts council increasingly “takes on the role of an intermediary body responsible for drawing an array of relevant institutions into a bargaining process to facilitate the framing of national policy” (Ibid., p. 462). Nevertheless, in a study from 2009 (cited by Glinkowski 2012, p. 181), only seven per cent of artists in the UK thought that there was enough artist representation in decision making bodies involved in culture. In the case of Eastern Germany, Wesner concludes that “in many current cultural policy discussions, artists as a professional group remain underrepresented” (Wesner 2018, p. 100). In other words, they are not being sufficiently consulted in the policy making process. However, Wesner’s understanding is that the negotiations between artists and authorities take place in a zone which in itself “favours instrumentalised cultural policy” (Wesner 2018, p. 109). Therefore, the artists “engage reluctantly” (Ibid.) in the negotiations. In other words, her conclusion is that artists voluntarily abstain from influencing cultural policy.

What the studies above show is that artists are consulted as a form of cultural policy experts, but also that there is disagreement on their influence in real world policy making. In a corresponding way, when it comes to the way in which artists influence cultural policy in the Nordic countries, it has been claimed that their route to influence is coloured by a liberal and non-authoritarian form of corporatism (Mangset 2013c, p. 27). Heikkinen stated in 2003 that the organisations of professional artists in all the Nordic countries played “a major role in the nomination and membership of the bodies allocating state support for artists” (Heikkinen 2003, p. 287). However, in recent years, corporatist structures in cultural life seem to have declined (Mangset 2009, p. 292). This follows a more general tendency of erosion of more general social forms of corporatism in Norway (Pekkarinen 1992, p. 322).

Another way of looking at the influence of artists in cultural policy, is to examine their roles in what Vestheim has called the “*overlapping zone* between culture and politics” (Vestheim 2012b, p. 530, emphasis in the original). The main point of this term is to show that there are two forms of legitimacy that must be met within cultural policy, namely political and economic rationales on the one hand, and aesthetic and cultural rationales on the other. The former type of rationales is primarily promoted by politicians and bureaucrats, while the latter is primarily promoted by managers of cultural institutions, and individual artists. The overlapping zone is where these types of rationales meet, and where “negotiations and exchange of rationalities, ideas, values, interests and money” (Ibid., p. 540) take place. Vestheim underlines, however, that a premise for the functioning of such an overlapping zone, is that “professional cultural workers and artists must have vigorous organisations that can represent them as a collective vis-à-vis political bodies, public agencies and market representatives” (Ibid., p. 541).

The concept of the overlapping zone can be regarded as an argument for the view that the policy process for the cultural sector should take the form of a cooperation and negotiation between politicians, bureaucracies, cultural institutional managers and artists organisations. Vestheim also suggests that “engaging in public policy means to prioritise common interests before self-interests” (Ibid., p. 541). In other words, stakeholders in the overlapping zone should behave as if they were uninformed about their personal situation,

under a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1999). However, that is a difficult requirement to meet. As Vestheim points out, “one cannot ignore the fact that self-interest is also at stake” (Ibid., p. 537).³⁶

Politicians who ultimately make the cultural policy decisions, and other stakeholders in the overlapping zone, such as artists and artists’ organisations, might be motivated by self-interest, or they might be motivated by ideological convictions about the common good. This is summed up in Table 2-1. Chapter 4 primarily examines (3) and (4), although it is in some cases difficult to keep self-interest and ideology separate in cultural policy analysis.

Table 2-1 Self-interest versus ideology among artists and politicians.³⁷

	Artists	Politicians
Self-interest	(1)	(2)
Ideology	(3)	(4)

2.6 ARTISTS’ VIEWS ON CULTURAL POLICY

Numerous studies have been conducted on views and values held by *managers* in political and cultural institutions, both internationally and in Norway, with regards to cultural political preferences (e.g. Johannisson 2006, Cray *et al.* 2007, Bjørnsen 2009, O-Kyung 2010, Røyseng 2008a). By contrast, there is a lack of studies on the views of artist *practitioners* on cultural policy. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Daniel has concluded that there is a need for more studies on policy views held by practitioners in the creative sector (Daniel 2014a, p. 553). However, a few studies have been conducted on the subject. I briefly review studies conducted by Daniel (2014a, 2014b), Nijzink *et al.* (2017) and Wesner (2018), all of which represent important and recent contributions.³⁸

In a study by Daniel (2014b) from Queensland in Australia, artists and creative workers were asked about their participation in the policy making process in cultural policy. The study concluded that the opportunities that were offered to artists, with regards to participation in the policy making process, were extensive and readily available (Daniel 2014b, p. 263). Another finding from this study was that the creative sector felt that the

sector was more visible for *local* authorities in Queensland, than for the national government in Australia. Some stakeholders therefore suggested that power and decision-making should be more decentralised. This study also reported on considerable concern in artist communities with regards to recent funding cuts.

It is worth noting that Daniel's study involves "artists and creative industries workers" (Ibid., p. 261). The reason why this is an important observation, is that there seems to be general difficulties in defining the borders between the creative industries and the arts. In Scandinavia, these conceptual demarcations have been problematised by Bille (2012), who concludes that it is difficult to come up with clear definitions within the sector. The same observation is made by Røyseng (2011, p. 15). The problems related to the demarcations, or lack thereof, between the arts and the creative industries, are also addressed in Chapters 4 and 5.

In a study conducted by Nijzink *et al.* (2017) in the Netherlands, the values of local policy-makers were compared with values of artists and creative workers. Nijzink *et al.* (2017) used policy documents to identify the values held by municipal governments. In contrast, with regards to the identification of corresponding values among artists and creative workers, the researchers conducted an online survey. Nijzink *et al.* (2017) chose to use the *economies of worth* perspective by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), and the concept of *value regimes*. With this theoretical framework, they made several conclusions about the relationship between values expressed by artists values and values expressed in cultural policy documents.

In the same way as in Daniel's (2014a) study, Nijzink *et al.* (2017) conclude that there is a general concern regarding the public funding level in the sector. Two thirds of the artists and creative workers were of the opinion that municipal support was insufficient (Nijzink *et al.* 2017, p. 606). Both artists and creative workers were equally dissatisfied with the role of their respective municipalities as stimulators and facilitators. These findings might suggest that the commercially leaning creative industries expect public funding of the creative industries to mirror the public funding of the non-commercial art sectors.

Another finding from the study by Nijzink *et al.* (2017) was that the municipalities and the creative workers had different priorities regarding the *world of inspiration*, which is

a term used by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). Moreover, artist organisations and creative workers tended to view the market and the industrial world as problematic, while the municipalities, on the other hand, were convinced that the *world of inspiration* should either be overcome or be used to create value in the market and in the industrial world. Both policymakers and artists thought it was unclear whether the arts should be considered parts of the creative industries (Nijzink *et al.* 2017, p. 612).

The study by Nijzink *et al.* (2017) demonstrates three different forms of analytical challenges faced by this kind of stakeholder analysis of the cultural sector. First, their theoretical tool is highly specific, in the sense that they *a priori* point to the model of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) as the most theoretically viable one, for their purpose. While it might be possible to transfer some of the conclusions made by Nijzink *et al.* (2017) to the more *general* case of differences in government and artist priorities, their use of a *specific* theoretical tool complicates those possibilities. Secondly, Nijzink *et al.* (2017) abstain from making a conceptual distinction between the *self-interest* of artists and creative workers on the one hand, and the *ideological* inclinations of these stakeholder groups on the other. From the perspective of my thesis, which is primarily concerned with the ideological aspect, it is not clear to which extent the artist values identified by Nijzink *et al.* (2017) are rooted in *self-interest*, and to which extent they are rooted in *ideological* differences. Thirdly, the study by Nijzink *et al.* (2017) is not limited to non-commercial arts, such as the classical music sector. It studies the arts and the creative industries more broadly. All these three factors reduce the degree to which their study can be transferred to the more general question of cultural political values among non-commercial artists.

Wesner (2002, 2018) has conducted studies concentrating on visual artists in Eastern Germany, their policy views and adaptation after the German reunification in 1990. These studies are remarkable in two ways. First, they take a longitudinal approach, in that they follow artists and policy makers in Eastern Germany from 1996 to 2018 (Wesner 2018, pp. 8–9). Secondly, they are rare examples of the use of grounded theory in cultural policy studies. In some ways, the visual artists that Wesner interviewed seem to have experienced

the transition to the new Germany in a negative way. This had to do with the decrease in work security that followed with the transition into capitalism. As Wesner concludes:

It appears likely that they [visual artists in Eastern Germany] would have welcomed other options [than adaptation to capitalism], such as a more socialist society that would take their convictions into account and restore their reputations and social position (Wesner 2002, p. 322)

However, Wesner does not offer discussions on whether this view was primarily driven by self-interest or ideological conviction. In fact, what we can largely conclude from all the studies referred to above, is that they offer little discussion on the relationship between *ideological* views held by artists on cultural policy on the one hand, and *self-interested* views on the other hand. These two perspectives are largely examined by previous studies as if they were two sides of the same coin. Cultural policy views held *by artists* on the one hand, and cultural policy *for artists* on the other hand, are not analytically distinguished from each other in these studies.

However, when the general public calls for artists voices in the development of cultural policy, the most reasonable assumption is that it is the *ideological* aspects that the general public is primarily interested in. For example, when the journalist cited in Section 1.4 suggested that cultural workers should be invited to participate in the development of cultural policy, it is presumably not the self-interest of artists that she refers to. It is more reasonable to interpret the call for artist participation in the policy process as a request for more knowledge about artists' views on how cultural policy can make society better. It is also the *ideological* aspect, not the self-interest aspect, that will be the primary focus in Chapter 4.

2.7 CONCLUSION

The classical music sector faces challenges both in terms of production and consumption. The most important challenge from the production perspective is related to the rising costs within labour-intensive industries, which includes the classical music sector and its major institutions. From the consumption perspective, the classical music sector as political challenges related to cultural taste and musical consumption hierarchies.

These challenges have historically been met by political authorities in different ways. Rationales of cultural policy have been evolving, both internationally, and in the Norwegian case. Arguably, real cultural policy started after WW2, when cultural policy became a part of the general planning within the welfare state, and when different rationales were approached in a deliberate manner. Various typologies of rationales have been presented, but none of these are satisfactory *a priori* tools for empirical cultural policy analysis.

Artists might be viewed as epistocrats or experts in the policy making process of cultural policy. They are routinely consulted for advice within the overlapping zone between cultural life and public authorities, with regards to how challenges in the classical music sector should be addressed by the public authorities. Some studies have been conducted to explore artists' views on cultural policy rationales. Still, there is a lack of studies comparing the perspectives of practitioners within the classical music sector, with cultural policy rationales expressed by authorities.

3 METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES

The conclusions and interpretations reached in this thesis were based on qualitative research. Qualitative research can be defined as research that is “primarily (but not exclusively) nonquantitative in character” (Saldaña 2011, p. 3). I coded interview transcripts and policy documents, and subsequently used these codes in a hermeneutic approach (von Wright 1971, Gadamer 2004). As indicated by the research questions, the main goal was to convey politically related values of classical musicians, and to compare these with stated priorities in cultural policy. Moreover, it was a goal to do so in a way that seemed recognisable for the interviewees and political authorities involved. To use Schutz’ *postulate of adequacy*, the representation of these views should be “reasonable and understandable for the actor himself, as well as for his fellow men” (Schutz 1943, p. 147).

There is a large variety of potential qualitative methods available, each of them with strengths and limits. I had to weigh the strengths against the weaknesses, and to select the forms of qualitative methods that seemed best suited to address the research questions. I also had to make choices regarding the *amount* of qualitative material that should be gathered, from the perspective of saturation. Furthermore, I had to make choices with regards to the use of theory and values in the analyses. In this chapter, I present the considerations that informed the methodological choices of the thesis.

3.1 INTERVIEWS

I needed to gather empirical material that would provide me with information on the views that classical musicians hold on cultural policy. According to Bardach, broadly speaking, we can consider two forms of empirical material, namely *documents* and *people* (Bardach 2012, p. 83).

As an initial observation of the classical music sector, we can observe that many classical musicians in Norway are members of unions. The main union for musicians, *Creo*, organises musicians within all genres, music teachers and artists within other art areas. In addition, *The Norwegian Society of Composers* organises composers, primarily from the classical music sector. These organisations have produced various documents which are all potential sources of inquiry for any researcher doing research within the cultural policy that applies to the classical music sector in Norway. They provide views on cultural policy. I used documents from these unions in some parts of Chapter 4.

However, in order to answer the research questions in a proper way, I also needed in-depth material that these documentary representations of musicians' views could not provide. Qualitative interviews can potentially provide in-depth insights (Rubin and Rubin 2005, Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, Wengraf 2011, Brinkmann 2013, Edwards and Holland 2013, Fujii 2018, King *et al.* 2019). I conducted semi-structured interviews, which is a form of interviews that is in-between an open conversation and a closed questionnaire.³⁹

Kvale and Brinkmann have described a semi-structured interview in the following way:

It comes close to an everyday conversation, but as a professional interview it has a purpose and involves a specific approach and technique; it is semi-structured – it is neither an open everyday conversation nor a closed questionnaire. It is conducted according to an interview guide that focuses on certain themes and that may include suggested questions. (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p. 27)

The interviewing tradition in social science is inspired by concepts from phenomenology (Neisser 1959, Husserl 1965; 1977; 2012, van Manen 2014). The goal is to avoid objectifying the interviewees, and to obtain an intimate relation where in-depth discussions are possible. As Merleau-Ponty points out, “wanting to treat [the social] as an *object* is the common error of the curious bystander” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 380, my emphasis). Conversely, according to Husserl, through transcendental phenomenology, “the serious problem of personal egos external to or alongside of each other comes to an end in favor of an intimate relation of beings in each other and for each other” (Husserl 1965, p. 190). This intimate relation of beings allows for a more in-depth form of understanding. To use Kvale and Brinkmann's words, the qualitative research interview can be used as a vehicle to obtain

the phenomenological aim of retaining “fidelity to the phenomena investigated”. (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p. 27).

As Kirk and Miller note, an attribute of qualitative research is that it is “intrinsically exploratory” (Kirk and Miller 1986, p. 17). What this means is that although some conclusions might be *expected* to appear, based on research results from previous studies, a qualitative inquiry should fundamentally be open for drawing a wide range of interpretations and conclusions.

One of the interview strategies that supports the explorative nature of qualitative nature of qualitative research, is the strategy that Kvale and Brinkmann refers to as *deliberate naiveté* (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p. 28): “The interviewer exhibits openness to new and unexpected phenomena, rather than having readymade categories and schemes of interpretation” (Ibid.). As we learn from for example Lakatos (1978) and Gadamer (2004), the researcher will always have *expectations* or *prejudice* regarding which answers to expect from an interviewee. Still, arguably, the researcher should take a position where all forms of answers from the side of the interviewees, are considered *possible*. In this thesis, which follows Belfiore in her call for “genuinely explorative research” (Belfiore 2009, p. 354) within cultural policy studies, this *deliberate naiveté* perspective of Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p. 28) was important as a guide throughout. For example, I asked, deliberately naively, as the first question, whether the interviewees thought that the public sector should fund the classical music sector (see Appendix 4). One of the interviewees responded with the statement: “Is that a question?” and subsequently remained silent, with a friendly smile. The question was perceived as too naive to deserve a serious answer from his point of view. But in most cases, the deliberate naivety did not induce awkwardness. On the contrary, my experience was that the *deliberate naiveté* strategy allowed the interviewees to reflect genuinely on their own values and perspectives, and to provide substantive answers to a seemingly harmless interviewer.

The semi-structured approach also allows the researcher to maintain a certain *focus*. As Kvale and Brinkmann put it: “The interviewer leads the subject toward certain themes, but not to specific opinions about these themes” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p. 31) For

example, I was not only interested in understanding the *general* values and priorities of the classical musicians that I interviewed, but I was more specifically interested in their views on the role of the *public sector*. The semi-structured interview format allowed me to lead the dialogues in this direction (see Appendix 4).

I decided to interview classical musicians from various *parts* of Norway. This decision had some practical consequences for how the interviews were conducted. First, the physical distances entailed that participant information sheets (see Appendix 2) were sent to participants, and that signed forms of informed consent (see Appendix 3) had to be obtained by postal service and e-mail. Travels to the locations of all the interviewees were not practically possible to arrange, for several reasons. Constraints related to finances and time was the most important reason. In addition, as Hanna has noted, there is a trade-off between the data quality that can be expected from face to face interaction on the one hand, and ecological concerns on the other (Hanna 2012, p. 240). Ecological concerns point in the direction of technological alternatives to physical travels. Hence, only four interviews were done face to face. Thirty of the interviews were conducted through video software, while three interviews were done on audio only, due to special requests. The expected quality of telephone interviews might be disputed (Miller 1995, Irvine 2011, Vogl 2013). However, these three interviewees explained that they felt that they would be better able to provide substantive opinions in audio only interviews, because they felt that face to face elements in the dialogue would be distractive. Although most of the interviews were arranged with the use of video, it was only audio that was *recorded* from these video interviews. This also applied to the interviews that were conducted face to face.

According to Lo Iacono *et al.* (2017, p. 10), the use of video conferencing in interviews should be “embraced with some confidence, rather than cautiously considered”. As Lo Iacono *et al.* (2017) underline, in terms of Goffman’s concept of self-presentation (Goffman 1956), the video interview encounter is somewhat different from a face to face encounter. For example, in a face to face interview situation, the whole person is conveyed, which is something that provides an opportunity for a more complete form of communication. Still, as Lo Iacono *et al.* (2017) observe, it is not necessarily the case that

video conference interviews provide empirical material that is less rich than face to face interviews. As an example, they refer to an interviewee who expressed that he felt “more loose tongued – in Skype than I do face to face” (Lo Iacono *et al.* 2017, p. 6).⁴⁰ In other words, he felt less inhibited by the video interview situation than in face to face interviews.

The research questions asked in this thesis are about political values, priorities and beliefs. The interview guide (see Appendix 4) reflected this political emphasis, and it did not include biographical questions. Knowledge about the upbringing or career progression of the interviewees might have increased our understanding of their views on cultural policy, but the nature of the research questions required a political emphasis in the interview guide.

My general impression from the interviews was that the physical distance allowed the interviewees to stay focused on the issues, and that it allowed them to be less occupied with the interviewer-interviewee social relationship. This focus was beneficial for the study. Some of the interviews took place when the interviewee was at his or her home, while other interviews were conducted when the interviewee was at his or her work building, for example backstage in the concert hall. My impression was that many interviewees appreciated the relatively low degree of invasiveness that the video interview situation provided.

A question that is often considered in qualitative research, is whether the interviewees should be considered *elite*. *Elite* interviewing is a methodological strategy with its own challenges (e.g. Kincaid and Bright 1957, Dexter 2006, Beckmann and Hall 2013, Beamer 2016). Clearly, there are cultural power elites in Norway (Engelstad 2017), although we might not be able to define precisely who these cultural elites are. Some PhD theses within cultural policy studies have employed what can be understood as *elite* interviewing, in terms of the political and organisational positions of the interviewees, and these studies have named the interviewees (e.g. Johannisson 2006, Bjørnsen 2009, Hetherington 2014). For me, however, it was important to make sure the interviewees did not consider themselves *representatives* for their respective institutions, but *practitioners* in the classical music profession, due to the nature of the research questions asked. Elite interviewing can be very useful, because, as Beamer observes, elite individuals may have “special insight into the causal processes of politics” (Beamer 2016, p. 87). But as Andersen points out, resourceful

interviewees might be valuable sources of knowledge without being elite individuals (Andersen 2006, p. 279).⁴¹ In my case, I was more interested in the values among practitioners, which meant that their factual *knowledge* about specific political processes was less important. Interviews of practitioners allow real confidentiality (Grinyer 2002, Moore 2012, Wiles *et al.* 2008). By avoiding political and organisational elites, I could also be relatively sure that the interviewees would not enter into a situation where they would use what Kvale and Brinkmann call “prepared ‘talk tracks’” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p. 147). While *elite* interviews might take the form of social performances (Goffman 1956), with extensive use of “talk tracks”, we can *a priori* expect that it is easier to get analytical or emotional replies from practitioners on grass roots level. Practitioners on grass roots level might also *a priori* feel free to criticise public policies and institutional policies by their employers. In cases of non-anonymous interviews of elites, such as managers of major cultural institutions, it is unlikely that the interviewer can avoid performative noise in the interview situation. If arts managers are non-anonymous, and if their institutions receive support from the public sector, we cannot reasonably expect these managers to convey their real views during interviews. Elite interviews might however be important in studies of power. If power is our main research topic, elite interviewing might be important. Table 3-1 sums up these differences. Arts managers are, in a way, arts *practitioners*. But I avoided them as interviewees, due to their roles as representatives for institutions, and due to “talk track” considerations.

Table 3-1 Arts managers versus art practitioners as interviewees.

Art managers	Art practitioners
Interviewees primarily represent their respective institutions.	Interviewees primarily represent themselves as individuals.
Interviewees are likely to employ performative sociality and “talk tracks”.	Interviewees are likely to be authentically analytical and emotional.
An important data source in studies of cultural power.	Less important in studies of cultural power.

Methodological choices are also necessary in terms of *sampling*. According to Patton, one characteristic of qualitative inquiry is the use of *purposeful* sampling. The researcher selects

“information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the questions under study” (Patton 2002, p. 230). As Palys notes, “the list of purposive strategies that may be followed is virtually endless” (Palys 2008, p. 697).⁴² A comprehensive review of pros and cons of different purposive sampling strategies is therefore not possible within the confines of the thesis. I followed Corbetta (2003), who suggests the following sampling strategy:

A few (normally from two to four) variables relevant to the issue under investigation are identified and a table is drawn up containing cells generated by the intersection of the columns and rows corresponding to the values of the (nominal) variables. For each cell generated in this way, the same number of subjects will be interviewed. For example, if the variables selected are gender, age (youth, adults, senior citizens) and education (lower, higher), their combination will generate 12 cells, for each of which we will interview the same number of people. (Corbetta 2003, pp. 6–7)

The goal with this sampling strategy is not to achieve *statistical* representativeness, but what he calls *substantive* representativeness (Corbetta 2003, p. 7).⁴³ From the perspective of this thesis, although the conclusions are not generalisable, the main categories of respondents within the classical music sector are represented. I decided to give priority to the variables age, gender, location, and instrument group, and aimed to reach a form of substantive representativeness within these variables. The sample of interviewees in the study therefore has a considerable representation of both sexes, most age groups, a variety of geographic locations, and all the major instrument groups within classical music (see Appendix 1). Furthermore, as Corbetta underlines, “the objective is not to pick out the relationships among variables, but to understand individual manifestations” (Ibid., p. 8). That is why I also used snowball sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981, Noy 2008), as a supplementary sampling strategy.

With regards to sample size, this is a widely discussed topic (Coyne 1997, Guest *et al.* 2006, Robinson 2013, Rapley 2014, Boddy 2016, Malterud *et al.* 2016, Sim *et al.* 2018). Baker and Edwards make the following suggestion:

In advising graduate students we often suggest aiming for a sample of loosely 30. This medium size subject pool offers the advantage of penetrating beyond a very small number of people without imposing the hardship of endless data gathering, especially when researchers are faced with time constraints. (Baker and Edwards 2012, p. 9)

However, as Mason (2010) observes, few researchers are *explicit* in their requirements of sample size. Many researchers claim that they use *saturation* as the criterion by which they decide on the number of interviews, without elaborating on their *understanding* of the concept of saturation. What Mason found in a study of PhD theses from the universities of UK and Ireland, was that the mean number of interviews was 31 and the median was 28, with the most common sample sizes being exactly twenty and thirty, i.e., multiples of ten. According to Mason, “sample sizes of round numbers suggest, perhaps, an insufficient grounding in the concept of saturation” (Ibid., p. 59), and he suggests that there is “something pre-meditated about the samples in these studies” (Ibid., p. 62). He thus implicitly criticises the tendency where saturation is downplayed as the *deciding* factor in sampling. From Mason’s study we might be concerned that the numbers twenty or thirty are becoming *rules of thumb* numbers for social science PhD theses. In that case, round numbers are the deciding factor for the number of interviews, instead of saturation. Mason suggests that we should “at the very least, understand the concept of saturation”, and with a proper understanding of the term, we will be “(...) better able to understand the limitations and scope” of our work (Ibid., p. 62). What Mason’s study demonstrates, is that essentially, there are two different saturation strategies that we can use, and which serve very different functions. On the one hand, there is an *ideal* version of saturation, which Dworkin has described as the point where “(...) the data collection process no longer offers any new or relevant data” (Dworkin 2012, p. 1319). On the other hand, there is a *pragmatic* strategy, where the amount of data gathering is determined not by the degree of saturation, but by the time and financial resources available in the project. In the latter case, as demonstrated by Mason’s study, round numbers are *de facto* often used.

Neither the ideal saturation strategy nor the pragmatic strategy for data gathering were realistic in this project. If we look at the *ideal* saturation strategy first, then in principle, we should continue to gather data until the increased knowledge from each extra unit of data reaches *zero*. But in any qualitative research project, it is hard to imagine a situation where the researcher can claim to have reached this point. The knowledge reached by each additional data unit diminishes, but it hardly ever reaches *zero*. On the other hand, a *fully*

pragmatic solution to the interviewing strategy would entail deciding on a *fixed* number of interviews *a priori*, for example thirty, in accordance with the advice from Baker and Edwards (2012) quoted above. But when push comes to shove, saturation matters more. Therefore, in the course of the project, I used saturation as the *main* factor in decision-making with regards to data gathering, although pragmatism was a significant second factor. When I had conducted 37 semi-structured interviews, there was a substantial degree of repetition of themes, so I finished the interviews. Clearly, however, this number is far too small for generalisations, and the thesis therefore cannot claim any generalisability of the conclusions to the general population of classical musicians in Norway.

3.2 TEXTS

The aim of the thesis was to compare practitioner perspectives with the political perspective. I therefore needed empirical material representing the political perspective on the three levels of government in Norway.

As Bowen points out, document analysis is “particularly applicable to qualitative case studies – intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organisation, or program” (Bowen 2009, p. 29). The use of policy documents in analysis also has other advantages. The documents are often easily available, cost-effective to use, stable, and unaffected by the research process (Ibid., p. 31).

Public policy can be understood as “the sum total of government action, from signals of intent to the final outcomes” (Cairney 2012, p. 5). When it comes to *analysis* of public policy, *public policy analysis*, this is a concept that can be defined in different ways. For example,

Policy analysis is systematic thinking about public issues or decisions leading to practical responses that can be broadly communicated. (Bovbjerg 1985, p. 154)

Policy analysis is a process of multidisciplinary inquiry aiming at the creation, critical assessment, and communication of policy-relevant knowledge. (Dunn 2018, p. 3)

Public policy analysis seeks to promote social values by informing participants in the policy-making process. (Vining and Weimer 2015, p. 273)

We define policy analysis as evidence-based advice giving, as the process by which one arrives at a policy recommendation to address a problem of public concern. (Meltzer and Schwartz 2019, p. 15)

As we see, some understand policy analysis as *descriptive*, while others view it as inherently *normative*. Vining and Weimer (2015, p. 273) claim that policy analysis is inherently normative, in that the promoting of social values is inherent to policy analysis. However, in this thesis, I took a *descriptive* approach to policy analysis.

In addition to the *descriptive-normative* distinction in public policy analysis, there is also another distinction that can be made, in the understanding of the term *policy*, namely the distinction between *policy as process* and *policy as end product*. The most common view is that policy is a *process*, such as in Cairney's (2012, p. 5) definition referred to above. When the term *policy* is understood as a *process*, it is also reasonable that public policy *analysis* examines this *process* (e.g. Birkland 2015). In this thesis, however, I primarily examined policy documents as *end products*. I paid less attention to the policy process *behind* these end products. What this means is that I conducted *descriptive-interpretive analyses of texts in documents*. I paid less attention to the *processual* side, and I did not systematically study *non-textual* elements in the documents.⁴⁴

The reason why cultural policy documents are valid as representations of cultural policy for the classical music sector, is that these documents are usually published by the public authorities that fund music institutions and projects. When it comes to the role of texts in cultural policy, it is important to distinguish between two different *roles* that texts might take, or more precisely, the roles that might be *attributed* to them by the researcher. First, policy documents might be regarded as *representations* of cultural policy. In this view, it is acknowledged that other aspects such as actions, processes or discourses may *also* be representations of cultural policy. By contrast, policy documents might be attributed the role of *constituents* of cultural policy. In this latter perspective, policy documents are not only *representations* of cultural policy, but they *are* cultural policy.

Whether we regard policy texts as representations or constituents of policy, cultural policy texts can be interpreted either in a *literal* or an *intentional* way. As Manning states, in the perspective of law: “textualists choose the *letter* of the statutory text over its *spirit*”. The

reason why textualists do so, is, to use Manning’s phrase, “the intricacy and opacity of the legislative process” (Manning 2005, p. 420). By contrast, we might analyse documents in terms of their intentions.⁴⁵ These analytical approaches are summed up in Table 3-2. (1) and (2) denote the analytical position where texts are considered *constitutive* for cultural policy, while (3) and (4) denote the analytical position where texts are considered *representational*.⁴⁶

Table 3-2 Literal versus intentional analysis.

Literal analysis	Intentional analysis
(1) Texts are considered the only relevant material in policy analysis. The texts are interpreted in the way that a reasonable user of words would have interpreted them.	(2) Texts are considered the only relevant material in policy analysis. The texts are analysed in terms of their intentions, including potential hidden intentions.
(3) Texts are considered one of several potential representations of policy. Texts are therefore interpreted alongside other representations of policy. The texts themselves are interpreted in the way that a reasonable user of words would have interpreted them.	(4) Texts are considered one of several potential representations of policy. Texts are therefore interpreted alongside other representations of policy. The texts are interpreted in terms of their intentions, including potential hidden intentions.

Arguably, the ideal way of interpreting cultural policy, is (4). The role that is attributed to text is then only *representational*, which means that other empirical material than texts are also considered relevant. In (4), texts are interpreted in terms of their *intentions*, including potential *hidden* intentions. This *representational* and *intentionalist* approach can be expected to provide us with the *richest* outcomes. In this thesis I pragmatically used approach (2), although I would have used approach (4) if had had the opportunity to do so.⁴⁷

Derrida attributes a *constitutive* status to texts when he declares that “reading (...) cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent” (Derrida 1976, p. 158). Moreover, he claims that “There is nothing outside of the text” (Ibid.). It is also the same type of constitutive status that Weber attributes to the texts when he concludes that “The management of the modern office is based upon written documents” (Weber 1978, p. 957). According to this constitutive view of texts, the written documents are *essential* as empirical material for understanding the rationality of “the modern office”

that Weber studied. If we employ the same principle to cultural policy analysis, we might consider policy documents to *be* cultural policy. In that case, we do not consider the texts to be *representations* of “something other than it”, to use Derrida’s words, but we consider the texts to be simply “it”. What the claims and observations by Derrida and Weber suggest, is that in the case where a researcher approaches a policy sector such as cultural policy, it is the *textual* material that should be in focus.

Notably, the policy documents that describe rationales for public funding of the arts are rarely *music* political documents. They are documents that are general for all arts sectors, and sometimes also for a much wider conception of culture than just the arts. This is congruent with the political belief in the commensurability of different forms of artistic expressions (Belfiore and Bennett 2007b, p. 136 Belfiore and Bennett 2009, p. 30). What this belief entails in practical analysis, is that when we analyse the ways in which the authorities legitimise public funding of classical music as a *specific* arts sector, we most often have to do this by analysing *general* cultural political documents. In some cases, this might be questionable, for example in cases where policies might seem to apply more to *other* arts sectors than the classical music sector. But in many formulations of arts policies, it is reasonable to assume that these policies *also* include the classical music sector, although the policies are rarely *confined* to this sector.

With regards to policy documents, I used purposive sampling. This corresponded to the aforementioned purposive sampling of interviewees. On all levels of government, I concentrated on those types of documents that could be expected to represent government policies with relevance for the classical music sector after 2000.⁴⁸ I did not focus on cultural policy priorities by specific political parties. I decided not to do so, because Norwegian cultural policy has largely been characterised by consensus (Røyseng 2015). As Mangset and Hylland point out, the different political parties have a “core of consensus” (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 316), and “a certain degree of rhetorical overlap” (Ibid., p. 317). Therefore, it is plausible to analyse cultural policy overall, and not only focus on cultural policy priorities of specific political parties.

At the state level, I prioritised government declarations (GDs), budget proposals (BPs) and white papers (WPs), because they are documents where the Norwegian government describes its plans for the arts sectors to the general public (see Appendix 5). Government declarations are overall declarations that a new government makes when it enters power. In Norway, such declarations are commonly produced, due to the electoral system referred to in Chapter 1. State governments are usually coalition governments that cannot simply use *one* political party program as their political platform. The political parties that intend to form a government, therefore need a GD that conveys their intentions. The GDs are relevant sources of representations of state priorities within the cultural sector. I studied the GDs produced since 1997. These GDs stem from coalitions formed by political parties with different ideological backgrounds, and the GDs therefore represent a wide spectrum of political ideologies.

Budget proposals (BPs) are crucial in cultural policy. The considerations that underpin the state funding decisions are commonly described in the BPs that the governments submit to the Parliament in October each year. The state level BPs that I studied, represent parties from different ideologies, in the same way as the GDs referred to above. State cultural policy is also described in White Papers (WPs) and strategies that are specifically oriented towards the cultural sector. The combination of GDs, BPs and WPs provided a relatively extensive representation of state cultural policy on the strategic level. I supplemented this material with other potentially relevant documents, such as grant letters to the major institutions.⁴⁹

From the regional level, I selected 23 documents (see Appendix 6). The counties are obliged to follow the formal state level legislation concerning arts and culture. According to Article 4 in the *Act of Culture*, counties and municipalities have the obligation to “provide economic, organisational, informing and other relevant tools and measures that promote and provide a broad spectre of cultural engagement, regionally and locally” (Lovdata Foundation 2007). The policy objectives of the regions within the area of cultural policy are expressed in various planning documents. Cultural policy is sometimes treated as a distinct policy area, but cultural policy in the counties is also often interconnected with other sectors, such as health, education and regional development (Vestby 2013, p. 13). Consequently, documents

describing county cultural policy can be divided into two different types of planning documents. First, some counties have *dedicated* cultural planning documents, focusing on areas such as arts, culture and cultural heritage. Secondly, some counties have included the cultural sector in other policy areas, most notably regional development. This means that although most counties have formulated specific priorities within cultural policy, these priorities can be found in different forms of documents. Some of these documents refer to culture in a relatively broad sense, while others are more specifically related to the arts sectors.

From the municipal level, I selected 27 cultural plans (see Appendix 7). As Mangset and Hylland observe, the state level and the municipal level are relatively equal when it comes to cultural spending, although they engage in different forms of culture (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 208). But there is a difference between these levels of government, in terms of the types of texts that they produce. While the state level produces a *variety* of documents that describe cultural policy, cultural political priorities on the municipal level are usually described in one specific form of documents, namely cultural plans (CPs). Some municipalities refer directly to the *Act of Culture* as a reason for developing a CP, while other municipalities seem to identify a need for cultural policy planning independently from this Act. In any case, as Hylland and Mangset further point out, one should not underestimate the municipal level:

It is easy to focus solely on state authorities – ministry and arts council – when one is to describe the public cultural policy. One then forgets that the municipalities arguably play a just as important cultural political role as the state. (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 208)

In a practical research perspective, this means that the legitimation that is done on local and regional levels should not be overlooked, due to the considerable amount that is spent on culture on the local level. This is also the reason why this thesis examines policy documents on all the three levels of government.⁵⁰ However, I confined the sample to municipal plans produced by municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants.⁵¹

When it comes to documents that are published by government bodies, it might in some cases be asked how *representative* these are for their respective authorities. Some might argue that it is unreasonable to limit analysis of policy to analysis of *documents*, because the

documents are too influenced by the specific civil servants who write them. As a case in point, it is a well-known fact that during the 1970s and 1980s, one specific civil servant in MC had a particularly prominent position (Vestheim 1995, p. 178, Dahl and Helseth 2006, p. 231, Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 230). A relevant question in such a case, is to which degree the policy documents of the time were *representative* for the political authorities in power, and, on the other hand, to which degree they represented the values of the specific civil servant that had such a prominent role. According to Grund (2008, p. 23), the two first WPs on culture in Norway, from the 1970s, were by some called the first and second *revelations to John*. The important role played by an individual civil servant was thereby implicitly underlined by comparing his role in the MC to the role of a prophet.⁵²

What Grund's observation demonstrates, is that one should be careful not to overestimate the number of people who are involved in the work with a policy document before the document is published. Grund's example is from the state level, but in counties and municipalities, which often have limited administrative resources, it can be expected that the situation is roughly the same. The political representativeness of policy documents within the cultural sector might therefore in some cases be questioned. However, for researchers who analyse these policy documents, the most pragmatic strategy is to approach policy documents as *if* they reflect the values and priorities of the politicians who are in power. Moreover, even in those cases where very few civil servants or other bureaucrats have been involved in the work with a cultural policy document, it might still be argued that the document constitutes *the policy* of that sector, if we subscribe to the constitutive view of cultural policy texts. That was what I did in this thesis. I acknowledged that some of the documents that I studied, might in fact be *revelations* to one specific person, to use Grund's term. But even if a policy document is in fact the *revelation* to a John, or a Thomas, or an Anne, it would still be unreasonable to *dismiss* this document as an irrelevant policy paper. It is important to remember that the publishing authority of such a revelation, whether that is the state, a county, or a municipality, is still *responsible* for the published revelation.⁵³

3.3 THEMATIC ANALYSIS

I used thematic analysis as the analytical approach to the interview transcripts and policy documents. This analytical approach provided a suitable way of presenting and discussing the research findings.

The term thematic analysis is most commonly associated with relatively recent research, due to an influential article by Braun and Clarke from 2006 (Braun and Clarke 2006). Their article describes how thematic analysis can be used to analyse and categorise different forms of data, including interview transcripts and documents. The approaches to knowledge organisation that Braun and Clarke describe in their article, is old. However, the method that they describe has been more commonly associated with other terms, such as classification and typology (Foucault 1970, pp. 125–165, Bailey 1994). The underpinning aim, whether we use the term thematic analysis, classification or typology, is to organise and analyse data, so that the data becomes more comprehensible. As Merton noted, “(...) the ancient device of classification serves to convert the tacit empiricism of lists into the analytical rationalism of categories” (Merton 1975, p. 336). The categories help us understand the data in a better way.

According to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis can either be considered a tool that can be used *across* the spectrum of qualitative methods, or it can be considered an *independent* tool of inquiry in itself. They further conclude that one of the major strengths of thematic analysis as a research tool, is its *flexibility*. This flexibility made thematic analysis an attractive tool for the research questions that were asked in this thesis. The thematic analysis approach allowed me to analyse the empirical material relatively independently of the expectations that were examined in Chapter 2. In other words, it allowed for “genuinely explorative research” (Belfiore 2009, p. 354) with regards to rationales for public funding of the classical music sector. Braun and Clarke (2006) are primarily concerned with *people* as their sources of data for thematic analysis. Interview material thus fits well into their analytical system. But their method can also be used in analyses of documents. As Coffey notes, it is “(...) entirely possible and appropriate to undertake a thematic analysis of documentary data” (Coffey 2014, p. 370).

Arguably, thematic analysis is *de facto* already a prominent research strategy within cultural policy studies, although it is rarely explicitly *presented* as such. Some of the typologies referred to in Chapter 2 can be considered thematic analyses within cultural policy studies (Bennett 1995, Belfiore and Bennett 2008). What these studies have in common is that they limit the use of a *priori* theoretical systems. This means that the themes are inductively generated from observed data. Still, they do not only provide lists of observations, they also theorise, using what Merton called the “analytical rationalism of categories” (Merton 1975, p. 336).

Thematic analysis has been used explicitly in different areas of research, both applied to *people*-based empirical material (e.g. Clark 2017, Haeyen *et al.* 2018, Silverman *et al.* 2018, Lin 2019) and to *text* documents (e.g. Nisbett 2013, Bagheri *et al.* 2017, O’Kane and Boswell 2018). Notably, with the exception of Nisbett’s (2013) study of international policy documents in the UK, the use of thematic analysis in the area of cultural policy has rarely been *explicitly* described and scrutinised as such. Still, as I have shown above, one might argue that thematic analysis has *de facto* been used in various previous publications within this research area.⁵⁴ The flexibility that Braun and Clarke (2006) describe, is also a general attribute of much qualitative research. As Ely notes:

The overriding characteristic that many qualitative researchers find most crucial is flexibility. Intellectual flexibility is one aspect. We may in fact start out with some ideas of what we will find – it is natural for the human mind to be curious about the future and to anticipate its outcome. But it is incumbent upon qualitative researchers to remain open to the data that emerge from the field. Cognitive rigidity may interfere with seeing many aspects of the data, and may seriously short-circuit the pursuit of further knowledge. (Ely 1990, p. 132)

Braun and Clarke (2006) differentiate between *realist* thematic analysis on the one hand, and *constructionist* thematic analysis on the other (Ibid., p. 85). As they explain, in a *constructionist* perspective, meaning is assumed to be produced *outside* of the individual. By contrast, in *realist* thematic analysis, which I used, it is assumed that there is a relatively clear line between language and meaning, and that the views that are expressed, stem from the people who are consulted in the research process, not from non-identifiable sources outside of them. In my thematic analysis of data, I used the six step process suggested by Braun and

Clarke (2006, p. 87). These steps are (1) familiarisation with the data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes, (5) defining and naming themes and finally, (6) producing the report, which in this thesis is Chapter 4. During step 6, the writing of the report, or Chapter 4, themes were contextualised *a posteriori*, by use of relevant theoretical literature.

Some of the familiarisation with the data was done *during* the sampling process, and throughout the transcriptions of the interviews. Although transcriptions are time-consuming, they have the advantage that they also allow for familiarisation.⁵⁵ After the familiarisation phase, I generated initial codes. For example, a view that was expressed by some interviewees, was that institutions that receive government funding should play a certain number of works composed by Norwegian composers. This observation generated the code *national repertoire*. In a corresponding way, some interviewees thought that institutions should actively try to recruit Norwegian musicians. I called this code *national recruitment*.

The third step, the search for themes, was done by looking for *patterns* in the initial codes. For example, I considered that concepts such as *musical repertoire* and *recruitment* pointed to a common category of *collective identity*. In reviewing the themes, which is step four, I examined how the categories related to each other, and whether they seemed to cover the initial codes in a satisfactory way. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that step 5 should consist of defining and naming the themes. However, I made tentative names for the themes already during the steps 3 and 4, and step 5 thus consisted of *corrections* of themes that had been named during earlier steps.

Braun and Clarke (2006) describe the result of the thematic analysis as a *system of themes and sub-themes*. This was reflected in the analytical process in this thesis, in the sense that some themes seemed to have some elements in common that allowed for the definition of a higher-order theme. I then changed the status of the initial theme from a theme to a sub-theme. This corresponds to what Neuman describes as *axial coding*, where the researcher looks for patterns in the initial open codes (Neuman 2007, p. 333).

The coding process will inevitably be influenced by the overall research strategy that underpins the research project. A research project can be open, in the sense that it does not

have any pre-formulated research questions. In this project, however, I had specific research questions as guidance. In that sense, the process was analyst-driven. As Braun and Clarke (2006) explain:

(...) a ‘theoretical’ thematic analysis would tend to be driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytic interest in the area, and is thus more explicitly analyst-driven. This form of thematic analysis tends to provide less a rich description of the data overall, and more a detailed analysis of some aspect of the data. Additionally, the choice between inductive and theoretical maps onto how and why you are coding the data. You can either code for a quite specific research question (which maps onto the more theoretical approach) or the specific research question can evolve through the coding process (which maps onto the inductive approach). (Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 84)

In other words, in a thematic analysis, there are in principle two distinctively different approaches that can underpin the coding. The first way is where the researcher has defined his or her analytical interest *before* his or her encounters with the data. In my case, for example, the research questions had been defined *before* the coding started. In the case of the policy documents, the research questions also guided the way in which I coded these documents.

3.4 THEORY IN THE ANALYSES

As we saw in Chapter 2, cultural policy studies is informed by different theoretical perspectives. Concepts from welfare economics have been used to study production challenges of the classical music sector, and the policy implications of these challenges. Correspondingly, challenges related to consumption aspects have been addressed from the perspective of the sociology of taste. In the case of arts practitioners’ views on policy, researchers have used both *a priori* theoretical systems (e.g. Nijzink *et al.* 2017), and inductive approaches, such as grounded theory (Wesner 2002; 2018).

I used thematic analysis in this thesis, as described in the previous section. In a thematic analysis, it is possible to make use of deduction or induction (Braun and Clarke 2006, pp. 83–84). We might give prominence to *one* or a few selected theoretical systems, or we might aim for *emergence* of findings, such as in grounded theory. The degree of theory use in the analyses has a vast impact on the analyses themselves. I had to choose either a

theoretical approach, an inductive approach, or an eclectic approach. I chose the latter. That is, however, not a trivial decision. Many studies of cultural policy make explicit use of one selected theoretical system. Some researchers might argue that the selection of such an *a priori* system is *constitutive* of scholarship. However, selecting such an *a priori* system might also result in research waste, as we will see. I therefore abstained from using a selected *a priori* tool. I only used theory in an eclectic manner throughout the thematic analysis. It is necessary to provide some reflections about this methodological choice.

In the history of legitimation for public funding of various sectors, theory from welfare economics stands out as a prominent *a priori* theoretical system (e.g. Pareto 1971, Pigou 2013, Musgrave and Musgrave 1989, Stiglitz 2000). Concepts used in economics include *utility*, *merit goods* and *market failure*. These concepts can, in principle, be used to grasp the reasons behind public funding of various policy areas. The problem with concepts from welfare economics, however, is that it is very difficult to connect these concepts to empirical references in cultural policy documents. As we will see in Chapter 5, public authorities within cultural policy in Norway rarely express themselves in ways that can reasonably be translated into the conceptual system of welfare economics.⁵⁶

There are also conceptual alternatives to welfare economics, when it comes to cultural policy analysis. For example, there are various high and middle-level theories and concepts from sociology and the humanities. But while the conceptualisations of rationales for public subsidies have remained largely *constant* within welfare economics, high and middle level theories in the other social sciences have been more fluctuating. In fact, as Mangset has pointed out, the use of theory has tended to be influenced by popularity waves:

The social sciences and the humanities tend to be strongly affected by more or less superficial popularity waves: Habermas had his greatest period of fame more than 30 years ago. Bourdieu came into fashion in the 1980s and 1990s, later on he has more or less been replaced by Foucault. We are now waiting for Luhman (sic) or Boltanski to conquer the academic scene. (Mangset 2010a, p. 48)

With regards to Bourdieu, Røyseng notes that Bourdieu's concepts have been extensively used in cultural policy studies, and that the popularity of Bourdieu's concepts has "inevitably (...) motivated many researchers to look for new theoretical heroes" (Røyseng 2010, p. 68).⁵⁷

Mangset was right in his prediction, in the sense that Boltanski has now conquered the academic stage in cultural policy studies, together with Thévenot (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). They are new “theoretical heroes” of cultural policy studies, in the sense that their conceptual system has been used in numerous publications (e.g. Kann-Rasmussen 2016, Larsen 2016; Lemasson 2013; 2015; 2017, Nijzink *et al.* 2017). Notably, however, these studies do not provide extensive discussions of *alternative* theoretical frameworks. Riding the popularity wave of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) is seemingly more important than providing convincing epistemological reasons for doing so. Boltanski and Thévenot’s positions as “theoretical heroes” in cultural policy studies status seems to suffice as motivation for using Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) conceptual system.

However, it is not enough for a researcher to simply find a “popularity wave” or a new “theoretical hero”. It is also important to make the data conform with the adopted model. This process might produce unfortunate results. The desire to ride the theoretical popularity wave might induce the researcher to attempt to force the data to fit into the model. As Swedberg puts it: “(...) all too often an awkward attempt is made to force the research findings into some existing theory (...)” (Swedberg 2012b, p. 12). This applies not only to theoretical heroes of cultural policy studies. It applies more generally. Weber, for example, forced the concept of *rationalisation* on virtually *everything* that had to do with music (Turley 2001, p. 640, cf. Weber 1958). That is one potentially unfortunate result of a clearly defined *a priori* conceptual tool. Correspondingly, data might be forced to conform to Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) concepts.⁵⁸

As Mangset points out, in the quote above, theoretical concepts proposed by Foucault have become influential in the social sciences and humanities. Cultural policy studies, as a subdiscipline *derived* from various social sciences and humanities, is no exception (e.g. Bennett 1992, Barnett 1999, Sigurjonsson 2010, Pyykkönen 2012, Khan *et al.* 2015, Miller and Yúdice 2002).⁵⁹ Foucault’s concepts have provided a theoretical popularity wave in cultural policy studies. But in practical analyses, Foucault’s concepts sometimes obscure more than they illuminate. Schaanning, a philosopher who has published extensively on the works of Foucault (e.g. Schaanning 1991; 1997; 2000; 2001; 2017), concludes that theory

increasingly appears as unnecessary decorations, and as add-ons to the empirical findings, in a way that is supposed to make the texts appear more academic (Schaanning 2013).⁶⁰ In these cases, academic affectation produces what has been referred to as academic waste (Elster 2011, p. 160).

High-level theoretical tools in cultural policy studies might for example be concepts such as *field*, *habitus*, *cultural capital* (Bourdieu), *discourse*, *governmentality* (Foucault), *hegemony* (Gramsci), *economies of worth* (Boltanski/Thévenot), *autopoiesis* (Luhmann) and so on. Notably, researcher waste is not only caused by researchers themselves using concepts in a wasteful manner. In some cases, the concepts might be too vague to be analytically useful. For example, with regards to Bourdieu's concept *field*, Jenkins has stated:

Bourdieu's literary and discursive style can be interpreted as a strategy designed to bolster and generate his own academic and intellectual distinction. He, [Bourdieu], however, offers a different explanation. If, for example, there is a 'certain vagueness' in some of his concepts – his own example is the concept of the 'field' – this is because they are intentionally 'open' and 'provisional', to permit them to be of maximum heuristic use (...) (Jenkins 2002, p. 169)

The downside of the “maximum heuristic use” perspective, however, is that it is challenging to use the concept of *field* in practical empirical analysis.⁶¹ As Mills has put it, the ordinary researcher might “empty the concepts with which you are dealing of clear and present empirical reference (...)” (Mills 2000, p. 221).⁶²

Glaser's and Strauss' alternative is to let theory “emerge from the data” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 36). They wanted to avoid the forcing of data into “great man” theories:

The analyst may, indeed, force this connection because he was taught to think that science *is* applying an analytic framework to an area of study – not to force is to *stray* from science. (...) he may force the connection to ensure his promotion in an organization staffed with colleagues who feel there *ought* to be such a relation, because a “great man” said one existed. (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 29, my emphases)

Notable examples of grounded theory within cultural policy research are the two aforementioned studies by Wesner on visual artists and arts policy in Eastern Germany (Wesner 2002; 2018). Wesner describes grounded theory as “free and open ended”, and

recommends grounded theory as a methodology for cultural policy studies (Wesner 2018, p. 180).

But while theory-laden inquiries might be influenced by “popularity waves” (Mangset 2010a), it was not a realistic alternative to let theory “emerge from the data” in this thesis, as in the original grounded theory approach. This was because, as Lakatos puts it, “there are and can be no sensations unimpregnated by expectations” (Lakatos 1978, p. 15). As Braun and Clarke put it, “data are not coded in an epistemological vacuum” (Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 84). There must be somebody who interprets and analyses, because there is no *ground zero* from which data can be interpreted, and this somebody will inevitably possess expectations that colours his or her analyses. The problem with theory-laden research waste is when these expectations stem from theoretical systems or concepts that are used in an inflexible manner, as “sacred texts to be worshipped as totems” (Turner 1998, p. 245).

Glaser and Strauss were aware of the fact that all inquiry is in some sense theory-laden. They were not naive empiricists (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 3). But neither did Glaser and Strauss provide a tool for *how* analysts should use theory *a priori* (Kelle 2007, 6) within the grounded theory program. As Kelle points out, “*The Discovery of Grounded Theory* neither gives clear-cut methodological rules nor practical examples about how previous theoretical knowledge can be fruitfully introduced in the process of category building.” (Kelle 2007, 6-7).

Table 3-3 shows the contrast between different cultural policy research strategies. The table uses a quote from a publication that uses grounded theory, and contrasts this with a theory-laden publication. They are vastly different, as we see. The grounded theory example from Wesner (2018, p. 4) is rather straightforward, while the theory-laden example from Pyykkönen (2012, p. 558) is rich on *a priori* described theoretical concepts. Pyykkönen’s formulation is significantly theory-laden, and I am not sure I understand the quote, even in its proper context. In Table 3-3, (1) and (2) sum up the ways in which Foucault’s system and the grounded theory system should be used in practical analysis, respectively. (3) and (4) are quotes that illustrate these approaches in practical cultural policy analysis. Arguably, both

of these approaches should have a place in cultural policy studies, although there are risks of research waste with both strategies.

As a third alternative, Bryman suggests that literature can act as a “proxy for theory”, and that theory is often “latent or implicit in the literature” (Bryman 2012, p. 22). Bryman defends the “publications-as-theory” form of research. This is research that is “conditioned by and directed towards research questions that raise out of an interrogation of the literature” (Ibid.). It has no clear connection with *one or a few specific* theories on grand or middle-range level. This “publications-as-theory” approach might *refer* to a grand theory, although without identifying this specific grand theory as *the* theory that is used in the empirical analyses. The grand theory is then referred to in the attempt of *answering* the research question, but the grand theory is in that case not an *inherent* component of the research design itself.

Table 3-3 Theory-laden analysis versus grounded theory analysis.

Theory-laden analysis	Grounded theory analysis
(1) “[Foucault’s] method is to ask what rules permit certain statements as true and some as false; what rules allow the construction of a map, model or classificatory system; what rules allow us to identify certain individuals as authors; and what rules are revealed when an object of discourse is modified and transformed (...)” (Philp 1991, p. 69)	(2a) “The researcher reads and analyses the data word by word, line by line, paragraphs by paragraph, or incident by incident, and might use more than one of these strategies.” (Thornberg and Charmaz 2014, p. 156) (2b) “As coding and memoing progress, patterns begin to emerge.” (Holton 2010, pp. 24–25)
(3) “It is not difficult to see a rather straightforward relation to governmentalisation discourse, as the suggested methods for democratisation in culture and production and the dissemination of cultural expressions require effective conduct and regulation. The connection between democratisation and commodification is manifested such that the goals of democratic aspirations should serve the favourable production and dissemination of cultural expressions.” (Pyykkönen 2012, p. 558)	(4) “[identity, myth and memory] form part of what I define as the specificity of the artist. The notion of professionalism conveys the intricacies and complexities of artists’ careers, but at the same time it recognises myth, memory and identity politically. Over the course of this chapter, I suggested that professionalisation and the associated cultural policy framework, as seen in the context of unification, shapes artists’ thought and experiences, but this requires a more detailed analysis.” (Wesner 2018, p. 41)

From the perspective of Norwegian cultural policy studies, an article by Mangset and Hylland (2014) on the recruitment of actors to theatres, is an illustrative example of this “publication-as-theory” approach. First, Mangset and Hylland (2014) review relevant literature on a relatively low level of abstraction. They briefly include middle level theory by Beck (1992) and Bauman (2000) in this review (Mangset and Hylland 2014, p. 78). Still, they do not give a *a priori* prominence to any grand or middle level theory, neither from economics, nor from sociology, political science or other disciplines that inform cultural policy studies. In the end of their article, they sum up their findings in nine clearly articulated points (Mangset and Hylland 2014, pp. 84–89), which are easily comprehensible for lay people. It is hard to see how it might have *added* to the value of these findings, if they would have been able to interpret the data within the framework of a concept such as *discourse*. Moreover, and to use Mangset’s own rhetorical question: “Would one not end up with approximately the same results?” (Mangset 2017, unpaginated).⁶³

The practical consequence for this thesis, is that I followed in the footsteps of Hylland and Mangset (2014) which I described above, in a pluralistic application of the preconceptions and expectations from Chapter 2. Following Mills (2000), I recognised the difficulties of operationalising high-level theoretical concepts such as *discourse* or *field* into manageable tools for analysis. My empirical analyses are therefore not based on a *single* or pre-defined set of high or middle level concepts such as *utility*, *merit goods*, *market failure*, *discourse*, *field*, *hegemony*, *modernity*, *economies of worth* or others. None of these are given a *a priori* prominence as conceptual tools in the analyses. At the same time, I also acknowledged Kelle’s (2007) warning about the problems of the grounded theory framework, in that it is unclear how a *a priori* theory should or could be used in an analysis based on grounded theory.

The result is a “publication-as-theory” approach (Bryman 2012, p. 22) that is also informed by the preconceptions and expectations from Chapter 2. What this means is that in Chapter 4, I refer to relevant middle level concepts, primarily from economics and sociology, where that seems relevant, from the perspective of the primary research question.

3.5 VALUES IN THE ANALYSES

Belfiore argues that there is an “uneasy relationship between academic cultural policy research, policy advocacy and the policy-making process” (Belfiore 2016, p. 206). What this means is that there are different positions in cultural policy studies as a research area, when it comes to the role of value judgments. The situation that Belfiore describes does not only apply to cultural policy studies. As Betta and Swedberg point out, contemporary students, in general, are badly educated on the relationship between value judgment and value freedom (Betta and Swedberg 2017, p. 454). As long as cultural policy researchers are badly educated on the relationship between value judgment and value freedom, it is likely that the relationship between cultural policy research and cultural policy advocacy will remain uneasy.

The possibility of value-free inquiry is often rejected. Rudner has made a useful summary of the main points that often underpin the rejection of value freedom as a possible research option:

Those who contend that scientists do essentially make value judgments generally support their contentions by either

- A. pointing to the fact that our having a science at all somehow “involves” a value judgment, or
- B. by pointing out that in order to select, say among alternative problems, the scientist must make a value judgment; or (perhaps most frequently)
- C. by pointing to the fact that the scientist cannot escape his quite human self – he is a “mass of predilections” and these predilections must inevitably influence all of his activities not excepting his scientific ones. (Rudner 1953, p. 1)

With regards to A and B, as Skjervheim has put it: “We cannot *choose* to be engaged; by our being in the world, we are already engaged, in one way or another” (Skjervheim 1976a, pp. 63–64, my emphasis). Therefore, it is impossible for us to separate ourselves from the matter that we study. The separation between the researcher and the researched material is therefore only a matter of *degree*, because it is theoretically impossible for the researcher to observe without participating.

It is hard to find literature where Rudner’s A and B are contested. Hence, in practice, virtually all scholars seem to agree that *value-free* scholarship is theoretically impossible, if avoidance of Rudner’s A and B are required for value-freedom. For example, As Røyseng

states: “Research contributes to bringing some parts of the field of arts and culture into the light, conceptualise them, relate them to a specific framework (...)” (Røyseng 2004, p. 112). The only interesting question, from the perspective of this thesis, is therefore whether it is possible for a social scientist to avoid Rudner’s C. Weber’s (1949) well-known claim is that *despite* the “mass of predilections” described in Rudner’s C, it is possible to conduct scholarship without letting these “predilections” *influence* the research. Conversely, if we believe that it is impossible to avoid Rudner’s C, we will claim that the *knowledge production* and the *moral values* of the researchers are so inextricably linked, that it is impossible to keep them separate. For example, in this view, if the scholar believes that rap music is inherently evil, we will assume that his or her analyses of the role of rap music in society will be *coloured* by this conviction, because Rudner’s C is unavoidable.

Notably, members of these two camps do not always *declare* their value-free or value-laden epistemological points of view. In fact, they rarely do so. Therefore, it is not always clear whether a publication within cultural policy studies *aims* to be value-free or not. In some cases, however, it is clear, and this has a significant impact on the way that the analyses unfold. An example of Weber-oriented cultural policy research is a study on church music communities in Norway (Hylland and Stavrum 2015). The study concludes that when these communities consider traditional hymns to be a treasure, i.e., that the hymns are highly valuable, then that is a normative view that researchers should review with analytical detachment:

For us as researchers, it is important to look beyond potential normative views such as this, and to analyse them from a critical perspective. It is here we think the perspective of the sociology of art can help us to see things clearly. (Hylland and Stavrum 2015, p. 33)⁶⁴

In other words, the researchers implicitly assume that it is possible for them to conduct their analyses without letting their own personal value judgments *colour* these analyses. One might object and claim that the perspective of the sociology of art is just as normative as any other perspective. But these researchers seem to use the sociology of art as their analytical tool because they are convinced that this perspective is *less* inherently normative than the

analytical alternatives. This indicates that value-free analysis, in terms of Rudner's C, is the epistemological ideal that they are striving towards.⁶⁵

The considerations regarding value-free and value-laden analysis are relevant for all the social sciences.⁶⁶ When it comes to cultural policy studies, this area of inquiry is largely *derived* from the social sciences, and cultural policy studies has thereby inherited the value question from these social sciences. The cultural studies strain of cultural policy studies is sometimes referred to as *critical* cultural policy studies (McGuigan 2004). *Critical* cultural policy studies explicitly or implicitly considers ideologies such as neoliberalism and capitalism to be inherently morally objectionable (McGuigan 1996, McGuigan 2004). Moreover, from the *critical* cultural policy studies point of view, researchers who claim that they do not take a stance, are “justifying the way things are presently constituted” (McGuigan 2004, p. 136). As Hammersley has put it, the possibility of value-free analysis is “dismissed by ‘critical’ researchers as either an ideological disguise or as self-delusion” (Hammersley 2013b, p. 33). Eagleton even suggests that the conceptual distinction between value-laden and value-free inquiry is ethnocentric (Eagleton 1990, p. 166), and dismisses the possibility of conducting value-free inquiry.

Most Scandinavian publications within cultural policy studies are far from the critical cultural policy studies that McGuigan calls for. Scandinavian cultural policy research is influenced by a conviction about the possibility of value-free inquiry, when it comes to Rudner's C. I share this conviction. It is possible to control the “mass of predilections”, and to prevent them from colouring the analyses. This also means that I believe it is possible to assess the plausibility of a research publication without knowing anything about the personal “mass of predilections” of the researcher behind the publication. For example, it is possible to assess the plausibility of the conclusions reached in *The Distinction* (Bourdieu 1984), even though Bourdieu does not provide us with explicit self-reflections about his own personally held values. Our task, in our assessment of *The Distinction*, is not to objectify Bourdieu and ask ourselves what his personal values are. Our task, in the assessment of his work, is to consider his data and his analyses, and make a conclusion with regards to the plausibility of

his analyses. His personally held beliefs and political standpoints should be regarded as irrelevant in our assessment. As Weber has put it,

An anarchist can surely be a good legal scholar. And if he is such, then indeed the Archimedean point of his convictions, which is outside the conventions and presuppositions which are so self-evident to use, can equip him to perceive problems in the fundamental postulates of legal theory which escape those who take them for granted. Fundamental doubt is the father of knowledge. (Weber 1949, p. 7)

We can assess the plausibility of the anarchist's analyses without knowing anything about the values held by the anarchist. An anarchist and a conservative might agree perfectly on the *plausibility* of an analysis, although they are likely to disagree on normative issues related to law. To paraphrase Weber, the plausibility of their respective analyses does not rely on their respective intrinsic value judgments, but on their ability to employ *fundamental doubt* throughout their inquiry.

An advantage of research aiming for value-freedom in terms of Rudner's C, is that this research strategy allows for *less bias* and *deeper probing* than what is usually found in value-laden inquiries. As Hammersley has put it, "research aimed at producing value conclusions is *more* likely to suffer from bias as regards the pursuit of factual knowledge" (Hammersley 2017, p. 10, emphasis in original). Betta and Swedberg conclude that "Value freedom helps to guide the research into new and fruitful directions and to steer it clear of propaganda" (Betta and Swedberg 2017, p. 445). Moreover, by aiming for value-freedom, it is possible for the researcher to "(...) probe deeper and to make a more sophisticated analysis than if she includes an advocacy of her own values" (Ibid., p. 447). The researcher aiming for value-freedom can *concentrate* on analytical aspects, and he or she can avoid getting distracted by personal passions and desires to make value judgments alongside the analyses.

Rudner's B tells us that "in order to select, say among alternative problems, the scientist must make a value judgment" (Rudner 1953, p. 1). This means that both of the research questions in this thesis reflect value judgments from my side. But the artist perspective is not a perspective that I have chosen due to a conscious stance *for* the artists, and *against* the governmental authorities. In principle, Weber's *fundamental doubt* is equally relevant with regards to all stakeholder groups.

Becker suggests that we should take side (Becker 1967). In other words, he suggests that we should not try to control the “mass of predilections” described by Rudner (1953, p. 1), but we should let these predilections guide us in specific directions in terms of value judgments. As Blomgren (2012) has pointed out, most cultural policy researchers take the side of artists.⁶⁷ As a case in point, Wesner takes side with the artist perspective, and she is correspondingly critical to tendencies in the German political landscape (Wesner 2018, p. 4). For example, she calls the voting result of *Alternative for Germany* in 2017 “alarming” (Ibid., p. 182). Explicitly value-laden analyses such as the one by Wesner are highly prevalent in cultural policy studies, partly due to the heritage from cultural studies (Belfiore 2018, p. 13).

Table 3-4 Value-free versus value-laden cultural policy analysis.⁶⁸

(Aiming for) value free	(Aiming for) value laden / critical
<p>(1) “(...) the investigator (...) should keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts (including the “value-oriented”) conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and his own practical evaluations, i.e. his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including among these facts evaluations made by the empirical persons who are the objects of investigation).” (Weber 1949, p. 11)</p> <p>(3) “(...) why can’t an affluent society like Norway provide scope for even more artists? It is not our primary task as researchers to give normative considerations to questions like this. It is, however, interesting to discuss the following question: is (sic) the government able, by providing more public support, to compensate for the lack of market income, so that anyone with sufficient expertise and interest can achieve a reasonable and good working condition? Probably not.” (Heian <i>et al.</i> 2012, p. 73)</p>	<p>(2) “In short, the study of culture is nothing if it is not about values. A disenchanting, anti-moralistic, antijudgmental stance constructed in opposition to cultural and political zealotry only takes you so far. The posture may be cool, detached and irreverent, but it is not value-free.” (McGuigan 1992, p. 173)</p> <p>(4) (...) in order to sell off the Colosseum, the signature of two ministers would be required on the ministerial decree, rather than that of the Minister of the Economy alone. This provides very little reassurance, especially in the view of the very exiguous political weight that the cultural Ministry has always had in the Italian political tradition. For, although probably no government, present or future, will want to really sell the Colosseum to a Japanese firm (or at least, so one would hope), in the present legislative framework, the legal possibility has been put in place for this to be actually possible.” (Belfiore 2006, p. 311)</p>

It is not necessary to examine whether it is theoretically possible to achieve fundamental value freedom, in terms of Rudner's *C*. What we can conclude, is that some analyses are *more* value free than other analyses, in terms of Rudner's *C*. The question of value freedom in terms of Rudner's *C* is a *continuum*, not a *dichotomy*. In this thesis, my aim was to minimise the effect of Rudner's *C*. This means that I aimed to abstain from taking side in the way that Becker (1967) describes. The aim of value freedom also entailed that I avoided using some *concepts* in the analyses. As Derman has pointed out, researchers aiming for value-free inquiry should "strenuously avoid *concepts* containing an implicit value judgment" (Derman 2012, p. 46, my emphasis). As Røyseng has pointed out, if we use concepts in a taken-for-granted manner, we risk favouring one type of interests at the expense of others (Røyseng 2000, p. 232). In analyses that aim for value-freedom, it is therefore incumbent to exclude concepts that are intrinsically charged with normative considerations.⁶⁹

The different positions of cultural political analysis, with regards to the value questions, are summed up and exemplified by theoretical and empirical examples in Table 3-4. The aim of this thesis was to comply with the value-freedom form of analysis that is defended in (1) and (3).

3.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have reviewed the methodological choices that I faced before and during the empirical analyses. I have accounted for the ways in which I made my choices, with regards to interviews, texts, analytical approach, and the use of theory and values in the analyses.

I have described the ways in which I decided to sample interviewees and conduct interviews. I used semi-structured interviews, which is an approach where it is possible for the researcher to direct the dialogue in the desired ways. The interviewees were located across Norway, and I therefore made use of digital video technology. I decided to use saturation as a primary way of deciding on the number of interviewees. However, the confines of the project also limited the number of interviews that it was possible to conduct. I interviewed musicians with different backgrounds and characteristics.

I have described how I sampled policy texts on the three levels of government, based on their relevance for my research questions. Cultural policy texts are rarely oriented only towards one arts sector. They are more often formulated as general propositions with relevance for the different art sectors. I therefore analysed general cultural policy documents on the three levels of government. I analysed these documents in terms of their intentions. This means that I in some cases derived meanings from the text that are not literally stated.

I have also reviewed thematic analysis, which is the analytical tool that I used in the empirical analyses. Thematic analysis can be used in a deductive way, where the researcher defines an *a priori* typology, and interprets the findings within this typology. Alternatively, the researcher can use thematic analysis as an inductive method. I used the latter method, although it is also possible to claim that the typology presented in Chapter 4 satisfies the formal requirements for typologies examined in Section 2.4.

I have reflected on how to use theory and values in the analyses. I concluded that the use of *a priori* selected theoretical systems in cultural policy analysis are sometimes wasteful, while grounded theory provides too little information on how to use preconceptions and expectations in the analyses. I therefore decided to use an eclectic approach to theory, within the thematic analysis framework.

Finally, I have defended the view that it is possible, in some ways, to conduct value-free cultural policy analysis. I have also made the case that value-free cultural policy analysis is advantageous, because it helps the researcher to probe deeper and conduct more sophisticated analyses.

4 RATIONALES AND COMPARISONS

In this chapter, I address the first research question:

1) Which public funding rationales are emphasised in Norway, by public authorities and classical music practitioners, respectively?

As mentioned in Section 1.2, this research question is the primary research question of the thesis. It therefore receives the largest amount of attention. I compare public sector views and practitioner perspectives within a thematic analysis of cultural policy rationales. I present the themes and subthemes that emerged from policy documents and interviews. The thematic structure is illustrated in Figure 4-1. As shown in the figure, the themes and subthemes all have corresponding sections and subsections throughout the chapter. The numbers of the sections and subsections appear in parentheses in the figure.

The figure serves three different functions. First, it acknowledges the importance of explicit typologies in cultural policy analysis. As discussed in Section 2.4, different typologies have been proposed, and Figure 4-1 represents my contribution to the continuous work with typologies within the research area of cultural policy studies. Secondly, the typology provides a structure within which it is possible to compare public policy and practitioner perspectives. Within each subsection, I refer to empirical references from the public sector and the practitioner perspective, respectively. Thirdly, the figure provides a navigation aid for readers. Within the thematic analysis approach, it is important to present themes and subthemes in a coherent manner, because themes and subthemes relate to each other. Therefore, Chapter 4 is longer than the other chapters in the thesis. Figure 4-1 is intended to make it easy to navigate through this long chapter without losing overview.

As illustrated in Figure 4-1, I concluded that public funding rationales for the classical music sector in Norway can be categorised into three main categories: Equality rationales,

collective well-being rationales and intrinsic value rationales. This conclusion was reached on the basis of coding of the empirical material, and subsequent organisation of themes into mutually exclusive categories.

Within these three mutually exclusive main themes, I identified several subthemes. Within the equality rationale, I identified economic equality, geographic equality and access equality as relatively prominent themes. Within the collective well-being rationale, I identified the creative economy rationale, the collective identity rationale, the collective civility rationale, and the public health rationale. Correspondingly, within the intrinsic value rationale, I identified *as-if*-incommensurability and human-independent value as two distinct subthemes.

I identified equality rationales as rationales that are characterised by overall intentions of promoting equality between citizens, and between groups of citizens, with regards to the dimensions of equality referred to above. Collective well-being rationales, by contrast, do not necessarily promote equality. The label collective well-being applies for the cases where the primary concern expressed was the overall well-being of citizens within the country, region or municipality. Finally, I labelled some rationales as intrinsic value rationales. Both in the policy documents that I examined, and during the interviews with the practitioners, intrinsic value emerged as a distinct category of rationales, although it might be argued that the term itself does not provide a satisfactory account of its meaning. The comparisons of viewpoints held by the public sector and by the classical music practitioners that I interviewed, are presented within these three main themes of rationales. As demonstrated in Figure 4-1, each of the main themes has its own section in the chapter.

Clearly, a categorisation of cultural policy rationales is up for discussion. This also applies in this case, even though the categorisation builds on clearly identified empirical material. Both the categorisation and the labelling involve a significant amount of subjective judgment from my side, but the three main themes should be regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories.




Figure 4-1 A typology of public funding rationales for the classical music sector.

4.1 EQUALITY

Many of the 37 practitioners that I interviewed expressed equality values more strongly than what is done in the cultural policy documents that I analysed. This tendency was most prominent in terms of economic equality and redistribution of wealth. On the other hand, in areas such as geographical equality and cultural access, I found no significant differences. Policy documents focus more on *cultural* equality in the sense that they are often aesthetically relativist. At least some of the interviewees expressed a less relativist position, with regards to aesthetic content. I will now address the three identified equality-related subthemes in more detail, with regards to viewpoints expressed by the public sector and by the 37 interviewees.⁷⁰

4.1.1 Economic equality

Before delving into explicit cultural policy, we should have in mind that economic equality is promoted both through the income side and the expenditures side of public budgets. With regards to the income side, Norwegian authorities promote equality through a progressive tax system. In the case of classical music, this means that most people who attend classical music performances pay less in taxes and ticket prices, in total, than the actual production costs of the performances. Government provision of cultural services thus contributes to redistribution of wealth. As the Norwegian Ministry of Finance states:

The tax system contributes to redistribution, primarily through the financing of broad and good welfare services, and through arrangements that secure income. In addition, the tax system contributes directly to redistribution by calculating the tax burden on the basis of income and wealth. (Ministry of Finance 2017, p. 59)

Hence, people without their own sources of income still have economic access to welfare services, broadly defined. Culture is one of these services. As Vestheim observes in the case of western democracies: “As taxpayers and common citizens, everybody has the right to enjoy culture as a social good” (Vestheim 2012a, p. 500). This is important to have in mind when analysing *explicitly* expressed cultural policy, because it shows that governments engage in economic redistributive policies through the provision of cultural services, even in cases where they do not necessarily make this redistributive aim *explicit* in any cultural policy document. To put it simply, The Ministry of Finance is the primary manager of the *income*

side of cultural policy, and this income side of cultural policy is progressive, in the Norwegian case.

On the other hand, The Ministry of Culture manages most of the *expenditures* side. This is where cultural policy goals and aims are *formulated*. It is not *obvious* that all parts of the cultural policy sector are redistributive. Clearly, as stated by the Ministry of Finance in the quote above, the overall intention with the tax system in Norway is that it should be progressive. But there are continuing concerns about the possible regressive nature of the public support for the arts (Throsby 2017, p. 139), due to the fact that people with high incomes are more inclined to actually *use* these services.⁷¹ As Alasuutari points out, “public spending on symphony orchestras, theatre and opera can be seen as subsidizing the activities of the wealthiest part of the population in particular” (Alasuutari 2009, 110). Kleppe and Løyland have coined this effect *the reverse Robin Hood effect* of cultural policy (Kleppe and Løyland 2014).⁷²

In state policy documents within cultural policy after 2000, redistribution effects of cultural policy are rarely used as *explicit* legitimations of public funding. Possible reasons for this lack of economic focus might be the regressive element mentioned above. Still, the national government does in some cases address economic barriers to cultural participation, for example in a WP called *Culture, inclusion and participation*:

(...) there are various and complex reasons why people do not use cultural services. Physical accessibility and price might be among the barriers that prevent people from active use of culture. The government will contribute to improving access to cultural events for people and groups that face considerable physical and economic barriers. (Ministry of Culture 2011, p. 66)

The price element is a way of addressing the equality issue from an economic point of view. There is a concern for potential audiences that see economic barriers to cultural participation as substantial, in contrast with high-income attenders for whom economic barriers are less relevant. But on state level, these instances of concern for the economic aspect of cultural inclusion, are exceptions. Economic barriers, including price, are rarely regarded as important factors that the state level takes into consideration. The state also abstains from defining formal requirements regarding the pricing policies of the classical music institutions that

receive support. It is possible that the relatively low degree of focus on this issue from the perspective of MC, reflects a general opinion that the ticket prices are not particularly high. Alternatively, it might be that MC does not view the economic equality dimension of ticket prices as relevant for potential attenders.⁷³

Documents on regional and local levels show the same pattern, with a limited focus on economic sides of cultural equality. But a few municipal CPs express concerns with regards to economic access to culture, for example in this quote from Sola Municipality:

Sola Municipality has larger income inequalities than several of our neighbour municipalities and the country as a whole. Income inequality in a municipality can be a sign that there are also social inequalities. Family economy and social background are of major significance for the everyday of children. Participation in cultural and leisure activities give a feeling of being seen and valued, and it creates a sense of achievement and friendships. (Sola Municipality 2015, p. 10)⁷⁴

Economic aspects are addressed as a problem in this quote. Still, this plan does not discuss the specifically *financial* dimensions of cultural access, related to aspects such as ticket prices. In general, plans on the regional and local level are primarily concerned with two economic aspects. First, there is a focus on citizens' *own activities* as cultural participants, for example as participants in amateur orchestras or pupils in cultural schools. This is congruent with the focus of the *new* cultural policy briefly examined in Chapter 2. In addition, there is a focus on *institutions and individual artists* facing increasing costs of production, and the need for public support to these institutions and individual artists. Counties and municipalities are less concerned with economic barriers from the perspective of general citizens as cultural *audiences*.⁷⁵

The economic dimension of cultural access was generally more emphasised by the classical music practitioners that I interviewed, than what is usually the case in Norwegian cultural policy documents. This might have to do with the nature of the classical music sector. Several interviewees expressed a rather low degree of tolerance for the economic inequalities that can be found *within* the sector, in terms of salaries. The inequalities within the classical music sector, which have been examined by for example Lehmann (2002) and Scharff (2017), are not immediately relevant for the *political* aspect of the public support for the

sector. For example, it is possible to imagine that one classical music practitioner might accept the economic inequalities within the sector, while simultaneously expect that the public funding of the sector overall should be economically progressive. But for some, this was an issue that they struggled with, ideologically. Some expressed a frustration with a situation where public funds are used to pay a cultural elite, or to finance posh venues. They seemed to perceive this as a problematic form of inequality that the Norwegian classical music sector is importing from societies where inequalities are more socially accepted.

I have become more and more (...) or rather, I have been this way the whole time. I mean, in classical music now it has become (...) they talk about this in general, in society, those who earn (...) I mean, the differences in society have increased. I feel that in classical music the inequalities have increased significantly (...) between the establishment (...) conductors who earn hundreds of thousands on a concert, I mean (...) it is absurd (...) It is problematic to spend that much of public funds and pay it to those at the top. I remember they had a discussion in Munich when that guy, there was a famous name (...) I wonder if it was Levine who got a job as a conductor in Munich, and he was going to get 14 million. And even the Germans reacted, I mean, it is public, that orchestra. I really get ashamed on behalf of our profession, I mean (...) that they at all can *think of* (...) I think it is deeply problematic, as a cultural (...) I cannot support it, so if somebody asks me about it (...) I think it is just morally wrong. (Elias, pianist)

You know, these new venues, they have become very expensive. They are too expensive for the artists, the independent artists.⁷⁶ So, what happens is that the independent artists become dependent on a new type of gate keepers (...) executives and program managers who are often not Norwegian. So (...) there is a [cultural] elite in Norway, and they benefit from the Norwegian system (...) they become opera managers, orchestra executives (...) high positions, and they rarely have a heart for (...) they bring their own networks and the culture from their countries. (Robert, composer)

Considering these comments, one might ask why the classical music practitioners would not want the authorities to *abstain* from supporting the sector, and simply spend the public funds on measures that are unambiguously progressive. One possible reason is that their generally positive view of the public support of the sector is underpinned by self-interest. But another aspect that was emphasised by some, is that the public funding makes it possible for the major institutions to keep the ticket prices low. That seems to be a crucial factor, because low ticket prices make it economically possible for different demographic groups to attend classical music performances. Some of the interviewees expressed this point by comparing Norway

with other countries which also have considerable public funding of classical music institutions, but where prices for classical music concerts are much higher.

I get almost shocked, and also happy, when I see what it costs to attend a concert in Norway. In principle it is nothing compared to what you pay in the Musikverein or in the Concertgebouw or (...) not to mention Salzburger Festspiele, where you can pay 400 euros for a ticket. And Austria has of course also public support for the arts, so it is rather amazing that this cultural form is available to almost everybody. (Oliver, string player)

I feel very much that Norwegian cultural policy, as it is now, compared to many other countries, is a very equalising thing (...) our concert tickets are not beyond the reach of anybody. (Anne, wind player)

In general, there was a stronger focus on potential economic barriers for classical music audiences among the interviewees in this study, than could be found in the policy documents. There was a belief that keeping performance ticket prices low is an economically equality-promoting measure.

This view was accompanied by a more optimistic view among the interviewees on possible outreach to non-elite audience groups, than what is expressed by the MC. Due to this optimism, the *reverse Robin Hood effect*, referred to above, was generally not perceived as relevant among the interviewees. Some of them believed that the subsidies that allow institutions to keep ticket prices low, are subsidies that might work in a *progressive* way. Robert, who made the critical remark on the power of international cultural executives in the quote above, expressed this point in the following way:

Nobody would have been able to afford performances with full price, and that is our system [The Norwegian system]. Thus, what the attenders may not be aware of, ordinary people, is that it is they who to the largest extent are being sponsored, by the ticket prices being so much lower than the production costs. If one would have to pay what it in fact costs [to produce a concert], only an elite would be able to afford it. (Robert, composer)

Few interviewees believed that it was likely that audiences would remain elite, in terms of economic and cultural capital. Most of the interviewees perceived cultural taste as something fundamentally *dynamic*. Hence, although classical music concert attendance is positively and persistently correlated with income (Danielsen 2006a, p. 53), many interviewees believed that it should be possible to change this pattern. This conviction induced some interviewees

to support economic egalitarianism in political terms, while at the same time strongly defending public subsidies to the classical music sector.

Another version of the optimist view on outreach to non-elite groups was an optimist view on reaching non-elites by differentiating price levels. For example, one interviewee who had lived and worked in various countries, thought that price differentiation might work in a progressive way:

The fact that it is expensive to go to the opera does create inequality. But in England, I lived there for a while, it is possible to get cheaper tickets, so in that area I think we could maybe have something to learn from England, in the sense that you can get a less attractive seat and pay less. The people who had the most expensive seats tended to dress up a bit, while those who had the cheaper seats went there in ordinary clothes. In that way, it became less elite. (Frank, singer)

This is also a fundamentally culturally optimist view, in the sense that the underpinning premise is that it is possible to reach non-elite demographic groups through the price mechanism. By reaching non-elite audience demographic groups through the price mechanism, it might be argued that non-elite demographic groups might also get their fair share of the public subsidies of the classical music sector. That is one way of reconciling an economically egalitarian ideological conviction with the realities of the economic inequalities of the classical music sector.

4.1.2 Geographic equality

The relationship between centre and periphery has been a central issue in Norwegian cultural policy. More generally, as Bakke puts it, the centre-periphery dimension has been a “formative conflict dimension of Norwegian society and politics” (Bakke 2003, p. 148). The whole Nordic region has a relatively high degree of political decentralisation, possibly due to strong welfare states (Schakel 2010, p. 348). Still, compared to the other Nordic countries, Norway is special. As Angell *et al.* (2016) observe, “Norway singles itself out in the way that the ideal of equality is closely tied to *geography*“ (Angell *et al.* 2016, p. 7, emphasis in the original). Public authorities aim to maintain a certain population level in rural parts of the country, and to provide services for the whole country. This includes cultural services such as classical music performances.

From a *general* policy perspective, various measures have been introduced in the efforts to slow down centralisation in Norway. These political efforts include subsidies for agriculture, regional research and innovation programmes, and housebuilding programmes (Angell *et al.* 2016, pp. 54–71). The decentralisation policy perspective contains two objectives that are related, but not identical. First, it aims to reduce the gap between the Oslo region and the other regions when it comes to key areas such as population development, standard of living and well-being. Secondly, it aims to reduce the gap between urban and rural areas within each region (Ibid.).

An important factor in the relationship between centre and periphery, is the way that taxation regulations are designed. In legal terms, the national level has *total* power when it comes to taxation. This is stated in the *Constitution*, article 75 (Lovdata Foundation 2014). The counties and the municipalities do not have any *constitutional* right to a share of the tax incomes, but the Parliament decides in the annual national budgets that a certain proportion of the taxes should be paid *directly* to the counties and municipalities from local citizens and companies (e.g. Ministry of Finance 2017, p. 41). In addition, the Parliament transfers considerable amounts of the national income to the municipalities and counties (e.g. Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2019a). In this way, the state government does to a certain extent level out general economic differences based on geography.

If we move from the general policy level to cultural policy, the relationship between centre and periphery has been an important area of focus in cultural policy studies in general (Bakke 1994, Shoup *et al.* 2014, Zan *et al.* 2007, Mangset 1998, Häyrynen 2013, Kawashima 1997). From a theoretical point of view, according to Kawashima (1997), decentralisation in cultural policy can take three different forms, namely cultural, fiscal and political decentralisation. She uses the term *cultural* decentralisation when the aim is to make culture more geographically *accessible to users*, *fiscal* decentralisation when the aim is to increase relative public *spending* in the regions, and *political* decentralisation when the aim is to increase the *power* of regions in the *decision-making* process of cultural policy (Kawashima 1997, pp. 342–349). Norwegian cultural policy has been significantly coloured

by the conflict between centralisation and decentralisation (Mangset and Hylland 2017, pp. 311–312)

What Kawashima's distinction between different *forms* of decentralisation illustrates, is that the degree to which cultural policy is centralised or decentralised, might depend on the way in which we use the terms. In the case of an orchestra such the Oslo Philharmonic (OPO), this is a centralised institution, regardless of how centralisation is defined. By contrast, The Bergen Philharmonic (BPO) is in part centralised, and in part decentralised. BPO is completely state *funded*, which means that it is a centralised institution in the *fiscal* and the *political* sense. However, it may be claimed to be *culturally decentralised*, in the sense that most of its performances are primarily for people who live in a region other than the Oslo region. But on the other hand, the BPO is located in a major *city*, and most of its performances are primarily accessible for urban citizens. Whether the funding of BPO is an example of centralisation or decentralisation therefore depends on how these concepts are defined.⁷⁷

Clearly, Kawashima's categories of regional cultural *access*, regional cultural *spending* and regional cultural *power*, might in some cases work in different directions, and they might be difficult to balance. For example, if power is *decentralised*, one might claim that this represents an *egalitarian* form of cultural policy, in the sense that it downplays the centralisation of cultural political power to Oslo or other major cities. But in that case, we may also reasonably expect that there will be significant inequalities between the regions, in terms of cultural *funding*. Some regions might choose to prioritise public funding of culture, while other regions might not do so.

If we look at the state government, the geographic equality rationale has not only been historically important, but it was also strongly represented in a recent WP on culture, which states:

The Ministry of Culture is of the opinion that it is necessary to consider solutions that over time makes it possible to maintain the distribution of funds according to the geographical location of institutions and measures. (Ministry of Culture 2018a, p. 92)

In other words, MC aims to secure regional cultural access, and regional spending, of cultural *funds*. But at the same time, the aim is to balance this with regional cultural *power*:

The Ministry is of the opinion that a certain number of institutions of national format can be well governed by local and regional authorities (...) (Ministry of Culture 2018a, p. 92)

The most typical attitude among the 37 interviewees in this study was a general support of the political objective of geographic cultural equality, although there was a certain ambivalence with regards to *how* this objective should be achieved. For example, one interviewee expressed his ambivalence regarding the touring strategy of his orchestra:

I often think to myself that (...) for example we play in [small place]. We go there 3-4 times a year, I think, and that's a part of an agreement we have [with the state] to get a certain public funding.

Q: Right.

And sometimes I think to myself, you know, often there is only fifty people in the audience, maybe. Maybe I am being pessimistic (...) I am sorry, I was probably a little bit pessimistic, let's say a hundred. So, I think to myself, perhaps these people would actually prefer to have a big night out and use the money (...) instead of sending the orchestra there, they could come to [city] and, you know, experience the concert in the, you know, great concert hall instead. (Sebastian, string player)

What this shows, is that although the objective of geographic inclusion might be supported, there are different ways of approaching the problem. On the one hand, there is the superior artistic experience in the urban centre, with specialised acoustics. On the other hand, there are tour concerts which might reach audiences in the districts, but which produce acoustically inferior experiences. This is a dilemma that faces many countries, but Norway is a special case, with its scarce population and challenging topography.

The tensions between the Oslo region and the rest of the country, and between cities and rural areas, are not confined to the cultural area, and these tensions are also relevant for institutions in many other policy areas. What is special, in the case of classical music, however, is that transport of musicians and instruments, accommodation, time use and other costs are considerable (Ministry of Church and Education, p. 15). This is a production challenge of the "handicraft economy" (Baumol and Bowen 1966, p. 377). That is also why, in many cases, only a certain number of musicians or singers travel, while some stay at home. Northern

Norway is a special case, due to its vast distances. The Arctic Philharmonic (AP), which is the most prominent classical music institution in Northern Norway, is expected by the state to cover the whole north of the country, although it might be questioned whether this goal is reached.⁷⁸ As one interviewee from Finnmark put it,

I don't know which mandate The Arctic Philharmonic has, but they rarely visit us in Finnmark, and when they do, that is only with a small ensemble. Is Finnmark County supposed to pay for this? They come here rarely, with 20-25 people, and they do it just to get their money. I think that is wrong use of money. (...) Diplomacy is fine, but the priority should be on touring in Norway. If they have money left after that, they can go to China. (Thomas, wind player)

The claim here is that AP should primarily take care of the cultural access of inhabitants in their own region, which is defined as the three northern-most counties, and not prioritise ambitious touring projects abroad. This illustrates a conflict between aesthetic objectives on the one hand, and geographic cultural equality objectives on the other. On the one hand, touring abroad might increase the feeling of prestige and motivation among the musicians. This prestige and motivation are by some viewed as necessary sources for the development of domestic legitimacy and aesthetic quality. As some interviewees expressed it,

We have been to Japan and Germany lately. It is kind of (...) that makes us do our best (...) and it also gives us a feeling of how good we are. And when we succeed, then that gives us a confidence that we bring back home. And when we go on tours, and when we sort of use that PR for what it is worth, then people at home will also notice. There is that saying of becoming a prophet in your own country. You don't get big at home before you have become big abroad. (John, string player)

A certain touring activity is valuable for (...) I was about to say (...) the "internal medicine" (...) of an orchestra. To play for a different audience, to experience other halls (...) (Alfred, wind player).

The major classical music institutions are also tools in foreign policy.⁷⁹ In that sense, there are continuous trade-offs between international touring on the one hand, and geographical equality for domestic audiences. Most of the interviewees supported the political priority of securing geographical cultural equality. But many also held the view that if a professional orchestra stops touring abroad, the orchestra will not be able to maintain the aesthetic quality of the performances that are presented for its domestic audiences.

When it comes to the perspective of decision-making power, the current situation is complex. In Kawashima's conception, authorities at the state level might also seek to decentralise cultural policy in the political sense, i.e., decentralise the cultural policy decisions. But when the focus of the central government is on the decentralisation of *decision-making power*, and not exclusively on decentralisation from the perspective of *audiences*, this also means that the actual funding depends on the bureaucratic structures and priorities of the *regional* authorities. The question of regional cultural political power became a topical issue in 2018, when an expert committee recommended that all the professional symphony orchestras and operas outside of the Oslo region, should be funded by their respective regions (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2018, p. 126).⁸⁰ From the point of view of the interviewees in this study, there were at least two major areas of concern with this recommendation. The first was the feeling of a *downgrading* of the institutions outside of Oslo, and the second was a concern regarding cultural *competence* in regional bureaucracies.

One particular case is The Bergen Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO), which has for a long time been defined as a *national* orchestra, with full state funding (Ministry of Culture 2018d, p. 72). The expert committee recommended that the financing of this orchestra should be transferred to the regional level. This caused a political outrage in Bergen Municipality, which stated the following in a letter to MC:

The Bergen Philharmonic is one of the oldest orchestras in the world, and it has deep roots in national music history. The claim that the orchestra is not a national cultural institution, and to use this as a reason to transfer the financing responsibility from the state to the county, has no professional fundament, and cannot be taken seriously. The geographic belonging of the audience cannot be used as a reason to view an institution as "national". All institutions (including those in the capital) have an audience and a range that is mainly local or regional. Institutions in Bergen can, in line with institutions in the capital, fulfill "national responsibilities" if they are given equal resources and mandate. (Bergen Municipality 2018a, pp. 14–15)

Clearly, the suggested decentralisation of the political governance and funding of BPO from the state to the county level, was perceived by Bergen Municipality as a downgrading of the orchestra in the city. What this shows, is that geographic equality in terms of culture, is not only about factual access to cultural experiences by local audiences. Political and financial centralisation might in some cases be preferred by the political leadership in the city that

hosts an orchestra, due to the financial and cultural benefits that this centralisation secures for the city's cultural prestige and cultural audiences.

While OPO and BPO are fully funded by the state, and officially defined by the state as *national* orchestras (Ministry of Culture 2018d, p. 72), it is unclear how these orchestras differentiate themselves from the other professional orchestras, in terms of actual operations. All the professional orchestras have traditionally received grants from both the state and from the regions, but in 1992, MC declared that OPO and BPO should be fully financed from the state (Ministry of Culture 1992, p. 19). For the four other orchestras outside of the Oslo region, the sharing of financing responsibility between the state and the regions remained. The orchestras all engage in touring in Norway, primarily in their substantive regions. For example, in the case of OPO, recent Norwegian tours have been to cities like Lillehammer, Ringsaker, Larvik and Tønsberg, all cities a relatively short train ride away from Oslo (Oslo Philharmonic 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2016, 2017, 2018a). Some interviewees thought that an orchestra should not be defined by the state as national, unless this orchestra would tour to cultural venues around the *whole* country.

One might discuss whether there should be national institutions in Oslo and Bergen and not other places, because (...) For example I know how the Oslo Philharmonic and the National Theatre work, they don't have any more national function than the rest of us. They cover the Oslo region, but they don't go on Norwegian tours, so they don't have a national function. Then why should the citizens in the Oslo region have the privilege of a nationally supported orchestra, and not Bergen⁸¹ or Trondheim? I don't get that. (Emma, wind player)

The percentage of state financing was viewed as symbolically important among the interviewees, from a geographic equality point of view. The prospect of a full decentralisation of the financing and governance of the symphony orchestras was perceived as a downgrade. There was also a concern regarding the *competence* of the regional bureaucracies. As some interviewees put it, in the case of a potential full regionalisation:

I would by far prefer to have a small number of people in the ministry who have a competence on music, rather than us having to fight for funding on the regional level. (Alfred, wind player)

The problem with transferring all the funding to the regions, is that regional politicians, bluntly put, don't have the understanding of how these big organisations work. (Amanda, wind player)

That [full regionalisation of financing and governance of symphony orchestras] is very, very stupid, and I think there is going to be a big discussion on this issue. I think we have only seen the beginning yet, and I think the cultural sector will fight it tooth and nails. Just wait and see. (William, string player)

This concern is clearly related to the *political* decision-making dimensions, although these concerns might also reflect long-term concerns for *funding* levels in hypothetical cases where funding is transferred from the state level to the regional level. A decentralisation of the decision-making power in the classical music sector, would in the eyes of these interviewees involve a weakening of their respective institutions. From their perspective, decentralisation would therefore involve an unambiguous loss of cultural status.⁸²

Equality in terms of geographical distribution of cultural services is a multidimensional issue, as demonstrated above. State authorities try to balance cultural geographical equality, in terms of decision-making power, financing power and the audience perspective. Many of the interviewees saw it as a clear advantage that major political and financial decisions within the classical music sector were centralised, but they still thought that performances should be geographically widely accessible. In that sense, these 37 interviewees did not express policy views which substantially differed from the way in which the geographic equality rationale is expressed by the public sector.⁸³

4.1.3 Access equality

Access to culture has been a theme at the forefront of cultural policy for decades. However, as Mangset and Hylland observe, it seems to be hard to influence cultural choice through cultural policy (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 395). Arguably, what Norwegian authorities do, when they prioritise classical music institutions financially, is to make aesthetic judgments. As Vestheim points out, it is hard to imagine a cultural policy that does not make this form of judgment (Vestheim 2004, p. 98). Notably, the public sector rarely *declares* classical music as aesthetically preferable to other forms of music. Still, through considerable classical music subsidies, the public sector *implicitly* relies on well-known conceptions of the universality of

artistic taste (Kant 1914, Hume 1826). The main challenge, from a political point of view, is the persistent differences in the degree to which people from different demographic groups attend classical music performances (e.g. Jordan and Weedon 1995). Some scholars attribute these differences to class aspects (Bourdieu 1984, Bennett *et al.* 2009, Østerberg and Bjørnerem 2017, pp. 110–111). But regardless of which mechanisms are behind these patterns of cultural consumption, the policies that are designed to ensure access to classical music, are measures that aim to level out these differences.

The access to culture discussion has many dimensions. Bourdieu's approach is class related (Bourdieu 1984), suggesting that cultural taste reflects class. Others subscribe to the so-called omnivore theory (Peterson 1992, 1996, 1997, van Eijck and Lievens 2008, Purhonen *et al.* 2010). This theory suggests that cultural distinction is primarily defined by cultural consumption in terms of variety and amount. What has been demonstrated, whether one takes a univore or an omnivore perspective on musical taste, is that barriers to the consumption of genres such as classical music, are not necessarily caused by the aesthetic material itself. As Bourdieu puts it, familiarity with high art is applied in a "pre-reflexive mode" (Bourdieu 1984, p. 418). Therefore, it might be difficult for outsiders to decipher the social codes associated with art genres such as classical music.

Most major classical music institutions in Norway work systematically to reach new audiences. The activities through which they aim to increase the size of audiences can be described with concepts such as *arts marketing* and *audience development*. *Arts marketing* is usually used to denote activities that increase ticket sales, in what Hill *et al.* refer to as "mutually satisfying exchange relationships with customers" (Hill *et al.* 2012, p. 1). This approach usually entails frequent use of traditional commercial marketing concepts such as consumer behaviour, satisfaction, segmentation, positioning and tactics (Hume and Sullivan Mort 2008, Huntington 2007, Kolhede and Gomez-Arias 2017, Siu *et al.* 2016). On the other hand, the term *audience development* is more often used when the interaction between artists and audiences transcends ticket sales transactions, when the building of audiences is long-term, and when the interaction takes the form of community building (O'Sullivan 2009, Borwick 2012). The concept of audience development is also often used when the goal is to

reach underrepresented demographic groups. That is why work with audience development is closely related to cultural access. Government bodies in various countries have in recent decades preferred the audience development approach to the arts marketing approach, in their overall strategies for social inclusion through cultural policy (Kawashima 2006, Newman and McLean 2004, Sandell 1998).

The development of audiences can be done in different ways. One possible way of conceptualising audience development which has been proposed by Kawashima (2000), is to divide it into the terms *cultural inclusion*, *extended marketing*, *taste cultivation* and *audience education* (Kawashima 2000, p. 8). *Cultural inclusion* involves efforts to reach out to groups that are least likely to attend the arts. *Extended marketing* means trying to reach people who are not yet consuming an art product, but who are presumed to be potential attenders. *Taste cultivation* means introducing different art forms and genres to an existing audience, while *audience education* means trying to “enhance the understanding and enjoyment of the arts which existing attenders currently consume” (Ibid., p. 9). In a cultural access perspective, it is primarily the *cultural inclusion* and the *extended marketing* perspectives that are relevant.

Kawashima also distinguishes between *product-led* and *target-led* audience development. What is meant by *product* in the term *product-led* is the artistic work, for example the musical work. Product-led means “to make a product first and then find the segment of the population that would be interested in it” (Kawashima 2006, p. 67). Applied to the arts, a product-led approach is to create the artistic work on the basis of arts-internal considerations of artistic quality and expression, and then subsequently market this work for potential audiences. Target-led, on the other hand, means “to determine a segmented target and find the right products for the group” (Ibid.). In the case of classical music, if the goal is to reach a certain demographic group, this might require that the repertoire is adapted to the assumed musical preferences of this group.

A main goal in state cultural policy is stated in the budget proposal (BP) for 2018, in that “everybody should have access to arts and culture of high quality” (Ministry of Culture 2017, p. 43). Corresponding statements can be found repeatedly in BPs and WPs after 2000. What this demonstrates, is that the question about cultural access is addressed across the

political spectrum. In addition, it shows that the aim of securing equality in terms of cultural access, is perceived by the state as equally important in contemporary Norway as it was in the first period after WW2. However, important aspects of cultural access equality are left unanswered within state policy documents. That is also why it is not a straightforward task to interpret the overall aims of the state in the area of cultural access. For example, central terms such as “everybody” and “quality”, which are frequently used, are ambiguous, but MC rarely offers interpretations that can easily be operationalised. “Everybody” might refer to a range of dimensions such as geography, income, gender, ethnicity and social class, while “high quality” might refer to any kind of cultural expression, from country music to avant-garde music.

If we look at the term “everybody”, a literal interpretation provides little information. In terms of its intentions, this is a term that might be understood in at least two different ways that point in significantly different policy directions. The term might suggest that there should be approximately equal factual cultural *consumption* by different demographic groups. For example, in this *consumption* understanding of the term “everybody”, it would be politically unacceptable if a certain immigrant group were significantly underrepresented on classical music performances. But there is also another potential interpretation. The term might entail that different demographic groups should have equal *opportunities* when it comes to attending cultural events. That is a completely different interpretation, although it is an equally *valid* interpretation of the term “everybody”. For example, although an immigrant group might be underrepresented among audiences of classical music performances, the government might still consider this underrepresentation acceptable, if the government is convinced that the cultural *opportunities* are equal.

A case in point is the aforementioned WP from 2011. This WP concludes that differences in cultural participation are more often caused by *social* than by financial or practical barriers (Ministry of Culture 2011, p. 25). However, it does not say whether these differences in cultural participation represent a *problem* or not. Neither does the WP define measurable target goals for cultural participation within various groups. This might have to do with lack of available research. While divisions in cultural taste seem to persist in the

Scandinavian countries (Rosenlund 2001, Prieur *et al.* 2008, Flemmen *et al.* 2018, Schmitz *et al.* 2018), research within the area has omitted important class discussions. More precisely, researchers have largely abstained from discussing which *criteria* should be satisfied before a society can be judged classless, in terms of cultural consumption and cultural taste. According to Dubois (2011), it follows logically from Bourdieu's sociology of taste that a democratic cultural policy should aim to enable understanding and appreciation among various demographic groups. This requires pedagogic support from cultural guides. Moreover, "a cultural democratization policy should de-sacralise and humanise cultural institutions in order not to intimidate the visitors and to make them feel at ease" (Ibid., p. 498). But the criteria for a culturally classless society remain unclear. Instead, the goal of research seems to follow the advice from Broady, which is to "present rigorous empirically based counter-arguments against the recurring prophecies about the arrival of the classless society" (Broady 2001, p. 58). Norwegian authorities also abstain from discussions about criteria for a culturally classless society. They rarely clarify whether access equality should be operationalised in terms of *availability for everybody*, or *equal consumption by everybody*. This represented a notorious interpretation problem in the documents that I analysed.

Norwegian authorities generally seem to consider *any* form of cultural participation beneficial, in a cultural policy perspective, provided that the participation can be defined as *cultural*. As a joint cultural policy document from the Trøndelag counties states, "Commercial culture is also good culture" (Innovation Norway Nord-Trøndelag *et al.* 2009, p. 31). Another relativist view is that "all citizens have the right to express what is good art for him or her" (Bergen Municipality 2018b, p. 31). In other words, taste is considered subjective, and the judgment of taste can, as Bennett puts it, be "associated with a wider range of cultural practices" (Bennett 2011, p. 538). Although the state rarely uses these expressions, the lack of specificity in terms of *forms* of cultural consumption suggests that the same view is also prevalent on state level. As Hylland has pointed out, non-participation is rarely included in the cultural political choice-frame, but otherwise, the range of legitimate cultural choices is wide (Hylland 2014, p. 23). In the case of classical music, this leaves us with a paradox. On the one hand, the subsidies of the classical music sector are heavy, in

comparison with other music sectors. The public sector thereby continuously takes a stance, in terms of musical aesthetics. But at the same time, authorities do not seem to consider it a problem that underprivileged groups relatively rarely attend performances within this most heavily subsidised musical genre, as long as these groups attend other forms of cultural events.

This cultural relativist strategy might be regarded as a way for the state to form a strategic alliance with the most powerful classical music institutions. Authorities maintain a rhetoric of aesthetic relativism, while the institutions maintain their focus on the core repertoire. As OPO writes in a self-evaluation report submitted to the ministry:

The single most important vision that the Oslo Philharmonic has, is to play the fantastic core repertoire⁸⁴ for orchestras, to a largest possible audience, to take a responsibility for challenging and renewing this repertoire, and to reach a wide audience through vital and varied presentation. (Oslo Philharmonic 2015b, p. 13)

To use Kawashima's concept, this is a fundamentally product-led strategy, where a specific artistic repertoire constitutes the core around which the organisation orbits. The core repertoire consists of what Goehr (1994) called the "imaginary museum of musical works", and which was central in the political *democratisation of culture* strategy (Girard 1997) referred to in Chapter 2. The perceived quality of this core repertoire legitimises public taxation and subsequent funding of OPO.

However, as might be expected, this alliance creates some *external* tensions. For example, an organisation called TrAP, which is an organisation working for diversity within Norwegian arts and culture, is unhappy with the situation. They gave the following suggestion to MC in 2018, with regards to the major cultural institutions:

Finance results, not just institutions. If we want changes, funds must be made available, so that the best institutions can compete for them. Making culture relevant for groups that do not consider culture relevant as of today, should be included as one such result. (TraP Transnational Arts Production 2018, p. 4)

The implicit suggestion is that unsatisfactory results in terms of audience development should lead to reduced public financing. Currently, MC requires from the major classical music institutions that they report annually on "strategies and measures for audience development that also include the minority population" (Ministry of Culture 2018b, p. 2). However, the

ministry does not ask the institutions to report on factual minority *attendance*. Neither does the ministry ask for reporting on attendance from other demographic groups. The challenge with a hypothetical form of public financing partially based on achievements in audience development, is that it might force institutions to deprioritise the core classical music repertoire. This might in its turn threaten the identity of the classical music sector.

TrAP's suggestion would clearly entail a target-led approach. A potential target-led approach might result in a weakening of the orchestra's focus on the core classical music repertoire. The phrase "single most important vision" underlines how important it is for the orchestra to avoid being pushed in the direction of a target-led and results-based audience development approach. Notably, the self-evaluation report referred to above is not a report that is easily accessible for the general public. It is semi-internal, in the sense that access to the report requires an active search on the webpages of the ministry. By contrast, in the easily available annual reports, OPO does not refer to the core repertoire as the single most important vision. Neither is the "core repertoire" mentioned on the web pages. Instead, on the web pages, it is underlined that "the orchestra has a broad symphonic repertoire" (Oslo Philharmonic 2018b). Possibly, the explicitly product-led approach that the orchestra wishes to retain, can be communicated freely in the communication with MC, while it is not considered rhetorically beneficial for the orchestra to express a principled product-led approach to the general public. The difference in communication strategies might suggest that OPO is elitist in the values that it holds and that drives it, but that it does not consider it politically expedient to openly acknowledge those values in public. Correspondingly, some interviewees also seemed to want the public sector to take a more explicit aesthetic stance for the core classical repertoire, to secure the legitimising fundament of the classical music sector:

(...) indifference (...) is what it takes to cut. And that was just what happened in the Netherlands and Denmark. In the Netherlands it was very clear. It was like, "hands-off", the art is free, autonomous, for 20-30 years (...) no interest from the politicians about what they [classical music institutions] were doing, and then, schmack, the cuts. (William, string player).

I have friends who are not musicians, and who don't know so much about it [music]. "That is your opinion", they say. Well, think about literature, nobody doubts what is most important of Donald Duck and Shakespeare, right? But if we turn to music, then [Norwegian country band] and the Philharmonic are supposed to be equal. No, they are not. I mean, objectively, they are not! (Roger, string player)

The musical equivalent of cartoons might for example be film music.⁸⁵ What seemed to be the case for some interviewees, was that they perceived film music as a legitimate part of the repertoire, but also that a clear demarcation should be maintained between the core repertoire and the other repertoire. Almost all interviewees were very positive to outreach initiatives, such as for example playing film music. But they also perceived it as crucial to maintain a clear division between core repertoire and the other repertoire. The audience development efforts of an institution are likely to be influenced by this clear division. As one interviewee put it,

Audience development, getting new, lasting audience to our core activity, that is not playing film concerts and play what people want. On the contrary, it is presenting for them what we do long term, stone by stone, work with children and youth, meet them early, work in schools. But above all, cooperate with those who show an interest in what we do, people who attend cultural schools, music high schools, and who themselves perform. We should meet them, invite them to visit us, play with us, sing with us, that is audience development. But playing what people want, that is not audience development, that is reaching out to the general population so that they know we exist, and that we exist for them, not only for those who belong to us. (William, string player)

If we look back at Kawashima's (2000) categories of audience development, her notion of cultural inclusion as a form of audience development, reaching those who do not normally attend, is not understood as audience development at all by this interviewee. His preferred audience development strategy is clearly universalist and product-led, not relativist and target-led.

The concept of a core repertoire, an "imaginary museum of musical works" (Goehr 1994) is not confined to orchestral music. It also applies to other parts of the classical music sector, which have lower levels of funding than the major orchestras. The independent musicians that I interviewed tended to share the same main perspective as the one quoted above. A classical guitar player described in this way how little relevance audience numbers really had for his ensemble:

We don't pay attention to that at all. We try to make a concert program or a project that can reach as many as possible from the premises that we set ourselves. We do try to play some audience friendly pieces and those things, but in those cases, we have ourselves chosen to play the music we play. We should just play as good as we can, so that people like it, and then maybe more people come next time. (Samuel, guitar player)

As Bjørnsen has pointed out, it is a challenging task to attract audiences from underrepresented demographic groups with a product-led approach (Bjørnsen 2010, p. 117).⁸⁶ Presumably, that is also why admitting that some groups simply do not “belong to us”, is perceived as legitimate. By abstaining from defining measurable goals when it comes to demographic outreach, the public sector has decided to promote the “fantastic core repertoire” at the expense of cultural access. In that sense, the general priorities of the public sector are close to the viewpoints expressed by many of the interviewees, in terms of cultural access equality. This means that if cultural policy for the classical music sector were governed by the values of the 37 interviewees, it is unlikely that they would significantly change the current overall strategy of the public sector, in terms of the access to culture rationale.

4.2 COLLECTIVE WELL-BEING

I use the term collective well-being about areas where the primary public sector focus is on collective results, and where the public sector pays less attention to relationships between citizens, in terms of power or equality. For example, when the National Norwegian Opera and Ballet (NNOB) was founded in 1959, it was based on aristocratic and bourgeois traditions (Vestheim 1995, p. 160). Arguably, national *collective* ambitions were therefore more important legitimating factors than reflections on equality.

The term *well-being* is challenging to define (Dodge *et al.* 2012). However, an advantage with the term is that it covers a range of dimensions, from material living standards to social connections and relationships (Stiglitz *et al.* 2009, p. 14). Thereby, the term captures how cultural policy might be beneficial for the well-being of a community or society as a whole. Based on documents and interviews, I examine cultural policy and practitioner perspectives related to the creative economy, collective identity, collective civility and public health. These are areas where the authorities on national, regional and municipal level often adopt a coordinating role, in order to enhance collective well-being.

4.2.1 The creative economy

The classical music sector requires public funding to sustain its activity. Still, despite its predominantly non-commercial nature, classical music has been included in the term creative

industries in various reports that have mapped the Norwegian creative industries (Haraldsen *et al.* 2004; Haraldsen *et al.* 2008, Gran *et al.* 2016). The term creative industries became widely used in the United Kingdom after Labour came to power in 1997. As Hesmondhalgh has put it, British policies for the creative industries involved “linking the arts to the economic and social benefits of a wider sector that included growing commercial industries” (Hesmondhalgh 2013, p. 177). However, this inclusion of the commercial industries in the concept of creative industries was not followed by a corresponding *exclusion* of non-commercial arts from the concept. According to Garnham (2005), what Labour wanted to achieve can be summed up in two very specific objectives. First, the term *creative* illustrated a transformation of cultural policy from a focus on high-brow culture, to an inclusion of the young, trendy and “cool”. Thereby, popular culture and ordinary culture (Williams 1989) was politically legitimised. Secondly, the term *industry* marked a shift of cultural policy, in the sense that it was expected that the cultural sector should give economic benefits, and not only be a burden on public budgets.

In Norway, the creative economy rationale has been highly prominent since 2000, as demonstrated by political publications. The WP *Culture and Industry* was presented in 2005 (Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs 2005). It was a descriptive paper that informed the Parliament about developments, existing policy measures and key statistics in the different cultural sectors. In the WP, it was also suggested that a major part of the public focus on the creative industries should be decentralised to counties and municipalities, although it was unclear why this should be the case: “Neither should the state take on tasks that other levels of government should have the main responsibility for” (Ibid., p. 7). The parliament, represented by the Standing Committee on Family, Cultural Affairs and Administration, did however express disappointment with the WP, due to a lack of specific policy measures (The Standing Committee on Family, Cultural Affairs and Administration 2004, p. 25). The Parliament therefore asked the government to make an action plan with specific policy recommendations. This action plan, *Action plan for culture and industry*, was presented in 2007 by three different ministries,⁸⁷ which in the plan described their intentions to increase funding of the creative industries. These ministries declared that the economic potential for

creative industries should be unleashed (Ministry of Trade and Industry *et al.* 2007, p. 5), much in the same way as the Labour government had done in the United Kingdom. It was underlined that the arts should not be commercialised. Nevertheless, the arts, including the classical music sector, were described as core parts of the creative industries (Ibid., p. 14).

The term *unleash* was important for the legitimization of public funding. It underlined the intentions of the Government to be an *active* partner in the development of the creative industries, not a passive spectator. The term suggested the view that there was an economic potential in the creative sector, although this potential would require an active role from the perspective of the authorities. Through the active role of the government, the creative industries would not only be a burden on public budgets, but it might help to increase collective well-being through economic growth. In addition, by using the term *unleash*, the state conveyed its entrepreneurial intentions with the cultural sector. It indicated that the state expected the cultural sector not only to be at the *receiving* end of public budgets. The cultural sector should also *contribute* to overall welfare and economic growth. One example of the type of funding that was increased in the action plan was the support to *Music Norway*, which is an organisation that was founded by the Ministry of Culture (Ministry of Trade and Industry *et al.* 2007, p. 25). According to Music Norway (2017, p. 5), the institution aims to promote Norwegian music of all genres. In other words, the classical and contemporary music genres were expected to benefit from the measure. Consequently, not only should the action plan be expected to unleash the potential in the *commercial* music genres, but it might also be expected to unleash the corresponding potential in non-commercial music genres such as classical music.

An additional action plan for the creative industries was presented in 2013. Again, music-related initiatives were prominent, as in the case of music export:

The government will also facilitate a process where composers and song writers can apply for grants for the performance of own works abroad. The goal is to strengthen Norwegian music export. (Ministry of Culture *et al.* 2013, p. 141)

The terms *composers* and *works* suggest that the classical music sector was interpreted to be part of the creative industries. Consequently, the classical music sector was provided with an

additional legitimising platform through this action plan. In addition to being legitimised by artistic merits, the classical music sector was thus legitimised through its expected contributions to the creative economy.

The creative economy rationale has also become prominent on the regional and local levels of government. Some counties have published dedicated plans for the creative industries, emphasising the prominence of the creative economy as a cultural policy rationale (Buskerud County 2009, Innovation Norway Nord-Trøndelag *et al.* 2009, Oppland County 2011). Oslo Municipality has a dedicated regulation for grants to innovations within the creative industries (Lovdata Foundation 2013a). However, the regions struggle in their work to operationalise the creative economy as a cultural policy rationale. For example, there are ongoing disputes on the role of profitability in the creative sector. For example, with regards to measures for the creative industries, Finnmark County writes that “professional artists have (...) criticised the focus on profitability” (Finnmark County 2008, p. 8). The county also provides further reflections on the question about profitability within policies for the creative economy:

This document is meant to provide directions for the cultural policy priorities of the county, when it comes to the development of cultural employment. The cultural political measures have traditionally not had a focus on profitability, entrepreneurship or business development. Industrial policy and cultural policy are supposed to complement each other. (Finnmark County 2008, p. 8)

The quote shows that the county hesitates, and this hesitation is quite easily understandable. One might argue that if the county’s development of cultural employment is guided by industrial policy and cultural policy as fundamentally *complementary* forms of policy, then there is little need for an additional form of policy that is specifically referred to as a *creative industries* policy. Employment in the private sector is continuously evaluated implicitly by the market. On the other hand, in public sector employment, profitability concerns are irrelevant, because public sector employment is exempted from what Baumol and Bowen call the “market test” (Baumol and Bowen 1966, pp. 376–378). What the county seems to try to do, cautiously, is to introduce a third form of employment through its creative economy rationale.

Within this rationale, however, it remains unclear whether the market test is supposed to be relevant, or not, and whether profitability is a requirement. In many cases, a *spirit* of entrepreneurialism is promoted, while at the same time, publicly supported forms of art and culture continue to be exempted from the market test. For example, in the case of a highly prominent creative industries initiative in Kristiansand Municipality, a significant amount was invested in the development of employment related to arts and culture, through the foundation *Cultiva*. The political force of this initiative was reflected in the significant financial power of the foundation.⁸⁸ But it is not clear that the goal was to generate *profitable* forms of employment. What seemed to be important was the *spirit* of entrepreneurialism, whether this spirit was reflected in a for-profit or non-profit institution. The creative economy rationale often entails that artists should be considered *entrepreneurs*, as in the quote from Finnmark County above. This approach is also used as a rationale at state level. For example, it is stated in a WP that it is important for the authorities to “make sure there is competence within entrepreneurship and business management” for cultural workers (Ministry of Culture 2018a, p. 62).

Many artists within the classical music sector combine institutional and freelance work, which also means that there are elements of entrepreneurship involved. Some of the interviewees working in orchestras explained that they occasionally would take jobs for other orchestras, in Norway and abroad. In the case of composers, these are often formally organised as one-person companies, and they are thus formally a “business”. While most of the composers’ incomes will often come from public grants in one way or another, either through direct funding, or from a *publicly* funded ensemble or orchestra, concepts related to entrepreneurship were still familiar among the composer interviewees. The view expressed by David below, is typical. He considers it perfectly acceptable to use the term “industry” about classical music composers, although he views it as unrealistic for most composers to make a living without public support in the long run.

It is also the case that I make a living from expressing myself, just like a journalist or a writer makes a living from writing. So, we are an industry in that respect. But when you call it that, the way is also opened for the requirement that all entrepreneurs should make a living without public support, because they sell things, and then it is the sales that

matter. And then we touch on the financial valuation of what you do, and all that. But as a concept, industry is perfectly fine, I think. (David, composer)

By concluding that “we are an industry”, this interviewee implicitly rejected the idea of the composer as an elevated artist. But on the other hand, the quote also represents a rejection of the idea of profitable employment through maximising of sales. The effect seems to be that the composer transforms entrepreneurialism into a form of egalitarianism. While some regional politicians point out that “commercial culture is also good culture” (Innovation Norway Nord-Trøndelag *et al.* 2009, p. 31), the composer underlines that his labour is also a form of labour. In general, there seemed to be a down to earth mentality among the composers that I interviewed. They wished to be perceived as workers, not as charismatic artists in the traditional sense (Kris and Kurz 1979, Bourdieu 1993b). One effect of this view, among composers, is that it becomes plausible for the political sector to include them in the concept of the creative economy, although the composers are rarely for-profit workers.

Many interviewees did on the other hand see concepts such as entrepreneurialism and creative industries as peripheral to their work. This means that although they might acknowledge the entrepreneurial aspects of the classical music sector, few of them believe that the sector might factually contribute to economic growth. In some cases, the view of the creative industries as a peripheral cultural policy rationale, was also accompanied by a certain frustration, such as in this example:

(...) it gets a bit artificial, now we are supposed to think in terms of markets, and now we are a growing industry (...) and Innovation Norway⁸⁹ and (...) it's like (...) what I think is (...) try to relax a bit, try to make good concerts and don't pretend to be so bloody creative all the time, it can obstruct real quality. (Simon, church musician)

Moreover, most of the interviewees were convinced that the political sphere did not literally expect them to start profitable businesses. As one interviewee put it,

The creative industries part is primarily about getting sponsorships so that the companies can put on music as part of their make up and facade (...) They buy a brand, to dress up a bit. That is usually what creative industries is about, as I see it. I mean (...) it is not as if I can start a cultural school or a music business and expect it to be profitable without public support. (Nina, wind player)

This view was typical for how the creative industries rationale was perceived among the interviewees. It was a rationale that was not seen as immediately threatening to the sector, in the sense that the sector is going to be tested by the market. The public sector does not express any intentions to erode the institutional structure that underpins the classical music sector. On the contrary, the creative economy rationale is framed as a rationale that *adds* to the public sector engagement. But while the interviewees did not fear marketisation of the classical music sector, they were concerned that this rationale might trivialise classical music, or that it might become a distraction from the artistic missions of the sector.

4.2.2 Collective identity

The question of national, regional and local identity is an important subtheme in Norwegian cultural policy. It is also a theme that is relevant to practitioners within the classical music sector, as we will see. Questions of identity were contested among the musicians that I interviewed.

Nation building and national identity rationales were important in Norway in the 18th century and in the first part of the 20th century (Vestheim 1995, Dahl and Helseth 2006). Classical music focused heavily on Norwegian identity during this period (Benestad 1993, Grimley 2006, Horton 1963, Solomon 2011). After WW2, when cultural policy became more firmly established as a policy area of its own, the identity perspective was overshadowed, at least rhetorically, by a focus on democratisation of high culture. This high culture perspective was primarily universalist, and not focused on identity concerns. Within the classical music sector, the repertoire was to be represented by “the imaginary museum of musical works” (Goehr 1994), i.e., the best of the best, not necessarily the best of Norway.

What the weakening of the national perspective meant, was that the national dimension received less attention in cultural policy understood as *explicitly* formulated rationales. This trend was not only a Norwegian trend, it was prevalent throughout the whole Nordic region. In some ways, the interest for the national dimension has also remained low. Harding has for example concluded that in Sweden, “explicit nationalism was extremely rare in official discussions on cultural policy around the turn of the Millennium” (Harding 2007, p. 375). As Duelund points out, however, the national dimension was not completely absent

in the various cultural policies that were implemented after the war, in the Nordic region. As he puts it, these policies “also served national ambitions – *implicit or explicit*” (Duelund 2009, p. 133). Hence, when it comes to the national dimension, we should be careful not to confuse *expressed* cultural policy rationales with *actual* institutional and political priorities. Duelund’s observation is echoed by Mangset and Hylland, who conclude that there has been a continuous national dimension in cultural policy throughout the entire history of cultural policy in Norway. (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 69).

On the national level, recent Norwegian cultural policy documents rarely express explicit connections between the arts and national identity. In those cases where the term identity is explicitly used, it is most frequently used within a perspective of *inclusion*, such as in the following example:

Everybody should be able to perform and develop their own cultural expressions, participate and influence cultural life. People migrate, and they bring histories, traditions and values that mirror who they are. In the future it will become crucial to succeed with inclusion. The goal must be to ensure that people feel at home in Norway, regardless of why people move to Norway, or move within Norway. In this respect, cultural life plays a major role, because culture is about identity, and because culture is an arena for common experiences. (Ministry of Culture 2018a, p. 40)

This quote is from the most recent WP on arts and culture at state level. In this WP, the relationship between the arts and identity is primarily connected to ways in which *individuals* develop self-identity through their artistic encounters, and not connected to *collective* conceptions of Norwegian identity. In terms of collective identity formation, this is an aspect that is confined to cultural policy aiming to reach minority populations:

For minorities, art and culture can be of help in establishing own public spheres where they can develop their own collective identities. (Ministry of Culture 2018a, p. 16)

It may therefore seem like the Norwegian traditional national dimension is weak in contemporary Norwegian cultural policy. However, as Duelund (2009) points out, in the case of the national dimension, it is also important to take *implicit* levels of policy into consideration. In Norwegian cultural policy on national level, there is a distinction between the explicit and the implicit, in terms of the national dimension. In explicitly formulated policies, such as in the examples referred to above, collective conceptions of Norwegian

identity are downplayed. However, in the internal documents used in the communication between MC and prominent classical music institutions, the focus on collective representations of Norwegian identity are clear, in the sense that the institutions are required to report explicitly on the number of performed *Norwegian* contemporary works. Notably, in some cases, institutions significantly prioritise Norwegian works before foreign works. For example, for 2017, in its report to MC, the Arctic Philharmonic (AP) reported that they had performed 72 Norwegian contemporary works, and 38 contemporary foreign works (Arctic Philharmonic 2018).⁹⁰ The corresponding numbers for the Norwegian Chamber Orchestra were 11 and 2, respectively (The Norwegian Chamber Orchestra 2018). Still, despite these instances of nationally oriented policies, the state level of government only uses the national collective identity rationale in a rather passive manner. It is only through the reporting requirements referred to above that the rationale is expressed.

At the regional and municipal level, the term *identity* is frequently used as a cultural policy rationale. Notably, the term is most often used about cultural policies in the broad sense. It is more common to refer to collective identity as a cultural policy rationale in areas such as cultural heritage, language and overall urban development, than it is in the case of the arts. The regional and local cultural policies thus mirror a fact pointed out by Skogheim and Vestby (2010, p. 39), which is that identity formation is often connected to the *historical* dimension of culture. Several counties and municipalities point to the connection between collective identity and cultural heritage. When it comes to the perceived identity building function of the more *contemporary* oriented arts, the emphasis is weaker, although we do find a few instances:

Culture creates and develops values in society, widely speaking. Beyond the economic aspect, value creation in the cultural sector is connected to identity, knowledge, production of meaning and experiences. The artist sector can provide individuals and society with values such as new insights and understandings. To sustain a society founded on democratic values, we depend on a cultural sector that promotes community and identity, and an arts sector which challenges our common beliefs. (Hordaland County 2014, p. 22)

Arts and cultural life should work as a catalyst for identity and social inclusion, and it should contribute to city development and growth. The city identity is built by the community which emerges when many citizens make use of the possibilities in cultural

life. Identity is also built on contributions by local artists. (Drammen Municipality 2018, p. 7)

From the perspective of the classical music sector, some institutions within the sector emphasise the relevance of the collective national identity dimension. As we saw, the authorities at the state level specifically request institutions to report on the number of performed contemporary *Norwegian* classical music works. This focus on the national dimension, in terms of contemporary music, is to some extent echoed by the sector itself. For example, a comment from The Norwegian Society of Composers in 2013 suggests that the collective identity dimension is also of relevance for them. In their comment, they underline that some of the grants provided by Arts Council Norway (ACN) to performances of new works, are problematic, because these grants allow foreign composers to receive Norwegian public funding, while similar grants are not available for Norwegian composers abroad:

(...) the Norwegian tariffs are high compared to other countries. Foreign composers thereby get better paid than normal when their commissions are financed through Norwegian grants. Ensembles can get funding for commissioned works by foreign composers with grants from Arts Council Norway, while Norwegian composers are not able to get grants for recordings [of their works] on foreign labels. (Norwegian Society of Composers 2013, p. 4)

What is also shown in the comment, is the *consequence* of this policy, with regards to the national dimension, from the perspective of Norwegian composers. In 2012, 17 per cent of the grants to composers from ACN were granted to foreign composers. These are grants that might alternatively have been used, as the professional composers' association suggests in their statement, as support for the promotion of Norwegian composers abroad. The society of composers thereby makes the case for a collective priority of Norwegian composers, at the expense of foreign composers.

What the interviews suggest is that, from the perspective of classical musicians and composers, the question about collective identity is separated into two distinct categories; *works and composers* on the one hand, and *performers* on the other. In the same way as national authorities, many of the interviewees expressed the view that the more *contemporary* a work is, the more important is the collective identity dimension. Technically, this involves

an *opposite* priority of what we saw in the case of regions and municipalities. While the collective identity aspect is most frequently associated with cultural *heritage* among regional and municipal authorities, the interviewees considered it more important to perform *contemporary* Norwegian music than to perform *historical* Norwegian music. The cultural heritage aspect of classical music was considered less important. As one interviewee put it,

I don't think there is any point programming an opera by [a specified Norwegian composer from the beginning of the 20th century], instead of [an opera by Richard] Wagner. In that case, I think the Norwegian audience can get more from Wagner than from experiencing a work by a composer who was *inspired* by Wagner. I think we should have a good overview over the Norwegian works that have been created [throughout history], but I think we have a bigger responsibility for developing new Norwegian composers. (Jonathan, string player)

In other words, in Jonathan's view, older works by Norwegian composers should go through a harder scrutiny with regards to aesthetic quality, before being adopted by an ensemble as part of their repertoire. This was a rather typical quote among the interviewees, in the sense that the legitimising force of the national dimension seemed to be stronger when it was applied to contemporary composers, than when it was applied to older musical works. Many of the interviewees held the opinion that works by contemporary composers living in Norway, should benefit from some *experimental flexibility* within the institutions that receive public funding. Notably, however, the focus was on Norway as place of composer *residence*. Other potential national dimensions such as ethnic origin, citizenship and a Norwegian musical *sound* were downplayed. In other words, the focus on collective national identity was a rather inclusive one. For example, a Japanese composer residing in Norway, and composing Asian sounding music, would hypothetically be included in this type of nationalism.

When it comes to the performer perspective, neither the government at the national level, nor counties or municipalities, have any active policies promoting the national dimension. The origin and citizenship of the performers are officially regarded as irrelevant. The same can be said about the official strategies of the major institutions' recruitment of performers. For example, the Stavanger Symphony, which has one of the highest proportions of non-Norwegian musicians among the professional symphony orchestras, states that they

consider openness as an important resource (Stavanger Symphony Orchestra 2015, p. 6). The only exception to this openness approach, from the perspective of the major institutions, is a prioritisation of Norwegian *conductors*. Most prominently, BPO has a dedicated program for recruitment of assistant conductors, and state that they through this program take a “national responsibility for the development of young Norwegian conductors” (Bergen Philharmonic 2014, p. 18).⁹¹

Many of the interviewees supported this inclusive view on collective identity, although, in general, the question about the cultural background of the performers was perceived as a rather complex area that also involves challenges. One interviewee viewed the question of the background of the performers as a “minefield”:

We have orchestras that are publicly financed. And if somebody said that they would like to have this and that [a minimum percentage of Norwegian musicians in the major institutions], then they would be accused of racism and other things. So that is a minefield. (Alexander, composer)

On the other hand, one interviewee claimed that it “would be hard to legitimise public support for a Norwegian cultural institution if there were no Norwegian citizens employed”. Other interviewees expressed this dilemma in the following ways:

I know that in some countries, such as in Australia, Canada, they have their first audition with only people from that country. And if they don't find somebody, one of their own, then they will open it up. The policy that we have in our orchestra (...) if it is between two people and one is Norwegian, the Norwegian will be offered the job. But it is very, very difficult today for the young Norwegian musicians, because a lot of people want to come to Norway, just because of the funding of the orchestras. So, then you have the people that are coming with a lot of experience from other countries, other orchestras, and the young Norwegians don't have a chance. So maybe they should start doing here what they do in other countries, have a first audition round with only Norwegians, for example. (Helen, wind player)

We have auditions that are highly competitive. I mean it's amazing how many people apply for jobs here [in our orchestra], from everywhere. And we are really actively trying to recruit Norwegian players. And it's, I think it's actually (...) from the perception of the public, and from the perception of the politicians, I think it's very important to have a relatively high number of Norwegian musicians in the orchestra. (Sebastian, string player)

This addresses an important question that is of specific relevance to institutions within music and dance, and where language is not crucial to the performance-related work. The question is whether the employees in these institutions only perceive the *performances* to be essential aspects of communication with the public, or whether musicians should be able to communicate with the audiences *beyond* the performances. The most common view among the interviewees seemed to be that non-performative aspects of communication are also important. In other words, they held the view that classical music institutions can achieve a higher degree of public legitimacy, if the musicians know the local language and customs. Some of the orchestral musicians pointed out that performers meet their audiences also in other contexts than the concert situation. As some interviewees put it,

(...) a lot of my colleagues from different countries that have been here a long time do not speak Norwegian, because the language at work usually is English, because the conductor is speaking English during our four hours or whatever on the stage, and (...) but I have found it very important to learn the language, because you are much more a part of the community, and I would not be against making it more strict, that people would have to learn Norwegian. (Helen, wind player)

(...) There is more to it than playing music. There is a lot, I mean, we have a very democratic system in Norwegian orchestras. We also need people to communicate (...) they need to be able to talk to politicians, they need to go on the radio sometimes, they need to be able to speak the language, they need to have a bit of an understanding of Norwegian culture, possibly, in order to present this music for the people and not just sort of being in a complete bubble, in their own world. (Tom, wind player)

But this is an issue that is rarely discussed in cultural policy documents. It seems to be an issue that is regarded as part of the autonomous decisions of the respective institutions.

Within the collective identity rationale for public funding of the classical music sector, there is also potentially an *aesthetic* component. This component might apply both to compositions and performances. If a composer makes use of folk music in his or her compositions, the aesthetic result is likely to be perceived to have a national relevance to it. A technical Norwegian example is provided by Benestad (1993, p. 669), who claims that “A specific melodic turn of a descending minor or major second, followed by respectively a major or minor third (...) adds significantly to the national character (...)”. Benestad’s observation is about *harmonic* aspects of music, but correspondingly, one might also attribute a national

character to *expressive* aspects of the performances. What we might expect, is that a Norwegian *sound*, or the representation of folklore instruments, might be attributed a certain prominence within the national dimension of cultural policy. However, when it comes to explicit policies, the national-aesthetic dimension is rarely mentioned in policy documents at all. The interviewees also largely concurred to this downplay of the national-aesthetical dimension in the musical works. However, some orchestral musicians expressed a concern that there was a danger of a homogenisation of the musical, in terms of *interpretations* of the musical works. While expressive elements in performances of classical music might in the past have reflected the place and traditions from which the performances emerged, the immense global competition for orchestral positions was by some thought to contribute to homogenisation:

There is an interesting discussion about orchestras, that because we now study in so many different places, we are all becoming a little more homogenised when it comes to the product that we give out. And some people say that some orchestras are losing their particular, special sound, that made them what they are. I personally think that most orchestras still have a degree of uniqueness, because they are still made up of individuals who don't all sound the same. (Margaret, wind player)

However, this view referred to a concern related to the identities of aesthetic *institutions*, rather independently of any national or regional dimension. The potential Norwegian *sound*, understood in the way that Benestad (1993) describes, did not receive much attention. In most cases, while interviewees made the case for programming contemporary works by composers residing in Norway, it did not matter whether the works by these composers had a sound that could be connected to Norway, or to the home region of the performing institution. This reflected the rather inclusive forms of nationalism and notions about collective identity that many interviewees expressed. The most typical view was that composers and conductors who reside in Norway, should be prioritised. In addition, some interviewees thought that there should be a certain representation of Norwegian musicians in the publicly funded institutions. Overall, the major classical music institutions are forced to make some rather difficult decisions with regards to questions of collective identity. As we have seen, these decisions are related to dimensions such as recruitment and repertoire. The

public sector largely leaves it up to the institutions to make these decisions. What the public sector and the practitioners that I interviewed largely agree on, is that musical works by Norwegian composers should be significantly represented in the repertoire of the major institutions. This was regarded as the most important aspect of the collective identity dimension among the interviewees, and it is also the dimension that the MC focuses on in its reporting requirements.

4.2.3 Collective civility

It has been claimed that the *civilising mission* has been a major force in Norwegian cultural policy (Bjørnsen 2009; 2012), and also in cultural policy in other countries, such as the UK and the United States (Bennett 1995, Bilton 1997; 2006). This rationale is influenced by cultural and aesthetic idealism and romanticism (e.g. Arnold 1993, Hegel 1993, Herder 2006, Kant 1914, Schopenhauer 2015). In Morgan's (1944) conception, human progress is a process from savagery via barbarism to *civilisation*. The concept of civilisation thus denotes *progress*. Moreover, as Elias puts it, the concept of civilisation "sums up everything in which Western society of the last two or centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or 'more primitive' contemporary ones" (Elias 2000, p. 5).

The word *mission* in the civilising mission has traditionally often been associated with colonialism (e.g. Abi-Mershed 2010, Boddy 2007, Conklin 1997, Harrison 2019, Hirono 2016, Jerónimo 2015, Morrison 2015, Simon and Smith 2001). For example, in the Norwegian case, some viewed it as a mission to civilise the Sámi people, who were considered underdeveloped and uncivilised (Sámi Parliament of Norway 2016, p. 19). Also, some Norwegian Christians missionaries viewed it as their *mission* to civilise Africa, socially and religiously (e.g. Predelli 2003, Tjelle 2014, p. 51, Drønen 2009, p. 89). In cultural policy, the word *mission* has been adopted from contexts such as these ones, because the word has been considered befitting to describe cultural political objectives. For example, Bilton refers to the "cultural missionaries of the Arts Council" (Bilton 1997, p. 10). Culture was perceived as a political tool for progress.⁹²

If we turn to the word *civility*, this is a word that denotes behaviour which is polite, respectful, decent and restrained (Peck 2002, p. 361). Desires and emotions are restrained

by self-control, and conflicts of interest are solved in formal ways, such as through the judicial system. Notably, civility can only be stable in a society if a certain proportion of the population choose civility as their mode of behaviour (Antoci *et al.* 2016). Consequently, the question of civility is fundamentally a *collective* one. This means that if a governing body views civility as the preferred mode of behaviour, interventions might be necessary. Interventions might for example involve incarcerating people who commit crime, or it might involve softer measures, such as public funding of classical music institutions which are assumed to *civilise* their audiences. The fundamentally collective nature of civility entails that the goal of “cultural missionaries”, to use Bilton’s (1997) term, is not just to promote civility among *individual* art consumers. The overall goal is *collective* civility.

A recent Norwegian example demonstrates how musical expressions might cause concerns, in terms of collective civility. As a Labour Party MP from Oslo put it,

We need an alternative to the gangster rap that many youngsters have on their ears. The gangster rap regrettably becomes more and more violent, and it encourages people to kill, shoot and rape (...). We want young people to think twice (...) they should forget violence and revenge. It can destroy their lives. Many youngsters are tricked into the gangs by cynical gang leaders. (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation 2018)

This is a civility issue. Killing, shooting and raping are clearly uncivil means of achieving power, in all reasonable definitions of the term civility. The quote is a rather rare example of “cultural panic”.

The MP quoted above called for an *alternative* to the gangster rap, for youngsters in Oslo. He held the clear conviction that gangster rap was inherently uncivil, and he wanted to provide an aesthetic alternative. He was concerned that increase exposure to gangster rap among youngsters might cause increased recruitment to criminal gangs. Therefore, in Abbing’s words, “civilized tastes should be replacing uncivilized ones” (Abbing 2002, p. 210). Notably, while the damage of criminal gangs is *collective*, in the sense that criminal gangs might reduce *collective* well-being through decreased security, the notion of civility also has an element of *individual* psychology and character-development. *Individual* uncivility among youngsters, caused by exposure to gangster rap, was assumed by the MP to cause a decline in Oslo’s *collective* well-being. The Minister of culture reacted to this concern by

stating that it represented an “extremely old-fashioned way of thinking”, and that the real cause behind increased recruitment to criminal gangs is social exclusion (VG 2018). The MP defended his view by stating that his criticism of gangster rap was confined to the *textual* elements in the genre. The MP and the minister thus seemed to agree that the specifically *musical* content is *neutral*, in terms of civility and uncivility.

Policy documents suggest that the idea of civility through exposure to the arts plays a role as a subtheme of cultural policy on all levels of government. Bjørnsen (2009, p. 386) found that the civilising mission had been a *key* rationale in Norwegian cultural policy. However, I only found a few examples of civilising cultural policy after 2000. The most explicit textual example that I found in the policy documents, was the formulation that arts and culture are “crucial for the development of the character and quality of life for individuals” (Government declaration 2001, Chapter 6).⁹³ The fact that this example is from a state government declaration provides the quote with political significance. In most of the documents, however, authorities on the various levels of government are very careful in expressing any reference to character development. Correspondingly, the practitioners from the classical music sector that I interviewed, expressed a certain support of civilising ideas, but they largely abstained from explicit notions of paternalism.

In some cases, cultural policy documents contain ideas that *might* be interpreted in the perspective of civility. For example, as Halden and Molde municipalities express it,

Cultural life can give aesthetic experiences, increase human self-understanding, promote identity and community, improve the overall understanding of society and contribute to self-criticism and criticism of society. (Halden Municipality 2015)

Art and culture challenges, stimulates, entertains and encourages continuous development throughout our lives. (Molde Municipality 2014, p. 7)

Notably, these formulations are to some extent related to *individual* character-development. Terms such as *self-understanding* and *self-criticism* suggest that those who engage in the arts, in some way or another, might become more restrained, and thus more civilised, in terms of the ways in which they participate in society. Arguably, self-understanding and self-criticism might be considered elements in civilising processes (Elias 2000), in the sense that they are

concepts that describe ways in which subjects might distance themselves from the immediacy of desires and emotions. By supporting the arts, the municipalities seem to believe that they can increase the civility among their individual inhabitants, and thus also increase collective well-being.

If we look at the national level, there seems to be an inclination to use a rather *empirical* and scientific understanding of the ways in which people might become more civil through their experiences with the arts. For example, in a national strategy for development of choirs in Norway, MC states:

Research shows that singing can give physical, psychological, emotional, cognitive and social advantages. Singing and singing together can have a positive effect on health and well-being and have a big potential in creating social relations and contributing to flourishing, vital and inclusive communities. (Ministry of Culture 2016, p. 8)

The term “research shows” indicates that the question about a potential civilising effect, is considered an empirical effect which in principle can be psychologically tested and thus confirmed or falsified. But if we look at the ways that the civilising effects are described as a cultural policy rationale (e.g. Bennett 1995, pp. 207–210), these effects are rarely considered technical cognitive effects that can be psychologically measured. Rather, civilising effects within the civilising mission rationale within cultural policy, are related to more abstract versions of cultural idealism (Bjurström and Hylland 2018). As Bjørnsen points out, when the civilising element is used as legitimation for public support of the arts, the civilising element is usually expressed as an “obvious truth that does not need further elaboration, and which does definitely not need to be supported by research” (Bjørnsen 2010, p. 115). Thus, when authorities describe cognitive effects of aesthetic experiences, in a psychological-technical manner, as exemplified by the quote above, this might entail a *weakening* of the civilisation mission as a cultural policy rationale, at least in the way that this rationale is traditionally understood.

In general, the practitioners in this study expressed scepticism against the potential role of civilising processes as a cultural policy rationale. For example, as Anne put it,

You are saying in a way that the opposite is true (...) until they are civilised, they are uncivilised, right (...) they are barbaric, or something like that (...) so I wouldn't use that word, but I think I understand what you mean (...) (Anne, wind player)

This reflects the problematic aspect of using civility as a point of departure for a conversation about cultural policy rationales among artists. During the interviews, conceptions of civility and civilisation occasionally induced awkwardness. What seemed to be the case was that bringing up civility as a potential rationale for public sector support of the classical music sector, was in and of itself perceived as an uncivil thing to do. This might have to do with intuitive difficulties in reconciling aesthetic idealism with the inclinations of the musicians towards political egalitarianism. As Hylland and Bjurström note, with regards to the related term *Bildung*:

(...) this reasoning had an obvious weakness from a democratic viewpoint, since it legitimated the distinction between cultivated and uncultured people, *Bildung* versus *Unbildung*, which was attached to or equalled class distinctions. (Hylland and Bjurström 2018b, p. 12, emphasis in original)

Many interviewees were reluctant to say much about the distinction between “cultivated and uncultured people”. In general, they were also reluctant to attributing higher degrees of civility to some musical genres than to others. A few of them were willing to do so, however. For example, Simon, a church musician, was convinced that the sound of the violin had demonstrated its capacity to enter human souls, and he was of the opinion that the introduction of the violin therefore had been a particularly important part of music history. He also believed that the public sector should promote the classical music sector more than other sectors, based on civilising aspects:

I believe that there is something special about classical music, because it relates to the best parts of what it means to be a human being. (...) Rock has much more immediate physiological and nature-impulsive effects on humans. It is not hard to get carried away [with rock], you can just let yourself dive into it, it is sex, drugs and rock and roll and (...) it is something that sort of works without any effort. (Simon, church musician)

Classical music might express intense emotions, but these are likely to manifest themselves in a restrained and thus civil mode. For example, as Small puts it, Haydn's music represents a

“warm, rational Enlightenment optimism”, while Brahms’ music represents a “solid North German intellect and reticent sensibility” (Small 1987, p. 19).

Another interviewee, Daniel, described his view on the relationship between collective civility and classical music by referring to his experiences from a youth orchestra:

(...) I do think that youngsters that play in an orchestra engage less in vandalism than other youngsters, in a way. I don’t have any evidence behind it, but I think it is healthy to perform something that goes beyond oneself, in a way.

Q: So do you think this is primarily about the social or the musical?

I *absolutely* think it is about the musical. Although they may not be aware of it, I think it has a lot to do with shivering down the spines in a community with others, and to contribute to something that is bigger than oneself. I am convinced about it, that even in a youth orchestra, it is not just the social, but also the (...) yes, the artistic (...) even in a youth orchestra. (Daniel, string player)

He did not claim that it would be possible to *prove* what was going on in a youth orchestra, in terms of measurable effects. It was primarily about intuition, and less about measurement. Neither did he claim a scientific and measurable correlation between affinity for classical music on the one hand, and a low level of vandalism on the other. However, he seemed to be intuitively inclined to believe in such a correlation, in an idealistic aesthetic manner. Indirectly, his statement can be read as a support for public funding of the classical sector due to its civilising effects.

One interviewee was concerned with collective civility in a more negative way, namely in terms of how officials behave during classical music performances.

I don’t think it’s pleasant when the current prime minister opens a music festival, sits for two minutes listening to a Mozart string quartet, and then just stomps out of the hall with her whole following, one of whom of course starts talking in the mobile phone (...) I have to say that shows a complete lack of understanding of what you are a part of. I thought that was outrageous (...) people were completely shocked. (Julie, string player)

This demonstrates how a clash between a political and an aesthetic elite can manifest itself physically in the concert hall, where rational time management in the eye of the former is perceived as a lack of civility by the latter. “What you are a part of”, as an attender of a classical music concert, is, in Julie’s conception, a community which acts and interacts in civil forms.

Still, the belief among some interviewees in a homology between musical content and civil behaviour, was significantly limited by their awareness of historical experiences within the sector. The classical music ambitions held by national socialists during the 1930s and 1940s were used by some interviewees to illustrate their reservations about civilising effects from classical music.⁹⁴ What seemed to be a typical view, was that there is a distinction between the micro and the macro level, when it comes to the civilisation potentials of classical music. On the macro and ideological level, several interviewees were convinced that the civilising potential of classical music had been historically demonstrated to be an illusion. On the other hand, they were more optimistic, in terms of the civilising potential of classical music on the micro level.

Some interviewees believed that exposure to classical music might induce micro level civility. This might have to do with their views on the content of musical works, which is often that there is not an arbitrary relationship between the music and what the music signifies. In this respect, their view differed from the view of political authorities. The latter rarely express any view of the musical content, in terms of civilising potential. But while some interviewees believed that playing or listening to classical music might prevent micro-level uncivility, for example vandalism or street level crime, they did not believe that micro-level civility would secure macro-level civility. Bluntly put, the most common view seemed to be along the following lines: After you have played or listened to classical music, you will probably not kill or rape your neighbour, because on the *micro* and psychological level, classical music makes people more civil. But on the other hand, you might *start a war* even if you listen to classical music, because on the *macro* level, classical music does *not* make people more civil.

The relationship between authorities and the practitioners that I interviewed, in terms of the civilisational aspect of classical music, is probably best understood in this micro-macro perspective. Authorities rarely provide explicit statements that can be interpreted as referents for the rationale of collective civility. Correspondingly, on the macro level, the interviewees largely rejected any notions of musical civilising effects. But some of them expressed a micro level optimism with regards to the civilising effects of classical music.

4.2.4 Public health

Health benefits of music have been acknowledged since antiquity (Horden 2016). In our time, both arts therapy in general, and music therapy more specifically, cover a large range of issues related to physical and mental health and well-being (Starikoff 2004, Kamioka *et al.* 2014, Raglio *et al.* 2012). Health benefits from the arts are by some considered an important rationale in Norwegian cultural policy, and it was also emphasised as an important rationale by some of the 37 interviewees in this study.

In Norway, music has a privileged role among the art forms, when it comes to public sector convictions about health-related benefits from the arts. This has been the case for several decades, and it has been indicated by various policy measures. For example, Arts Council Norway (ACN) and The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs cooperated with a public music institution called *Concerts Norway* in a major health-related project during the 1990s. According to MC, the goal with the project was to “promote the intrinsic value of art, and to promote culture as a tool in the work with public health” (Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs 2003a, p. 119). *Concert Norway*’s formal role in this major project was illustrative of the prominent status that music had obtained in the public sector in Norway, with regards to collaborative projects related to art and health.

Music has retained this prominent status. For example, in a recent WP, The Ministry of Health specifically examines *music* therapy related research publications (Ministry of Health and Care Services 2013, p. 85), while research from other areas of arts therapy is omitted. Moreover, the research unit called *National competence center for culture, health and care*, gives by far the highest priority to *music* related art therapy, while other art related forms of therapy receive little or no attention.⁹⁵ (National Competence Center for Culture, Health and Care 2019). Music therapy is also the sector that has the highest priority within academia, compared to other art and health areas, and music therapy has dedicated researchers and education programs at the Grieg Academy and the Norwegian Academy of Music. Also, in the National guidelines for treatment of psychosis, the category *Arts and Music Therapy* has evidence level 1a, which is the highest evidence level that a therapeutic form can achieve. As the Directorate of Health writes:

In some countries the common term “arts therapies” is established for different forms of this kind of treatment (268), but a corresponding common term and coordination of educations does not exist in Norway. In Norway there are only approved educations for music therapy. Research shows that music therapy is particularly effective for reducing negative symptoms. (Norwegian Directorate of Health 2013, p. 16)

In the WP *Future Care*, the Ministry of Health and Care Services differentiates between three different *forms* in which arts and culture can be used as a tool within health services:

The use of arts and culture in health services can serve many different purposes. Arts and culture have an own value as a source of experiences and of finding language and ways of expressions that can convey reactions, impressions, thoughts and understandings that otherwise can be hard to translate into words. Furthermore, singing, music, movement and dance can be part of good care, and create meaningful social experiences in daily life. Last, but not least, the use of cultural expressions can be used in treatment and have a therapeutic effect. (Ministry of Health and Care Services 2013, p. 85)

The first public health benefit that is described in this quote is a *broad* public health effect attributed to art experiences in general. We might think of these health benefits as relevant to *all* people who experience art and culture in some form, regardless of the health conditions of these people. The second form of benefits that are described in the quote, is explicitly connected to health benefits from *active* engagement with music and dance. Finally, the quote refers to explicitly *therapeutic* benefits. What this illustrates, is that legitimization of cultural policy based on the public health rationale, can both be expressed in a narrow and in a broad manner.

Health benefits from the arts are also viewed as important in cultural plans at the regional and local level. In general, the focus is on health in a broad perspective, and not only to clinical effects or effects from *active* participation.

By giving priority to broad and inclusive cultural activities, through the venues that reach out to everybody, we can improve public health. (Vestfold County 2015, p. 15)

Everybody who consumes culture in one form or another has better health, is more satisfied with life and experiences less anxiety and depression compared with people who are not so interested in culture. This is shown by research. (Ski Municipality 2017, p. 6)

It is common among counties and municipalities to describe health effects of the arts in these broad terms. They describe public health benefits both from *professional* and *amateur* art, and health benefits for *audiences* and *participants*.

As Stige has pointed out, there is an important distinction between music therapy on the one hand, and more socially oriented music related treatments on the other. The former has stronger requirements when it comes to health competence. In one particular case, it is expressed as a specific goal to employ *professional* artists in work with people with mental health problems, i.e., not people who are professional *therapists*:

A central goal is to (...) involve creative and performative artists from different areas in work for, and together with, people with mental health problems. These are not art therapists, but writers, visual artists, musicians and theatre instructors. (Bergen Municipality 2010, p. 11)

This quote emphasises the *professionalism* of the artists who work with people with mental health problems. Within the public health rationale, this is not an approach that is frequently described in Norwegian cultural policy documents. It is more common that the rationale is described in terms of *participation*.

Notably, a classical musician that engages in the type of work described by Bergen Municipality above, is not a *music therapist*, at least not in Stige's (2017) conception of the term *music therapy*. Health benefits from classical music might be provided by professionals of music therapy, or health benefits might stem from experiences of classical music that do not involve people with professional health competence. One of the interviewees commented on a project such as the one described by Bergen Municipality, and he thought the public sector should set more requirements regarding this type of combination of professional artistic practice and therapy:

We had a project here, which was initiated within children and youth psychiatry, where we had a writer's workshop, where pupils within child and youth psychiatry, together with writers, made new text, using their life experiences, in Mozart's requiem. Then this work was performed by youngsters. Such projects, with committed partners, where there is a need for professional music performers (...) I think funding authorities could require a bit more [from the institutions in this regard] (...) (Daniel, string player)

However, in the multidimensional area of health benefits from the arts, it may seem a bit unclear what the role of the professional artist should be. As referred to from Stige above, the idea of music therapy is not simply to move musicians from the concert hall and into health care buildings, but to employ a distinct form of therapeutic expertise. As Stige (2017) notes, in music therapy it is to a large degree the case that the therapeutic *use* value of music is not dependent on its *intrinsic* value.

This divide between the therapeutical use of the arts on the one hand, and the professional presentation of art in therapy on the other hand, was also reflected among many of the 37 interviewees. One interviewee expressed a very strong belief in the public health benefits of making music, on a professional level, more available:

I do believe that people get better health through better access to culture. If we could visit day care homes much more than we do today, or mental institutions (...) If we as musicians had given priority to it, that they had one experience per week, or even per day, I do in fact think (...) in that case we would have had less people in hospitals in general. I do believe that 110 per cent, without it being clinically proved. It is just something I believe, just like [people who believe in] God, I believe in it. (Ellen, singer)

This spiritual aspect was also by some interviewees mirrored by a reference to existential or psychologically therapeutic benefits from musical experiences. One of the interviewees saw this perspective as very ingrained in his artistic process.

The mastering of our lives (...) is existential, but that also means that it is health related. It is the aesthetic subjects that (...) or the languages, to put it that way, because we talk about different languages here. Those languages are the ones that can (...) that we can use to express ourselves with, and that we need in order to express ourselves. (David, composer)

One interviewee used art forms *other than music* as an illustration of how artistic experiences, in her view, in some cases might replace psychologists:

(...) reading Dostoyevski or seeing Munch's art or (...) how much more redemptive such things can be, the fact that art reflects life and life struggles. It represents a resource for other people's growth, and the chance to enter other people's lives and insights, while much of what we are offered today doesn't go below the surface. (Julie, string player)

It might be viewed as a paradox that this example is *not* from the art of music, which is after all the art form within which this interviewee was, and still is, a professional. Perhaps this use

of literature and visual art to illustrate the point, is a way of escaping the more mechanistic approach that seems to be rather prominent in Norwegian music therapy.⁹⁶

In general, several interviewees had a more spiritual perspective on the cultural health benefits than what is expressed in policy documents. However, in many cases, such as in the quotes from David and Julie above, it is difficult to distinguish these perceived health benefits from the musical experiences, as specifically *aesthetic* experiences. On the surface, the interviewees in the study emphasised health benefits from professional performances to a larger extent than what the public sector does through cultural policy documents. But it is not clear that the benefits that these interviewees referred to should be regarded as *health* benefits. It might be more adequate to view the health-related rationales described by some of the interviewees as *intrinsic value rationales*, which are examined in the section below.

4.3 INTRINSIC VALUE

The third main category of public funding legitimations that I will examine is *intrinsic value* rationales. Both from the political perspective, and from the perspective of the classical music practitioners in this study, intrinsic value constitutes a considerable legitimation factor for public funding of the classical music sector. This type of rationales is expressed repeatedly and in various forms. Moreover, legitimations based on notions of intrinsic value have *principled* differences from those based on conceptions of equality and collective well-being. Policy objectives based on the intrinsic value concept might be pursued independently from objectives that are based on equality or collective well-being objectives.

The concept of “intrinsic value” is not immediately intelligible. It requires some degree of conceptual interpretation throughout the analyses. According to Hylland (2009, p. 13) and Mangset and Hylland (2017, p. 317), the term intrinsic value of art has been deprived of its meaning in cultural policy in Norway. As Hylland points out, the concept is used actively, and it is used by the whole spectrum of political parties (Hylland 2009, p. 18). Still, policy documents rarely provide a clear understanding of what *intrinsic value* is supposed to mean. Hylland concludes that the concept has become “self-referential” and that “the use of the concept limits the general political discourse on cultural policy” (Hylland 2009, p. 8).

Policy-makers must always prioritise. That is how policy works. But the concept of the intrinsic value of art suggests that we have to do with incommensurability, i.e., that it is impossible to compare the value of art with other values that the public sector might pursue. Notions of intrinsic value therefore represents a conceptual challenge in public policy. As Hylland and Bjurström observe, the challenge of incommensurability is at the *core* of cultural policy. This is because cultural policy “(...) entails a number of different ways of dealing with or trying to make the seemingly incommensurable commensurable” (Hylland and Bjurström 2018a, p. 201). Practically speaking, this means that public authorities have to prioritise. What Hylland and Bjurström are suggesting is that, for example, public funding of an orchestra, and public funding of a new road tunnel, are seemingly incommensurable. But public authorities still have to prioritise between them.

In a similar fashion, Skjervheim’s (1976b) view is that although the public sector should govern culture in a rational way, and thereby accept commensurability, the public sector should *simultaneously* contemplate the *phenomenological inadequacy* of accepting commensurability (Skjervheim 1976b, p. 321). In other words, while public authorities within cultural policy must *act* rationally, they must also philosophically *reject the principle* of commensurability. In practice, policy-makers must act under the assumption of commensurability. At the same time, they must acknowledge the incommensurability of cultural values and other values. This is what we may call Skjervheim’s *phenomenological postulate* for cultural policy.⁹⁷

Some researchers use the intrinsic value concept in this seemingly contradictory way. As Hylland and Bjurström observe, “the autonomy and intrinsic value of art has the potential to function as such a superior value” (Hylland and Bjurström 2018a, p. 201). What this means, is that the bureaucracy governs as *if* art and culture were commensurable with other policy areas, but they do so under the implicit premise that this commensurability is phenomenologically inadequate. The superiority that Hylland and Bjurström describe, relies on incommensurability. Hence, while all cultural policy is *de facto instrumental*, because authorities must continuously weigh cultural policy spending against other forms of public spending, public authorities might not *express* this instrumentality in political texts.

Skjervheim's suggestion, that it is *responsible* for authorities to *act rationally* and to *reject rationality* simultaneously, might seem paradoxical. But arguably, his paradox is a rather widespread paradox. Most humans have things in their lives that they find it meaningless to put a price on. We might encounter situations where we are *forced* to put a price on them, but nevertheless, even if these situations reveal the prices that we *de facto* put on them, we do not *experience* these objects as commensurable with other things that we find more trivial. In a way, we are irrational. As Weber puts it,

(...) the more the value to which action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more "irrational" in this sense the corresponding action is. For, the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value for its own sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute goodness or devotion to duty, the less is he influenced by considerations of the consequences of his actions. (Weber 1978, p. 26)

For example, most people will instantaneously agree that the phrase "love has intrinsic value" is intelligible, and that it is absurd to ask how much somebody is *willing to pay* for love. We do not *perceive* an instrumental-rational approach to love to be phenomenologically adequate. As Sen has put it, 'the *purely* economic man is indeed close to being a social moron' (Sen 1977, p. 336).

Researchers usually assume that the intrinsic value of art is human-dependent. For example, according to van Maanen, Marx' opinion was that "an artwork can only realize itself in consumption by someone" (van Maanen 2008, p. 283). This is also an opinion that is shared by van Maanen himself (Ibid., p. 294). Still, human-independent conceptions of intrinsic value of artistic works *might* be relevant in certain contexts, as we will see later in the chapter. It does not seem to be *obvious* for all practitioners in the classical music sector that the value of art is by definition human-dependent.

4.3.1 As-if-incommensurability

By the term *as-if-incommensurability*, I refer to the desire among public authorities to recognise the phenomenological differences between cultural values and other values. Political objectives are *de facto* commensurable, in the sense that they compete with each other (Vestheim 2007; 2008), but human beings are likely to *experience* these objectives as incommensurable. *As-if-incommensurability* entails that the public sector expresses itself as

if it were possible to avoid thinking instrumentally in terms of policy objectives. *Real* incommensurability is a logical impossibility in policy, but the authorities might express themselves as *if* incommensurability were a political possibility.

As mentioned above, Hylland (2009, p. 13) and Mangset and Hylland (2017, p. 317) suggest that the term intrinsic value has become *self-referential* in Norwegian cultural policy. I will suggest a modification of this interpretation in the discussions below. However, when we examine how the term intrinsic value is used in policy documents, it is not difficult to understand how Hylland and Mangset came to their conclusion. Consider these examples from the municipal level:

An actively producing and communicating cultural life has intrinsic value, and creates a vital and attractive city. (Halden Municipality 2015, p. 2, Moss Municipality 2015, p. 5)

The intrinsic value of culture is invaluable. Art and culture challenges, stimulates, entertains and develops us throughout the whole life. (Molde Municipality 2014, p. 7, Sola Municipality 2015, p. 7)

Culture offers intrinsic value for individuals through experiences, but culture also has a value by bringing people together, either as spectators and audiences, or as participants and performers. (Fredrikstad Municipality 2011, p. 5, Asker Municipality 2015, p. 23)

What we observe here, is that *identical* formulations are used in different municipal plans. This suggests that the term intrinsic value is employed in a rather uncommitting manner. Clearly, if a municipality wants to claim that objectives within arts and culture are incommensurable with other political objectives, the credibility of this claim is reduced if the municipalities simply copy and paste statements from each other. But more importantly, and in support of Hylland and Mangset's (2017) observation, there is no elaboration of the intrinsic value concept in these quotes. In that sense, these quotes are very typical. We might *expect* authorities to provide some sort of definition of the term *intrinsic value*, because it is not a term that is frequently used in everyday parlance. But the term is rarely defined in cultural political texts.

If we take a closer look at the quotes, we can observe that the statements lack connecting prepositions. In the first of the three quotes above, which is used by both Halden and Moss municipalities, it is not clear whether culture is perceived as having intrinsic value

because culture creates a vital and attractive city, or whether this benefit of creating a vital and attractive city should be seen as something that comes *in addition* to the intrinsic value referred to in the first part of the sentence. In the first interpretation, the statement might alternatively have been formulated like this: “An actively producing and communicating cultural life has intrinsic value, *because* it creates a vital and attractive city”. In the latter interpretation, it might be formulated like this: “An actively producing and communicating cultural life has intrinsic value. *In addition*, it creates a vital and attractive city”. Those two interpretations seem to be equally reasonable, but they offer two very different understandings of how the concept of the intrinsic value might legitimise public funding of the arts.

Whether intended or not, this omittance of prepositions seems to do two things that might be rhetorically beneficial from a political standpoint: First, it reduces the need for an explicit definition of the term intrinsic value by *suggesting* that the definition of the term is *implied* by what comes after the *and*. In the first example above, this means that those readers who demand evidence for the claim that culture has intrinsic value, might become more content when it is also stated, potentially as a direct consequence of the intrinsic value, that culture creates a vital and attractive city. Secondly, by avoiding the term *because*, the text also avoids *externalising* the benefit arising from culture. It might therefore be rhetorically important to avoid using the preposition *because*. If a causal relationship is suggested by using the preposition *because*, then the most reasonable interpretation might easily change. The legitimising reason for public funding no longer appears to be *intrinsic*, but in fact becomes *extrinsic*. But arguing for the intrinsic value of culture by referring to *external* benefits, such as personal wellbeing, can easily be seen as an oxymoron. Norwegian policy documents seem to be careful avoiding any such explicit references to external benefits, perhaps with the intention to avoid this oxymoron.

The examples above are from the municipal level, but the pattern is the same on state level. In many cases when the state wishes to communicate incommensurability, the state does so through the term “intrinsic value”. The following quote is typical:

Art and culture have a unique intrinsic value for the individual. That is the starting point for the government's cultural policy. Art should comment, reflect on, criticise and challenge. Through art and culture we expand our understanding of ourselves and the society we live in. (Ministry of Culture 2019)⁹⁸

This is the first sentence in the official statement that presents overall state cultural policy on the government webpages. In the same way as we saw in the examples from the municipal level, the authorities have not considered it necessary to define the concept. Clearly, the government connects the term strongly to cognitive elements such as reflection, criticism and challenge. But the reason why the government can do so without defining the concept, is probably that they rely on an *intuitive* understanding from the perspective of voters.⁹⁹

In addition to extending the human lived experience of value-rationality into the political sphere, the term “intrinsic value” is in some instances used as a way of distinguishing high culture from ordinary culture, such as in the following examples:

The concepts of “art” and “culture” are often used interchangeably, despite these concepts often representing counterparts. In order to understand and discuss the intrinsic value of art, it is therefore important to simultaneously understand the important difference between these concepts. (Tromsø Municipality 2012, p. 15)

Art has intrinsic value due to its ability to provide us with experiences, but it also has an important function as creator of identity and as engine for innovation and development. Art can provoke us, challenge our usual perceptions, and might possess an important role as a correction to the development of society. (Hedmark County 2011, pp. 11–12)

Professional art and professional cultural efforts must be promoted as a value in itself. This is why the government will implement a strengthening of arts and culture. In the term “intrinsic value” lies a recognition of the foundational role of culture in human existence. (Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs 2003b, p. 11)

It seems reasonable to interpret these quotes as more oriented towards “high” cultural forms such as classical music, than to more “ordinary” musical genres (Williams 1989). A term such as “human existence” entails a gravitas that is rarely expressed by practitioners from other musical genres than classical music. For example, in the case of dance band music, Stavrum concludes that quality parameters are related to “the ability of music to create bodily and affective movement” (Stavrum 2014b, p. 111) that is rather far from the “human existence” perspective described by MC. Correspondingly, as Østerberg and Bjørnerem point out, almost all pop music is associated with sociality with sexual undertones (Østerberg and

Bjørnerem 2017, p. 98). When the government refers to the “foundational role of culture in human existence”, the government therefore seems to implicitly exclude some musical genres from the “intrinsic value” concept. The use of the term “intrinsic value” therefore seems to entail an implicit rhetorical public sector prioritisation of classical music, and a corresponding deprioritisation of other musical genres.

From the perspective of practitioners in the classical music sector, we might expect them to consider the aesthetic conception of culture to be more prominent as a cultural policy rationale than the “culture as a way of life” conception (Williams 1989). After all, classical music is usually the point of reference for the aesthetic conception of culture, when the aesthetic conception is applied to music. But the concept “intrinsic value” was rarely mentioned by the interviewees in this study, at least in its explicit form. They often referred to legitimising values that might be *interpreted* as intrinsic value rationales, but without using this term explicitly. The main difference between the policy documents and the interviewees, when it comes to the intrinsic value rationale, is that the interviewees were more inclined to use *spiritual* references, such as in these examples:

One gets a personal relationship to this music, in the same way as people go to church. I mean, if you are a Christian and if you believe in what it says, then it is your life, and regardless of what happens in the world, Jesus is there for you. And it is a little bit like that in classical music, I mean take Beethoven, or take Bach. Take Bach, then you have (...) you know, Bach is with us. (Elias, pianist)

I do in fact believe that many in the arts and culture sectors feel a calling, like the priest, or the imam. I believe there is a sort of spiritual dimension which it is hard to put your finger on. In fact, this applies to myself in a way. The reason why I am still a performing musician is not that I love my job every day. Nobody does, regardless of what they do. It is because once in a while, perhaps once or twice per year, I have experiences which are (...) I am not very religious, just to underline that (...) (Oliver, string player)

I think (...) for very many musicians (...) they would say that music is our religion (...) or it takes the *function* of religion. (William, string player)

Whether these are examples of the “intrinsic value” of classical music or not, might be discussed. But within the short conceptual framework outlined above, these spiritual references probably belong in the category of “intrinsic value” rationales. They signal incommensurability. Several of the interviewees used religious or spiritual metaphors to

legitimise public funding of the classical music sector. On the other hand, Norwegian authorities rarely do so.¹⁰⁰

4.3.2 Human-independent value

The term intrinsic value can be related to human experience, or it can be related to objects in isolation. Usually, in analyses of cultural policy, the intrinsic value rationale is associated with human experience and communication. As one municipality states: “To create without communicating it to somebody, is as meaningless as talking without anybody listening.” (Fjell Municipality 2007, p. 17).

Most of the interviewees expressed views comparable to the one by Fjell Municipality above. This means that they viewed culture as fundamentally communicative. But a few also suggested that the work of art might have a value in isolation, independently of the existence of any human-beings. This can be illustrated by the following quotes:

Somebody said [to a composer] that “it is a pity that your music is so rarely played, [composer]”. And then he [the composer] replied: “The most important thing is not that it is played, but that it has been written”.¹⁰¹

Q: I see.

And I think it was beautifully said, really, because, okay, then it exists. Then it is there. Then it is, I mean, registered for eternity, sort of. At least that was his attitude, and I do think I understand what he meant by it. (Martin, pianist)

Art has a value in itself, in its existence, and that value is related to aesthetic meanings. There is a connection between elements in the work of art that gives it a meaning through their relationship to each other. So, music has that circle reasoning in that one tone follows the other, and they constitute a whole. And what we say is beautiful, and what we seek in the aesthetic work, is just that it hangs together, there is a connection that gives an inner meaning, so that there are aesthetic laws in it, and it can stand for itself. But that is also the strength of art, that it exists as form, as defender of its own existence, its own meaning into itself. (David, composer)

However, it is possible that quotes such as these are not meant to convey real human-independence, in a sort of *absolute* intrinsic value of art. They might be isolated-sounding metaphors employed to describe value that is ultimately *for humans*.

A metaphor that was used by some interviewees, was the metaphor of eco systems. As an orchestra musician put it:

Norwegian musicians, Norwegian soloists and Norwegian conductors, we are a part of a musical eco system, that it is very important to understand that we are a part of, and in which we [the orchestra] have an important role to play. (William, string player)¹⁰²

One might ask whether this musical eco system is believed to have value in and of itself, or if it only has a value represented by the degree to which the musical eco system is instrumentally capable of providing high quality classical music experiences. In any case, “eternity” and “eco system” are metaphors that point beyond humanity. The latter concept might be related to movements which regard the value of biological life on the earth as independent of human beings (Naess 1989).

It is necessary to include human-independent values of art as a potential legitimising factor for public funding of the classical music sector, because it is not clear that intrinsic value rationales always have a human-dependent aim. Still, the notion of the value of the purely isolated musical work was relatively marginal. This applies to recent Norwegian cultural policy documents, and it also applied to the interviewees.

4.4 CONCLUSION

If we look at historical development of cultural policy rationales in Norway, previous research has identified some major developments, as we saw in Chapter 2. It is possible to view cultural policy as a consisting of competing rationales that replace each other. But it is also possible to look at cultural policy as consisting of rationales that exist in parallel. In the real world, as we have seen in this chapter, the situation is somewhere in between these two analytical approaches. Rationales replace each other, in terms of prominence, but they also co-exist as complementary form of legitimation for public funding of the arts. In the case of the classical music sector, it seems most reasonable to view contemporary Norwegian public policy as a palette of complementary rationales. Historically important cultural policy rationales in Norway, such as the national dimension and the civilising mission, are still relevant, although they have been complemented by other forms of rationales.

The typologies that have been proposed in previous studies have some lacks. They rarely comply with formal requirements that are defined within the domains of typology and classification. I concluded in this chapter that one potential way of categorising cultural policy

rationales, is to view them as consisting of three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive forms of rationales: Equality rationales, collective well-being rationales and intrinsic value rationales. Based on the empirical material that I used in this thesis, these three main forms of rationales emerged as the most plausible ones. They comply with the formal requirements of typologies in two important ways. First, the categories are mutually exclusive. This means that it was possible to assign a policy statement from the empirical material to one of the three main categories of rationales, without necessarily assigning this statement to other categories as well. In addition, it seemed reasonable to view these three categories as jointly exhaustive. This means that it was possible to interpret all statements in the empirical material within these three categories. However, the categorisation of rationales for public funding is a continuous process with no objective end result. Future studies might use different forms of empirical material, and they might suggest other ways of categorising cultural policy rationales.

In many respects, the 37 interviewees expressed views that were close to those expressed by the Norwegian public sector on the three levels of government. What this entails, is that the classical music sector would not see dramatic changes if the sector were to be publicly governed by a music political “epistocracy” consisting of these 37 practitioners. This applies to several of the cultural policy rationales expressed, such as geographic equality, cultural equality, collective identity, collective civility and public health.

Still, I identified some differences between public policy priorities and the practitioner perspective. Several interviewees expressed stronger views about economic equality as an important overall cultural policy goal. A few interviewees pointed out that there might be an element of opportunism in this egalitarian inclination, related to the dependency on a strong public sector. Still, equality preferences were important for most of the 37 interviewees due to ideological conviction, primarily, and not due to self-interest. There was a clearer preference for economic redistribution among the 37 interviewees, than what is expressed in policy documents.

I also found a considerable difference in the relevance attributed to the concept of the creative economy, as a legitimating factor for public funding of the classical music sector.

The Norwegian public sector, represented by both left-leaning and right-leaning political authorities, have embraced the creative economy as a cultural policy rationale. This is reflected in policy documents, and in the publication of dedicated white papers, cultural strategies and cultural plans for the creative industries. It is a form of rationale that is popular at all levels of government. Rhetorically, from the political perspective, this rationale applies not only to the commercial sector, but also to non-commercial art, such as classical music. By contrast, most of the classical musicians that I interviewed, were either reluctant to view the concept of the creative economy as relevant to their work, or negative in relation to the influence of the concept as a funding rationale. This reluctance seemed to be largely ideological, although there might also be elements of self-interest involved.

The public sector in Norway significantly emphasises *intrinsic value* as a rationale for public funding of the arts. However, it might in some cases be a challenge for the general public to comprehend the content of this rationale, due to the lack of public sector elaboration of the term. By contrast, the practitioners that I interviewed were inclined to use spiritual analogies in their views on rationales for public funding of the classical music sector. Some of these analogies were explicitly religious. But most of them were grounded in non-religious conceptions of incommensurable forms of value.

If we look at previous studies on artists' views on cultural policy rationales, it is a challenging task to compare these with the findings in this chapter. There are three different reasons for this. First, the theory-laden nature of some studies makes these studies difficult to use in comparisons. If we compare with the study by Nijzink *et al.* (2017) examined in Chapter 2, this study used concepts from Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) as *a priori* theoretical tools. The categories of rationales identified in the study by Nijzink *et al.* (2017) is congruent with Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) categories. For example, Nijzink *et al.* (2017) concluded that the *world of inspiration* was more important for the creative workers that they interviewed, than it was for the public authorities. But in order to compare that conclusion with the ones reached in this chapter, one would have to examine Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) framework. Clearly, that is not possible within the confines of a thesis with open research questions.

A second complication for comparisons is the question of self-interest versus ideology. For example, Nijzink *et al.* (2017) do not specify whether they are concerned with political views based on self-interest or ideological conviction among their interviewees. The same comparison problem also applies to the study by Daniel (2014b) reviewed in Chapter 2. For example, Daniel concludes that some artists in north-eastern Australia are concerned with the relationship between geographical distances and cultural policy decisions. But what is unclear, is whether this concern is induced by the self-interest of artists living in rural areas, or whether their concern is related to a more ideologically oriented concern with centralisation of cultural political decision-making. By contrast, my aim has been to separate between these two dimensions, and to focus on ideologically based viewpoints.

Thirdly, it is difficult to compare the research results in this chapter with results from value-laden studies. For example, Wesner (2018), in her value-laden study of the relationship between policy and artists' perspectives in eastern Germany, takes sides with the artist perspective. She is primarily interested in the self-interested perspective of the artists. Alongside her analyses, she is "continually arguing for artist-focused policy approaches" (Wesner 2018, p. 183). This makes comparisons difficult. However, considering the values that were expressed during the interviews, many of the interviewees would probably agree with Wesner's conclusion in that they would thrive better in a "more socialist society" (Wesner 2002, p. 322), both from the perspective of ideology and self-interest.

5 INTERPRETATIONS

The second research question is as follows:

2) How should we *interpret* the differences between authorities and classical music practitioners, with regards to emphasised rationales?

This is a subsidiary research question to the primary question in the thesis, which was examined in Chapter 4. Why are some rationales considered more important by authorities than others, in the public funding of the classical music sector? Why do authorities and practitioners differ when it comes to the ways in which they legitimise public funding of the classical music sector? I address research question 2 by providing conceptualisations and hypotheses, as a result of theorisation and abductions.

5.1 THEORISATION AS CRAFTSMANSHIP

“Why”-questions might induce us to suggest hypotheses of explanation, and to conceptualise findings that are not immediately easy to explain. The theorisation process leading to hypotheses and conceptualisations can be viewed as a *craftsmanship* process. As Swedberg puts it:

A craftsman needs to develop a special relationship to the material he or she works with. A carpenter, for example, must know how the different kinds of wood feel and act. Similarly a social scientist has to develop an intimate sense for what actors feel and think (...). (Swedberg 2012b, p. 16)

Swedberg’s carpenter analogy is a way of pointing to the *organicism* that should underpin the theorisation process. The carpenter knows the value of wood in a way that is organic, and the carpenter develops intuitive, tacit and tactile knowledge of the structures of the wood. This organic knowledge, in its turn, allows the carpenter to experiment, to play with new ways of using the material. Notably, the material has limits. Wood is not suitable for *anything*, and the carpenter knows this. Similarly, as Kirk and Miller (1986, p. 11) point out, “the world does not tolerate all understandings of it equally”. The epistemological relativist might

claim that all understandings are equal. By contrast, the organic craftsman researcher knows by intuition, from repeated intimate encounters with empirical reality, that some understandings of human societies are more equal than others.¹⁰³

Similarly, Mills calls for a “truly fierce drive” among researchers. It is through this drive that the researcher might become able to “lend meaning to facts” (Mills 2000, p. 135). This is something that can be achieved by, as Mills puts it, “a few simple techniques which have seemed to increase my chances to come out with something” (Ibid.). In other words, the techniques have allowed him to come up with potential explanations and conceptualisations of the “facts” that were not immediately comprehensible. As he describes:

The sociological imagination can also be cultivated; certainly it seldom occurs without a great deal of often routine work. Yet there is an unexpected quality about it, perhaps because its essence is the combination of ideas that no one expected were combinable – say, a mess of ideas from German philosophy and British economics. (Mills 2000, p. 135)

Routine work might for example be semi-structured interviews, and transcriptions and coding of these. Clearly, the repertoire of theory and the repertoire of empirical experience, are developed in a continuous process. German philosophy and British economics must be *known* by the researcher before they can possibly be made use of in new combinations. This means that there is a balance to strike. On the one hand, we must know a lot of theory.¹⁰⁴ But on the other hand, we must also develop ways in which to *play* with theoretical concepts that we know, so that we can “come out with something”, to use Mills’ expression. This “something” might for example be a new concept, a hypothesis, or a visual sketch (Swedberg 2016).

Mills’ process is clearly related to Peirce’s concept of *abduction*, although Mills did not explicitly refer to Peirce. Abduction is key to theorising, and also requires imagination. As Timmermans and Tavory conclude, “abduction, rather than induction, should be the guiding principle of empirically based theory construction” (Timmermans and Tavory 2012, p. 167). Peirce (1955, p. 151) writes, as a formal representation of the abductive process:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.

Some abductive attempts might fail, but others might succeed. The *A* that we are looking for, will often be in the form of a *hypothesis* that explains an observation that is not immediately comprehensible. But it might also be a *conceptual* understanding. As Swedberg remarks: “(...) Peirce refers to ‘theories and conceptions’, something that leads us to think that not only new theories but also new concepts come about through abduction” (Swedberg 2012a, p. 9).

Abductive reasoning is utilised continuously in research, although it is not always stated *explicitly* that this is the case. One example from cultural policy analysis is the following:

The Danish Ministry of Culture has taken the initiative to identify a specifically Danish cultural canon of art works, which contribute to defining Danish cultural heritage. (...) One can to a certain degree understand such initiatives as a type of nationalist cultural political defence measures against an increasing cultural globalisation and migration. (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 394)

We might consider it a *surprising fact* that the Danish government has introduced a Danish cultural canon. What Hylland and Mangset do, is to introduce an implicit hypothesis, *A*, which is that *globalisation and immigration will tend to lead to nationalist defence measures*. This hypothesis might be further explored by empirical studies. If there is a correlation between the degree of globalisation and immigration on the one hand, and nationalist defence measures on the other, then there is no longer reason to be surprised.¹⁰⁵

The example above demonstrates a relatively easily accessible form of imaginative inquiry, or theorisation, or abduction. The generation of hypotheses through abductive reasoning might be relatively straightforward, as in this example. But it might also be more speculative, and it might be based on qualified guess work. As Swedberg points out, we should consider it a theoretical contribution if “the study includes an interesting speculative theoretical part” (Swedberg 2017, unpaginated). Both in trivial and intricate questions, the aim of abductive reasoning is to come up with ideas of how to make sense of observations. At first glance these observations might seem surprising, counterintuitive, or difficult to grasp conceptually. But they might become comprehensible through abduction. In the abductive attempts below, the conceptualisations and hypotheses are to some extent my own, but they

are also largely borrowed from other researchers, and made use of for the purpose of addressing research question 2.

5.2 CONCEPTUALISATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS

Abductive reasoning rests on indicators, which might generate qualified guessing, or qualified conceptualisations. Peirce was of the opinion that humans have a universal “faculty of guessing” (quoted by Swedberg 2014b, p. 15). The creative work of the abductive researcher consists of connecting the dots plausibly, and of utilising the indicators in a way that generates the most useful hypotheses or the most useful conceptualisations.

It is also, as Swedberg points out, “crucial to get as much and as varied information as possible” (Swedberg 2012b, p. 11). This might include observations that we do not immediately recognise as relevant to the puzzle. The indicators may have different characteristics. In criminal justice, circumstantial evidence of guilt might for example be the character of the suspects, motives and observations. Correspondingly, in abductive reasoning in social science, abductive reasoning might rest on empirical observations and previous conceptualisations, or more anecdotal forms of evidence.

5.2.1 Holism

Several of the 37 interviewees expressed politically egalitarian viewpoints. Legitimation of a cultural policy was for these interviewees reliant on its ability to function within an overall ethos of egalitarianism. They had a desire to promote equality, and a belief that cultural policy was a vehicle for doing so.

This observation is perhaps not a particularly surprising one, but neither is the observation obvious or self-evident. For example, significant parts of the classical music sector are highly competitive, and not really egalitarian. But what seems to be the case is that professional competition is kept rather distinct from political preferences. As McCormick concludes, when music performance is described in competitive metaphors, this is viewed by many classical musicians as a “polluting framework for describing musical endeavors” (McCormick 2015, p. 164). Musicians fight tooth and nail to win an orchestra audition, while many of them at the same time are more than willing to pay a substantial proportion

of their orchestral salaries in taxes for redistribution. Many of the interviewees stated that they voted for left and green parties, although some of them were disappointed in what they perceived as a general political passivity among their colleagues. The quotes below were typical:

I guess we are on the left, and that is natural, we are dependent on a big public economy. But when it comes to political issues, then I think we are in general rather passive. If you go to the creative fields of art [e.g. composers], then people are perhaps to a greater extent trying to develop values and things like that. We [instrumentalists], on the other hand are very focused on our profession. But my impression is that people [classical musicians] are more concerned about environmental and climate issues than the average. (Jonathan, string player)

My impression is that people [my colleagues] are concerned with social justice, for example, things like that. That is rather common. There is also an environmental perspective among many, that is my impression. That tendency is very strong, people [my colleagues] are predominantly socialists. (John, string player)

Some of the interviewees illustrated their political leanings by referring to the Progress Party. This Norwegian political party was a reference point that they used to express their views, in the sense that it offered an illustrative contrast. The Progress Party is usually categorised as a part of the political right (Lindsköld 2015). A general impression from the interviews was that The Progress Party is the party that the entire classical music sector is in opposition to. This is not a surprise, because the Progress Party has traditionally been the parliamentary political party that to the largest extent has opposed public financing of art and culture.¹⁰⁶ When artists explain their views through their antagonism against the Progress Party, that might of course have to do with self-interest, in the sense that many artists themselves benefit from a large public economy. That is explicitly suggested in the quote above. But their opposition to the Progress Party seemed more induced by ideological conviction than by self-interest.

Why did so many interviewees prefer equality as a fundamental rationale for cultural policy? Why did so many of them lean politically green and left, despite competing tooth and nail in their professional careers?

One element that most classical musicians need, in order to become successful as classical musicians, is a developed imagination. Moreover, classical musicians possess a high

degree of introversion, which allows them to focus on developing the motorical skills needed for a musical career (Kemp 1996). A combination of imagination and introversion might have directed many of the 37 interviewees into a holistically oriented environmentalism and egalitarianism. There seems to be a *we*, a collective consciousness, that is being continuously confirmed and galvanised by the concert experiences, and which makes it unlikely that a person who has chosen a professional musical career, will lean towards the political ideology represented by the Progress Party and the political right.

A possible way of developing this interpretive line, is to look more closely at the views on social ontology held by the interviewees. A foundational issue within the social sciences is the relationship between individual and collective action. On one side are the theorists who claim that all action is based on individual deliberation, even in those cases where there are *institutions* that formally make the decisions. On the other side are theorists who believe that social structures, such as an ensemble of musicians, might possess causal powers that are independent of the individuals that constitute the group. Two of the most principled theorists in this respect, are Mises and Durkheim. They can serve as examples of these opposite sides. As pointed out by Kurrild-Klitgaard (2001, p. 120), Mises is often viewed as being the “most radical of all economic ‘imperialists’”. One important conviction held by Mises, is that all action is ultimately reliant on individual intentions. Mises states:

The *We* is always the result of a summing up which puts together two or more *Egos*. If somebody says *I*, no further questioning is necessary in order to establish the meaning. The same is valid with regard to the *Thou* and, provided the person in view is precisely indicated, with regard to the *He*. But if a man says *We*, further information is needed to denote who the *Egos* are who are comprised in this *We*. It is always single individuals who say *We*; even if they say it in chorus, it yet remains an utterance of single individuals. (Mises 1998, p. 44, emphasis in original)

This is in congruence with methodological individualism (Schumpeter 1909, Hayek 1942, Watkins 1952, Weber 1978, Elster 1982, Udehn 2002, Hodgson 2007).

The opposite view is described by Durkheim:

(...) collective representations, produced by the action and reaction between individual minds that form society, do not derive directly from the latter and consequently surpass them. The conception of the relationship which unites the social substratum and the

social life is at every point analogous to that which undeniably exists between the physiological substratum and the psychic life of individuals. (Durkheim 2014, p. 10)

In this perspective, collectives might have autonomous intentions that do not depend directly on the intentions of their individual members. Durkheim's point by the term *physiological substratum*, is that human beings normally take it for granted that their human consciousness is *one*, although we have many neurons whose activities are coordinated into this *one* consciousness. Individual consciousness is therefore emergent. One interpretation of the quote by Durkheim is that it is equally plausible to claim that a *group* might have a consciousness that is *one*, as it is to claim that an individual has *one* consciousness. In other words, the relationship between individual members and the group is analogous to the relationship between human neurons and an individual human consciousness.¹⁰⁷

Notably, the *descriptive* methodological individualism described by Mises, was also accompanied by *normative* views. For him, the only *moral* duty for a government, was to protect the private property of individuals, organisations and nations (Mises 1998). In principle, views on social ontology on the one hand, and views on policy on the other, might be independent from each other. But that seems unlikely. It seems more likely that there are correlations between views on social ontology and views on policy.¹⁰⁸ However, unfortunately, this is an area that lacks empirical research.¹⁰⁹ The key question is: Do people who perceive the world through the lens of ontological holism tend to have a stronger political preference for egalitarianism? If that is the case, then we might also hypothesise that people who subscribe to ontological holism, will be inclined towards political egalitarianism.

A comment from one of the interviewees in this study can serve as an anecdotal example of how holism might work in a practical work situation. Notably, this was an interviewee that seemed to be able to observe holism from a distance. In that sense, he was not a typical interviewee. He made the following observations about holism among his colleagues:

It is a fundamental attitude to life, that I also sometimes can experience in conflicts with my colleagues. For example, in a situation where somebody has been on audition, somebody has applied, and then there is a discussion, should we send that person to the second round or not. And then there is a colleague saying, "no, no, this and that, and bla bla, we do agree on that, right?" "No!" I say, "We do *not* agree on that. And I have

not *said* that”. There is very quickly this thing that people believe that everybody are always on the same frequency, there is something that is supposed to be understood.
(Elias, pianist)

This quote does not simply refer to an *aesthetic* disagreement. It refers to a disagreement about the notion of a *we* that some colleagues expect him to acknowledge and be part of, but which he refuses to accept unreservedly. He does not unreservedly accept the collective agency of the professional musical collegium, and he gets frustrated when he feels that this collective agency is imputed on him. As a somewhat individualistically oriented person in a classical music institution, he seems to observe the social holism of the sector from a distance.

The quote above describes a situation that employees in many professions might be able to relate to. But the feeling of a *we* seemed to be *particularly* strong among many of the 37 interviewees. There is an *immediacy* in the perception of a *we*. This *immediacy of a we* might result in an omission of the deliberation from the *I* which Mises refers to. Another interviewee described pupils in a high school class specialised in music. It seems to be the same phenomenon that she is describing:

[They are] high achievers at school, they have a lot of, well, as I say, they are feelers, they are very creative, they have a view on human beings that all have equal value, there is a good community, an own bond that is somewhat fascinating. I work at a high school, and [in the music class] there is sort of a green light [in terms of social environment] compared to other theoretically oriented classes. They have found something. It must be some general human traits that I am trying to find out of [self-reflectively referring to her own prior statements]. (Nora, singer)

The “something” that Nora refers to, is probably a strong feeling of a collective reality, which is continuously confirmed by the musical (Schutz 1951, Freeman 2001, Boer *et al.* 2011, Loersch and Arbuckle 2013).¹¹⁰ But these ontological issues are so abstract that she is not able to put them into words, although she would like to do so. Correspondingly, as Kemp formulates the cognitive inclinations of the classical musician:

(...) pathemia, intuition, and feeling converge in identifying a fundamental quality of [classical] musicians’ personalities. This relates to their characteristic stance of seeking out complex and symbolic possibilities in aesthetic objects and events, particularly mobilizing their high levels of sensitivity, imagination, and intuition. This perceptual mode of operating is in direct contrast to its *opposite manifestation in which individuals engage*

in a cerebral, cortically alert manner enabling them to focus on factual realities and logic in an emotionally cool fashion. (Kemp 1996, p. 83)

The “opposite manifestation in which individuals engage in a cerebral, cortically alert manner” which Kemp refers to, is easy to associate with the world of Mises and Hayek, referred to above, and which extends into the Norwegian Progress Party. In that world, we might speculate that there is a more *conscious* deliberation from the *I* to the *we*, which is the opposite of the *immediate we* which seems to be prevalent in the lifeworld of many classical musicians. This difference might extend into differences in the nature of the respective social environments. Although Kemp (1996) does not say so directly, his detailed observations of the world of the classical musician, seems to be significantly congruent with their beliefs in ontological holism. When so many interviewees expressed disagreement with the policies of the Progress Party, both with regards to economic policy, environmental policy, immigration policy and cultural policy, their views on social ontology might to some extent explain why.

Cultural policy is forced to calculate politically in a way that makes the political world rather different from the collective ontology of aesthetic experiences such as classical concerts. The social world, from the perspective of cultural policy, is thereby to a larger degree a world of *conscious* deliberation. This gives less room for the *immediate* experience of a *we* among agents in the political sphere. The lack of this immediate experience might be a reason why the egalitarian leanings of Norwegian cultural policy are less intense than these leanings were among the 37 interviewees.

5.2.2 Enchantment

There is another puzzling observation in Chapter 4, which is that the presumed potential of the creative economy is used by authorities as a legitimising rationale for public funding of the arts, without excluding non-profit art genres such as classical music from this rationale. By contrast, few of the 37 interviewees acknowledged the creative economy as a valid rationale for public support of the classical music sector.¹¹¹

The conception of not-for-profit arts institutions as part of the creative economy, is not only a conception that is used by public authorities. It is also a conception that is sometimes used in research. An illustrative example is the aforementioned article called

“*Artists and policy: a case study of the creative industries in north-eastern Australia*” (Daniel 2014a), in which artists are conceptualised as a part of the creative industries in the very *title* of the article. Correspondingly, in a recent Norwegian report on the subject, non-commercial arts are also included in the creative industries concept (Gran *et al.* 2016). As Throsby has shown, there are numerous conceptions of the creative industries (Throsby 2008a; 2008b). Gran *et al.* (2016) state that they build their conception on an EU report (EY 2014), which in turn states that it builds on UNESCO’s conception of the “cultural industries”.¹¹² In UNESCO’s conception, the degree of commercialisation is seen as *irrelevant* for the creative industries. In other words, there seems to be a “trickle down” conception of the creative economy which stems from UNESCO, and in which non-commercial arts sectors are included in the concept. This extends into Norwegian policy documents (Ministry of Trade and Industry *et al.* 2007, Ministry of Culture *et al.* 2013). The creative economy rationale has thereby seemingly become important in the political legitimisation of a non-commercial arts sector such as classical music.

As numerous researchers have pointed out, the discipline of economics has had a substantial influence on policy making (Eizenstat 1992, Lazear 2000, Banks 2011 Clark and Arel-Bundock 2013, Schrefler 2013, Bille *et al.* 2014, Eisner 2017, Christensen 2013; 2018).¹¹³ However, from the perspective of cultural policy rationales, it is important to separate between the different ways in which economic thinking asserts its influence. Any explanatory attempt with regards to the importance of the creative economy rationale in cultural policy will have to examine the different ways in which the discipline of economics might influence political decision-makers.

There are at least three different ways we can identify the influence of economics. There is the *welfare economics* perspective, the auditing perspective from *New Public Management*, and the wider *economic benefit* perspective. I will examine these further below, and subsequently suggest that we need to name an *additional* way that economic thinking influences cultural policy making. Borrowing a concept from Maffesoli (1996), we can call this the *neo-tribalist* influence of economics.

First, welfare economics states that public subsidies might reduce market imperfections in various ways. With the help of subsidies for arts and culture, the public sector might in some cases contribute to an increase in overall utility by correcting these imperfections (Cwi 1980, Peacock 1994). However, such considerations received little attention in the cultural policy documents that I studied. Based on earlier findings, that is not so surprising. As Belfiore has pointed out, “old arguments borrowed from welfare economics and centred on notions of ‘public goods’ are losing their lustre” (Belfiore 2015, p. 106).

Secondly, economic thinking has had an influence in the public sector through *New Public Management* (Ferlie 1996, Lane 2000, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), and the related increase in *auditing* of public policies (Power 2000, Belfiore 2004). A central aspect of this variant of economic thinking within the public sector, is a higher degree of “private-sector styles of managerial practice” (Hood 1991, p. 5). As Hood points out, in the *New Public Management* managerial paradigm, public sector institutions are transformed into “corporatized units” (Ibid.). What this entails, is that they are “operating on decentralized ‘one-line’ budgets and dealing with one another on an ‘arms-length’ basis” (Ibid.). For arts institutions, this managerial practice has pros and cons. On the one hand, the institutions are provided with significant freedom in their programming. Norwegian classical music institutions are allowed to make relatively free choices within the *artistic* realm (Knardal 2016, Røyseng *et al.* 2017). By contrast, in the administrative functions, private-sector managerial principles apply. As Røyseng puts it, “at the theatre where I carried out my case study, the business perspective is legitimate only if it is applied to the tasks that are defined as financial and administrative tasks” (Røyseng 2008a, p. 47). This managerial separation of administrative functions on the one hand, and artistic production on the other, seems to be the most practical consequences of *New Public Management* for classical music institutions in Norway. The administrative functions have become “corporatized units” (Hood 1991, p. 5), while the artistic functions are governed according to the arms-length principle.

Thirdly, economic thinking finds its way into cultural policy through what has been referred to as the creative economy rationale or the creative industries. The creative economy

rationales for public support of the arts involve different perspectives, such as employment (Banks and Hesmondhalgh 2009, Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010, Bille 2010) and urban development (Bagwell 2008, Florida 2014). Some researchers have pointed out that these funding rationales face conceptual challenges (Galloway and Dunlop 2007, Potts *et al.* 2008, Throsby 2008b, Daniel 2017, Purnomo and Kristiansen 2018). Still, the Norwegian public sector seems to use this rationale as if it were a *rational* legitimation for public subsidies of the arts. The belief in rationality is significantly underpinned by *numbers* and by the concepts from the economics profession. The following quote demonstrate the number rhetoric:

The creative industries have become a larger part of the Norwegian economy. The number of employees has increased by 50 per cent in ten years, and the output has increased by 77 per cent. In addition, the creative industries possess numerous attributes that are needed in innovation and restructuring of Norwegian trade and industry. The creative industries can also contribute to local and regional development. They contribute to development of the uniqueness and identity of places. (...) Norwegian cultural life has seen significant economic progress during recent years. Not only has cultural life flourished, but in addition, more cultural entrepreneurs have succeeded creating their own profitable cultural businesses. (Ministry of Culture *et al.* 2013, p. 5)

This use of numbers might be considered an attempt of what Belfiore calls a “Finance Ministry-friendly rationale for continued support” (Belfiore 2015, p. 96).¹¹⁴ The numbers that MC uses in the quote, are derived from a report in which non-commercial art forms are included (Espelien and Gran 2011). Numbers and academic sources support the rationality rhetoric. The adoption of concepts from the economics profession can be illustrated by a quote from a municipal CP:

Within the creative industries, geographic concentration and cultural clusters produce synergy effects, and they contribute to everybody achieving better results through the aggregated attraction power that such clusters have, for new actors, new competence and customers. (Bærum Municipality 2013 2013, p. 4)¹¹⁵

If we turn to the perspective of the interviewees, many of them were reluctant towards the creative economy rationale.¹¹⁶ One interviewee stated:

They say, “oh you know, we invest in culture, that is the new future (...) oil goes down and now, culture is going up”.¹¹⁷ And I have never quite understood how you really can make money, because art and music and film and everything is (...) for the most part, you lose money. But I mean (...) of course, you attract (...) I think what they also mention is

that you attract tourists and you attract people who want to live in a place (...) You attract people to the area that would not come here if we did not have culture. You wouldn't get as good people applying for the good jobs, you know, if you didn't also have the cultural side of the city. But I have never *really* understood, that *really* we are going to make money off of putting a lot of money into the orchestra, I haven't *really* understood that. But I am very thankful that they believe that (laughter). (Anne, string player)

This emphasis on the word *really*, can work as an illustration of the conceptual difficulties that accompany the creative economy as a funding rationale. On one level, the interviewee understands the argument that culture is going to take over after the oil industry, but on another level, she does not. Her confusion is easy to relate to. On the one hand, numbers *speak*, for example when creative industries researchers can point to increasing employment numbers. But showing that public funding of the arts is in some way economically lucrative for a state or for a region, is a different matter. We might easily understand the numbers. But we do not *really* understand, because of the conceptual ambiguity. It is difficult to understand how a non-profit sector can take over and serve as a replacement for a highly profitable industry such as the Norwegian oil industry. In addition, it is intuitively difficult to understand how an increase in employment and output in one sector, could possibly legitimise public funding of that sector. Some might even argue that it would be logical for the public sector to *reduce* public funding for sectors in which employment and output trend upwards.¹¹⁸

Welfare-theoretical arguments from economics rely on concepts that are rather intangible and abstract, such as *utility*, *existence value*, *public goods*, *externalities* and the *willingness to pay* (Hansen 1997, Throsby and Zednik 2008). In a sense, these concepts are economically rational. But while the intellectual apparatus of welfare economics might be rational, it is unlikely that this apparatus can satisfy the political desire for *meaning* in the long run. As Weber points out:

As intellectualism suppresses belief in magic, the world's processes become disenchanted, lose their magical significance, and henceforth simply "are" and "happen" but no longer signify anything. As a consequence, there is a growing demand that the world and the total pattern of life be subject to an order that is significant and meaningful. (Weber 1978, p. 506)

Considering Weber's observations, it is not so surprising that the arguments from welfare economics are "losing their lustre", to recall Belfiore's phrase (Belfiore 2015, p. 106). *Public goods* or *existence value* are concepts that are unlikely to satisfy the desire for meaning. Therefore, it might be perceived as politically-rhetorically convenient if the creative economy rationale can be *disconnected* from the arguments from welfare economics.

In the quote above, Weber possibly provides us with an abductive hunch to understand the creative economy rationale in a practical political-rhetorical perspective. By ignoring the disenchanting world of welfare economics, the public sector can instead use the enchanting powers of the creative economy rationale to legitimise public cultural funding, even in the case of non-commercial arts sectors. Although one would expect the cultural "handicraft" economies of the arts to decline (Baumol and Bowen 1966, p. 377), they do seemingly, on the contrary, *increase*, in terms of employment and output, *as by magic*. In the Norwegian case, the creative economy rationale thus seems to be uniquely valuable for the public sector, because it can be used to achieve two goals that are seemingly contradictory. First, it allows the public sector to *emulate* the rational language of economics, by using concepts such as *innovation, development, profits, synergy effects* and *clusters*, as illustrated in the quotes by MC and Bærum Municipality above, and by the use of quantitative data. Secondly, the concept allows the public sector to capitalise rhetorically on the enchanted world of the arts, without the public sector being perceived as irrational due to this capitalisation. The resulting cocktail of rationality and enchantment, manifested in the concept of the creative economy, seems to work as a powerful rhetorical tool in the cultural political legitimisation of public funding of the arts. One reason might be that while welfare economics and *New Public Management* are tools that can be used to satisfy requirements of *rationality*, in Weber's sense, the creative economy rationale might be more suitable to satisfy desires for *enchantment*.¹¹⁹

Hood (1991) and others describe how the public sector *emulates* managerial practices from the private sector through *New Public Management*. But through cultural policy, authorities seem to emulate the private sector in a completely different manner. Companies do not only need to develop a brand, they must also build *identity* among their employees.

Maffesoli (1996, p. 11) has used the term *neo-tribalism* to describe these tendencies, in which modern individuation, separation and rationality, are replaced by collective subjects such as corporate tribes. In the case of the cultural sector, corporations find ways in which they can channel the enchantment from the cultural institutions, into the corporation. If we combine Bourdieu's capital analogies (Bourdieu 1986) with notions of magical capitalism (Moeran and Waal Malefyt 2018), we might speculate that the corporations, through sponsorships, are able to add to the magical capital of the corporate tribes. The aura of the artist is converted into magical capital. One of the costs of this conversion, however, is artist shame and embarrassment. As one interviewee described it,

We do see that our sponsors, they require that we play this and that music, for example film music. For example, they required us to play an encore with a soundtrack from a movie from the 80s, and even in the Musikverein in Vienna, we were forced to play it as an encore. The whole orchestra was extremely ashamed, and thought it was very embarrassing. (Charlotte, wind player)

Presumably, the event referred to in the quote above might have been valuable for the building of corporate identity and corporate enchantment.

According to Maffesoli (1996), there is a distinction in history between rational and abstract periods on the one hand, and empathetic periods on the other. The latter periods are what he refers to as neo-tribal. As he puts it,

The rational era is built on the principle of individuation and of separation, whereas the empathetic period is marked by the lack of differentiation, the 'loss' in a collective subject: in other words, what I shall call neo-tribalism. (Maffesoli 1996, p. 11)

This is echoed by some of the literature on tribal management in for-profit corporations. Seemingly, tribal magic can increase the feeling of corporate identity, and thereby indirectly increase profits through the success of the group. As one management book describes it:

It is at this moment – when a leader begins talking about everyone's values, as opposed to individuals discussing "my values" – that tribal magic happens. It reminds us of alchemy, when people searched for a way to turn lead into gold. In a sense, the moment when Tribal Leaders can speak to the members of the tribe about the tribe itself, a group of individuals gels, a common identity forms, and people dedicate themselves to the success of the group. (Logan *et al.* 2011, p. 164)¹²⁰

Correspondingly, as it is explained in a Norwegian management book:

Can a normal company, a grey municipal department, and an average organisation be transformed into an Indian tribe? Certainly! (...) you must admix the magic glue that makes people and co-workers feel that *this* is where I belong, here are my tribal friends, my symbols and rituals. (Jensen 2002, p. 30)¹²¹

In some ways, this neo-tribal corporatism is echoed by the creative economy rationale. For example, in the most recent state action plan on the creative economy (Ministry of Culture *et al.* 2013), there is a very strong personalised element. The public sector, by its use of the creative economy rationale, seems to leave the rational era of individuation and separation, and enters the world of the enchanted corporate tribe. This means, to use Maffesoli's words, that the public sector is "lost" in the collective subject. Individuation is substituted with collective enchantment. One consequence is that "networking" is crucial. Having entered the enchanted world of corporate neo-tribalism, the public sector leaves its detached welfare economic rationality, and substitutes it with "networks". In the most recent state level creative economy action plan, the word "networking", is used no less than eighty times throughout the 149 page document. For example, it is described how a "network" of cultural businesses in a minor town was able to arrange a "social happening for the whole town" (Ministry of Culture *et al.* 2013, p. 70).¹²²

These neo-tribal tendencies did not resonate among many of the 37 interviewees, however. Their world is largely a world of restraint and civility, far from the ecstatic tribal dance around the totem. As one interviewee put it,

(...) there is something about restraint that can be good. And that (...) that is something that you must have in classical music, some degree of detachment, a bit of distance while at the same time being intimate. (Simon, church musician)

The life-world of most of the 37 interviewees had little in common with the enchanted corporate neo-tribalism that Jensen (2002) describes. They significantly expressed values of enlightenment and rationality. Norwegian cultural policy, on the other hand, is much more influenced by Jensen's (2002) enchanted corporate neo-tribalism. Possibly, the different attitudes to the creative economy rationale might be a result of these fundamentally different values. While agents in the public sector are seemingly inclined to embrace and emulate the

neo-tribalism of the corporate world, the identity of classical music practitioners might simply be too connected with the rational values of the enlightenment.

5.2.3 Religious atheism

A third observation from Chapter 4 which is not immediately comprehensible, is that authorities refer to the *intrinsic value* of art as a legitimising rationale for public funding of the arts sectors, although they rarely provide intensional definitions of the concept. In a rational western democracy, we might expect that they would define central concepts, but in the case of *intrinsic value*, the Norwegian public sector largely abstains from providing such definitions. On the other hand, the classical musicians that I interviewed provided more specific examples of forms of values of art that might be called intrinsic forms of value. In other words, they provided definition of intrinsic value by extension, or “family resemblance” (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 32). Although none of them made the following statement, they might have said something like this: “I am not able to provide you with a definition of the intrinsic value of classical music, but I can give you some examples”.

Arguably, all cultural policy is instrumental (Vestheim 2008). This is a statement that is analogous to Weber’s observation about all sorts of religion: “*do ut des*” (Weber 1978, p. 424). In other words: Ultimately, it is all about exchange. The tribe offers a gift to a god, and the god gives something back. The motivation behind magic is thereby sober and rational, according to Weber. If we continue along this line, we might claim that the same is the case with all world religions. Prayers ultimately have instrumental ends. In this perspective, the claim that the value of a prayer might be *intrinsic*, becomes meaningless. If there is always a motivational *end goal* of the prayer, then it makes little sense to claim that the value of the prayer is intrinsic. “I pray to you, my dear god, and in exchange, I expect you to take me to heaven”.

The concept of intrinsic value might reflect different political aims and motives. Vestheim has specified further what these motives might be: They might for example be educational, economic and social motives, or the development of democracy and enlightenment (Vestheim 2007, p. 233). In this conception, if MC uses the term *intrinsic value* in a policy document, it is reasonable for the analyst to ask *which* political motive is

behind it, not *whether* there is such a political motive or not. We might therefore ask why the public sector so often states that it would like to promote the intrinsic value of art, instead of explicitly stating which *objectives* the public sector is trying to achieve.

There are at least three potential answers to this question. The first potential answer is that the use of the term intrinsic value simply reflects *imprecision*. The following statement from a recent WP on culture in the UK might be an example of this. In the WP it is stated:

Evidence suggests that culture has an intrinsic value through the positive impact on personal wellbeing. Data shows that engaging with culture (visiting, attending and participation) significantly increases overall life satisfaction. (Department for Culture, Media & Sport 2016, p. 15)

Arguably, in this quote, the term intrinsic value is misplaced, and makes the quote imprecise. Following Vestheim (2007), we might simply conclude that “increased overall life satisfaction” is an example of an instrumental outcome of cultural policy, and that the term “intrinsic value” is simply superfluous, because the quote simply describes one form of cultural policy instrumentalism among many such forms. The first sentence in the quote could alternatively simply have stated: “Evidence suggests that culture has positive impact on personal wellbeing”. The quote above illustrates a point that Hylland has made:

Even though cultural political descriptions often promote the claim that culture has intrinsic value, this claim is almost always followed up by a utilitarian understanding that pushes in an instrumental direction, at least with the understanding that culture is also *for* something, and that it has *objectives*. (Hylland 2009, p. 20, my emphasis)

A second potential answer to the question of why the term intrinsic value is used by authorities, is that the bureaucracy might be *deliberately concealing* its true intentions by using the term. The intentions of the government might be of such a nature that politicians believe that these intentions cannot be told explicitly, for rhetorical-political reasons. The term intrinsic value has then become empty, as Hylland (2009, p. 13) points out, and is simply to be considered part of a political strategy to *conceal*. If all cultural policy is instrumental by its definition, we might claim that authorities are simply not telling the truth if they claim that they support the arts because of the intrinsic value of art. In that case, their

reference to the intrinsic value of art as a legitimising rationale for public funding of the arts, is empty rhetoric. As Vuys has pointed out,

(...) in the second half of the twentieth century, policy makers thought that society would benefit if the arts were given both generous support and extensive freedom. So it seemed that governments supported the arts for their own sake. But that was just a semblance. In fact, political motives were at work. The intention was to use the arts to bring about something that was considered to be beneficial to society. (Vuyk 2010, p. 177)

In Vuyk's perspective, if authorities claimed that they supported the arts for the sake of the intrinsic value of the arts, the authorities were not telling the truth. The authorities had other motives. Another example of potential concealment might be that some politicians wish to promote high cultural forms, at the expense of culture as a *way of life* (Williams 1989), while these politicians simultaneously perceive it as rhetorically undesirable to declare this wish publicly. Intrinsic value might in those cases work as an implicit rhetorical tool for a concealed political prioritisation of high cultural forms.¹²³

A third potential answer is that the political class and the bureaucracy might have a *vague* awareness of a form of value that they are simply unable to put into words. The term *intrinsic value* might simply remain opaque in policy documents because authorities are *unable* to convey their true intentions. To recall Belfiore and Bennett,

(...) the arts occupy a particularly fragile position in public policy, on account of the fact that the claims made for them, especially those relating to their transformative power, are extremely hard to substantiate. (Belfiore and Bennett 2008, p. 5)

An inability to express the meaning of the concept of the intrinsic value of art might be a result of the general substantiation difficulties that the public sector faces.

One way of getting around the challenges of substantiation, might be to refer to the transcendent. According to Røyseng, there is a prominent notion of the *transcendent* in Norwegian cultural policy. She has therefore introduced the concept *ritual* cultural policy:

In a similar way as anthropological studies of so-called "primitive cultures" describe how people who struggle with illness and childlessness through rituals is connected to supernatural forces that can make them healthy and fertile (...), the ritual cultural policy connects the problems that burden the societal body and the transformative powers of art and culture. (Røyseng 2008b, p. 11)

In this theorisation, Norwegian cultural policy is underpinned by something supernatural.¹²⁴ From an abductive standpoint, Røyseng's anthropologically based hypothesis is an attractive one. *If it is true* that Norwegian cultural policy is underpinned by assumptions about the existence of the supernatural, such as Røyseng suggests, we might be able to comprehend the frequent use of the term *intrinsic value* of art in Norwegian policy documents. The apparently “empty” concept of the intrinsic value of art (Hylland 2009, p. 13) leaves enough room open for supernatural underpinnings, while at the same time allowing the bureaucracy to at least *appear* rational.

The connections between the divine and cultural policy are not new in analyses of Norwegian cultural policy. Hylland concludes that the intrinsic value rationale is a *totem* that Norwegian cultural policy makers use in their legitimation of public funding of the arts (Hylland 2009, p. 17). Correspondingly, Røyseng suggests that we should be *divine detectives*, because cultural policy relies on the divine (Røyseng 2006, pp. 229–230). This is with reference to Luhmann, who calls for the discovery of “hidden religious premises in apparently secularized codes” (Luhmann 1985, p. 33). As Mendieta puts it, “religion is replaced by art, the prophet by the artist, the priest by the cultural critic” (Mendieta 2002, p. 36). What might be the case, is that when Norwegian authorities use the concept of intrinsic value, they wish to *appear* rational, although there are hidden religious premises at work, to use Luhmann's (1985) terminology.

In the case of classical music, many have used religious metaphors. We may consider classical music a form of “secularised prayer” (Martinson 2018), the “(...) supreme mystery of the science of man” (Lévi-Strauss 1969, p. 18), or a “(...) mysterious revelation of the highest wisdom, a divine service” (Mann 1992, p. 416). Lagrosen and Lagrosen make the following observations in their study of a symphony orchestra:

Apart from the more mundane values mentioned above [the customer, perfection, emotion], many of the musicians also wanted to create a value that is rather etheric or spiritual to its nature. It is mentioned in terms like being a part of something larger, a more holistic context or opening the eyes of the soul. A sense of infinity or sacredness was also mentioned. This is said to create an intense happiness that goes beyond the common happiness which is included in the previous dimension [emotion]. It is a way of flying away with the music to a higher realm and a sense of flow. However, this value

does not appear on its own, but rather through the two previous values [perfection and emotion] when they reach their fulfilment. Someone expressed that God is in the details. Through perfection combined with profound feeling, a spiritual experience can be created. (Lagrosen and Lagrosen 2017, pp. 325–326)

There are reasons to be cautious with regards to the role of art as an expression of the divine. Montagu claims that there is an inclination to use the term “ritual” about *any* object or *any* practice that cannot otherwise be explained, and he warns that this is a potential interpretive trap (Montagu 2017, p. 7). Similarly, Heinich states:

Religious analogy seems to be used by some scholars as an exclusive interpretative tool, transforming the research object into a mere projection of their cognitive categories. Everything then tends to become “religious”, by a kind of all-aspiring effect that attracts into “religious” anything that more or less looks like it, without ever discussing the relevance of such an assimilation, without any definition of what it means. (Heinich 2014, p. 73).

Clearly, religious analogies made by theorists such as Bourdieu (1980) and Luhmann (1985) might induce researchers to *project* religious analogies into cultural policy documents and the practitioner perspectives. But equally clearly, Røyseng’s (2006) conclusions about cultural policy being based on public sector conceptions of the divine, resonated with several of the practitioners that I interviewed. Many of the 37 interviewees in this study considered themselves atheists, but as a self-declared Christian interviewee put it,

I have colleagues who are atheists and who play Bach’s Christmas Oratorium in the church, and they are in a way *in* it, and they feel a content and a meaning in that music, which clearly is a religious form of music. Musicians like to look at music as something human instead of something religious. (Daniel, string player)

One interviewee who considered herself non-religious expressed some of the same thoughts:

I played for many years in a catholic orchestra that used to play once a month in a beautiful city in my home town. So, we would meet up and rehearse in the morning and then play the mass on Sunday, often quite difficult projects with short rehearsal time. And of course, there were people in that orchestra, including myself, who were not catholic, because there just weren’t enough Catholics to make a band, you know. So, I was alongside some people for whom religion was absolutely intrinsically part of what they were doing. But for me, the spiritual aspect of those things were the music itself and perhaps the sun streaming in the windows. (Margaret, wind player)

This spiritual but non-religious world-view might also apply to *audiences* of classical music. As Benzecry reports from his work on “opera fanatics”:

He asked me whether I was going to take into account the effect that music has on people. I started to respond, saying that, yes, there are cognitive and physical effects. He stopped me and explained: “No, actual effects, that music elevates you, that it makes you a better, more spiritual person”. (Benzecry 2011, p. 95)

These musical-moral convictions might be cognitively rooted in supernatural beliefs in moralising gods (Roes and Raymond 2003). While those supernatural roots had largely become irrelevant for many of the interviewees, their desire for spirituality was strong. Music might for them represent what has been referred to as an *endogenous* source of generation of meaning (Pennycook *et al.* 2016, Speed *et al.* 2018), independent from the supernatural. As one interviewee put it, with regards to musical values:

I call it a sense of meaning, it is a sense of coherence. Some call it intuition, but I think it is more honest to call it our sense of meaning, sense of coherence (...) which makes us totally lost without it. (David, composer)

We should grasp the way in which music might endogenously produce meaning, without falling into the trap of projecting religious analogy into the empirical material (Heinich 2014, Montagu 2017). One way of doing this might be to use the term “religious atheism” (Dworkin 2013).¹²⁵ As Dworkin points out, religion without God entails a sort of *inevitability* of what the world looks like. For example, there is an inevitability of the musical, which leads to a platonic view of the musical work: “When Emperor Joseph told Mozart that his *Figaro* had too many notes, Mozart replied, bewildered, that it had just enough. And so it does.” (Dworkin 2013, p. 101). Mozart thereby declined a relativisation of his opera. One does not have to believe in a supernatural entity to defend that view. Moreover, as Dworkin puts it, “many millions of people who count themselves as atheists have convictions and experiences similar and just as profound as those that believers count as religious” (Ibid., p. 1). Clearly, some of the interviewees in this study are among these. Their atheism does not make their spiritual desires any less profound than religious believers, although enlightenment, for them, has cut off the supernatural roots of their profound psychological

desires. They can still believe in conceptions such as the intrinsic value of art, along with other conceptions such as objective morality and human free will, despite their atheism.

This “Religious atheism” view is illustrated in Figure 5-1. As illustrated, the atheism that accompanies desires for spirituality, does not by necessity have to *reduce* beliefs such as the belief in the intrinsic value of art, the belief in objective morality, and the belief in human free will. These beliefs can still be sustained within an overall atheist worldview. They are beliefs that can be sustained, even when enlightenment has cut of the beliefs in supernatural forces. Especially, we can expect this to be the case among classical musicians, who are inclined to possess “high levels of sensitivity, imagination, and intuition” (Kemp 1996, p. 83).




Figure 5-1 Religious atheism among arts agents.

The public sector use of the term intrinsic value is bewildering, because “all cultural policy is instrumental” (Vestheim 2008). It is also bewildering because the public sector rarely elaborates on the meaning of the concept (Hylland 2009). However, the “religious atheism” concept might be the explanatory key. If it is the case that agents in the Norwegian public sector emulate the religious atheism of artists by using the term “intrinsic value”, then the use of the concept is no longer a mystery. Nor is it a mystery that the concept is rarely

followed by exhaustive definitions by public authorities, because the “religious atheist” worldview is not compatible with the “rationality” (Weber 1978) that many agents in the political sphere wish to be associated with.

As Weber pointed out, “obstructions due to certain value-attitudes derived from ethical and religious sources have tended to limit the development of an autonomous capitalistic system of the modern type in certain areas” (Weber 1978, p. 200). Another such “obstruction” is the notion of the intrinsic value of art, which is inherently in opposition to market orientation in art worlds. The difference between the life-world of the classical musician and the political sphere might stem from this difference. Within Dworkin’s conception of “religious atheism”, it seems adequate to use spiritual analogies to describe the values of aesthetic experience. These experiences might emanate from psychological dispositions that are real and profoundly felt, even though their supernatural roots to some degree have lost their relevance.

In the public sector, however, whether the spiritual underpinnings of the intrinsic value argument are atheist or religious, is largely irrelevant. The requirements of bureaucratic rationality prevent the public sector from using any such analogies. On the surface, the concept appears to have ended up as empty. Beneath the surface, the concept probably entails that the public sector tacitly adopts the same “religious atheist” worldview as described above. In this worldview, it is plausible to claim that artistic values are “intrinsic values”, in the sense that they are perceived as incommensurable with other values that the public sector supports.

5.3 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have addressed the second research question:

2) How should we *interpret* the differences between authorities and classical music practitioners, with regards to emphasised rationales?

I addressed this research question by theorising about the ways in which public funding of the classical music sector is legitimised by the public sector and the 37 practitioners that I interviewed. I provided some conceptualisations and hypotheses based on abductive

reasoning. In this abductive reasoning, I used empirical material provided within this research project, and supplemented it with empirical material and theoretical contributions from other studies.

I concentrated the discussions on three aspects of cultural policy rationales where I found the most significant differences between the viewpoints expressed by the public sector and the 37 interviewees. I suggested that the strong degree of egalitarianism among the interviewees, and their egalitarian views on cultural policy, can potentially be understood as a reflection of a widespread belief in ontological holism among these practitioners. I also suggested that it is an important factor that this holism is continuously reinforced by collective aesthetic experiences.

Moreover, I concluded that the scepticism towards the creative economy rationale expressed by the interviewees could be understood in terms of a restraint and detachment in the sector. These traits prevent practitioners in the sector from getting enchanted by the creative economy rationale. By contrast, I concluded that the Norwegian political sector, through its embrace of the creative economy rationale, demonstrates in practice that there is a desire for enchantment in the political sector, and that the creative economy provides a rhetorical tool for the satisfaction of this desire.

Finally, I concluded that many interviewees could be considered “religious atheists”. This means that they rarely express belief in supernatural agents, but they still believe in values that ultimately emanate from religious roots. The spiritual form of atheism expressed by the practitioners allows them to believe in the intrinsic value of art. I also suggested that one way of interpreting the frequent use of intrinsic value of art as a funding rationale in the public sector in Norway, is that this concept allows the public sector to express the same “religious atheism” without appearing irrational.

6 CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have addressed the following two research questions:

- 1) Which public funding rationales are emphasised in Norway, by public authorities and classical music practitioners, respectively?
- 2) How should we *interpret* the differences between authorities and classical music practitioners, with regards to emphasised funding rationales?

In Norway, classical music institutions are significantly funded by the public sector. One important reason for this, is that the classical music sector is predominantly a handicraft economy where it is difficult or impossible to automate production. The sector is faced by continuous production challenges due to this lack of automation potential. In addition, the sector has challenges related to the fact that it is difficult to reach a broad spectrum of demographic groups with classical music performances.

Due to challenges such as these, and other trends such as digitalisation and globalisation, there is a continuous need for research about rationales for public funding of the classical music sector. This thesis contributes to the body of research on funding rationales for the sector.

Arts practitioners constitute an important stakeholder group in cultural policy. In some ways, they represent forms of expertise that might be valuable in policy development. In addition, they are significantly dependent on public support for their employment. Still, there is a lack of research about practitioner perspectives on public funding rationales for the classical music sector. This thesis has aimed to make a contribution to the research that examines this issue.

In order to address the research questions, I had to make several methodological choices. I decided to conduct semi-structured interviews with classical musicians on the practitioner level, and to study policy documents. I used thematic analysis as analytical approach. This entailed that I aimed to allow themes to emerge from the empirical material. At the same time, I acknowledged that the way in which themes are structured in a thematic

analysis, will often depend on prior knowledge. However, in order to maintain analytical flexibility, I decided not to employ an *a priori* theoretical concept or system. I also aimed to analyse the empirical material in a value-free manner, because value-freedom in the analysis allows deeper probing and more sophisticated analyses than value-laden inquiry.

With regards to the primary research question of the thesis, I concluded that differences and similarities between public policy and the practitioner perspectives could be analysed within a typology consisting of three main categories of cultural policy rationales. I made a number of conclusions about differences and similarities between the public sector and the practitioner perspectives, in terms of how public funding of the classical music sector is legitimised.

Although I attempted to retain an analytical distinction between self-interest and ideology through Chapter 4, some of the viewpoints expressed by the 37 interviewees might be induced, at least in part, by self-interest. For example, when several interviewees stated that they were against any decentralisation of the funding decisions for classical music institutions, it is not clear that this was a view that they held due to an *ideological* conviction about the value of a politically centralised cultural policy. Although it is clearly an intention, from the side of the state, that a potential regionalisation of cultural political power over funding decisions for the classical music sector will be accompanied by a financial strengthening of the regions, this intention did not seem to persuade the interviewees about the value of decentralisation. A potential decentralisation was largely perceived as a potential downgrade, financially and politically.

In the case of NNOB, the formal status as a “national” institution seems to be rather undisputed. However, some interviewees thought that the notion of “national” in the case of the symphony orchestras seemed more random. As mentioned in Chapter 1, both BPO and OPO currently enjoy the “national” status. From a public funding perspective, they are exclusively funded by the state level, and their total public funding is higher than what is the case for the regional orchestras. But paradoxically, these institutions rarely tour nationally. They primarily tour regionally, within their respective regions, and internationally. That is

why their “national” status seems to be primarily related to national prestige, and not to national functions that distinguish them from the regional orchestras.

These confusions seemed to enforce the degree of self-interest involved in the question of institutional status. In the case of BPO, which was suggested downgraded from its national status in the report from the aforementioned expert committee, the self-interest element is rather clear. BPO risks losing prestige by losing status as a national orchestra. But there might also be elements of self-interest in the regional orchestras’ opposition to decentralisation. The musicians working in these regional orchestras observe that the orchestras with “national” status receive higher total public funding. It is possible that it is not the regionalisation *per se* that they oppose, but the prospect of reduced total public funding. Although many of the 37 practitioners agreed on the basic objectives of political decentralisation, securing funding of their employer institutions might be more important. But whether the disagreements are fuelled by self-interest or ideological conviction, it is likely that tensions are going to continue when it comes to the question of “national” status and the related prestige and funding.

In addition, there is a potential conflict related to the “capital” status of Oslo. The expert committee suggested that OPO, as the only symphony orchestra, should retain “national” status. However, the “capital” status is not founded on legal status. It is only founded on custom.¹²⁶ What this entails, is that politicians do not have a *constitutional* support for defining an institution as “national” only because it is located in Oslo. Conversely, there are no formal regulations that prevents the state from moving national institutions, such as ministries, to other cities than Oslo. With the tensions of the center-periphery debates in Norway, it is also not clear that the state will be able to formalise Oslo’s capital status. If the state is unable to formalise Oslo’s capital status, and if the state decides to fully regionalise the public funding of BPO and the regional orchestras, then the state might have to regionalise the public funding of the OPO as well. Clearly, these are topics that might become even more contested in the years to come. In those debates, we can expect that it might be difficult for observers to know whether the tensions are induced by self-interest or ideology among the different stakeholder groups.¹²⁷

When it comes to the question of equality in terms of cultural access, it is consistently difficult to comprehend whether the Norwegian public sector wishes to prioritise equal cultural *opportunities* or equal cultural *consumption*. As we saw in Chapter 2, this is also a distinction that theorists such as Bourdieu rarely discuss. Therefore, it is perhaps not so surprising that this distinction is rarely addressed by the Norwegian public sector on the different levels of government. From the perspective of most of the 37 interviewees in this study, this distinction seemed to be clear and unproblematic, in that equal *opportunity* was viewed as more important than equal *attendance* by different demographic groups. By contrast, although the Norwegian public sector rarely requires the institutions to report on the demographics of their audiences, it is not clear that the public sector is content with cultural access equality understood as equal *opportunity*. In that sense, the relationship between the cultural policy perspective and the perspective of the 37 interviewees in this study, is unclear.

When it comes to the question of collective identity, this is a topic that was described by the 37 interviewees as highly contested. It was the national dimension of collective identity that was regarded as the most relevant one by the interviewees, while the regional and local dimensions of identity were regarded as less important. The same pattern can be observed in the public sector. Neither the state nor the regional or municipal levels consider it relevant, within cultural policy, to promote any form of exclusive regional or local identities. It is the national dimension that is relevant. However, both the interviewees in this study, and the public sector, rarely promote *exclusive* forms of national identity in explicit ways. That is an analytical challenge, because collective identity must in some way denote characteristics that exclude outsiders. For example, when the state asks institutions to report on the number of Norwegian works performed, this entails a *de facto* element of exclusion of foreign composers' works.

Some interviewees held the principled view that nationality should be irrelevant in recruitment and auditioning processes. But other interviewees would like to see a minimum percentage of Norwegian musicians in the publicly funded institutions. This applied both to the Norwegian and to the foreign interviewees. These two contrasting opinions were rather

evenly distributed in the small sample of interviewees. Most interviewees supported an exclusive favouring of Norwegian composers, in the sense that they believed that NNOB and the symphony orchestras should provide exclusivity to Norwegian composers in their programming. They also supported conductor recruitment programs that are exclusively oriented towards Norwegian conductors, such as the aforementioned program by BPO. The public sector seems to support these national exclusive programs in a tacit manner.

However, it is interesting to note that neither the interviewees nor the public sector supported choosing Norwegian composition based on any perceived notion of Norwegian *sound*. For example, if a Japanese composer would hypothetically compose a work that in some way were perceived to *sound* Norwegian, this composer would still face the same exclusion mechanisms that foreign composers meet. Norwegian music from the 19th century was perceived as core repertoire by some interviewees, and it seemed clear that part of the reason was that this music typically *sounds* Norwegian. That is a paradox. Music from the 19th century is loved for its Norwegian-ness, but Norwegian-ness is irrelevant in the programming of contemporary works. It is possible that the 19th century musical nationalism is perceived as an expression of an irrelevant past.¹²⁸ The question of the relevance of musical Norwegian-ness for funding decisions would might be an interesting question for future research.

When it comes to the rationale that I labelled *collective civility*, a few of the interviewees saw this rationale as a valid one, for public support of the classical music sector. Classical music was by some interviewees perceived to induce civil forms of behaviour, and thereby contributing to increased collective well-being. It is also a rationale that is only moderately represented in the Norwegian public sector. The public sector does *de facto* take a stance in questions of aesthetic judgment through its funding decisions. Still, there are very few cases where the public sector explicitly provides statements that can reasonably be considered expressions of civilising ambitions. This is a paradox. If we look at political texts, political authorities seem to hold the view that there is an arbitrary relationship between the signifier and signified. In the example of “cultural panic” caused by gangster rap, which I examined in Chapter 4, the panic was caused by the *text*, not by perceived savage rhythms

or savage base. At least, the MP *said* that it was only the text that caused his concern. It seems likely that agents in the cultural bureaucracies subconsciously wish to influence people into more civil forms of interaction through classical music. That is a wish that is probably reflected in the high public funding levels of the classical music sector. But their *rhetorical* emphasis on this rationale is limited.

I identified some important differences between the public policy priorities and practitioner perspectives, with regards to the prominence of rationales. The practitioners that I interviewed were more inclined to prioritise economic equality as an overall objective for cultural political priorities. By contrast, the public sector on the various levels of government in Norway have significantly embraced the creative economy rationale. I also identified differences in terms of the intrinsic value rationale. The public sector often uses this concept to legitimise public funding of high arts sectors such as the classical music sector, but the public sector rarely defines the concept. By contrast, the practitioners that I interviewed significantly used spiritual or religious analogies that could be interpreted within the perspective of the intrinsic value of art.

For the three differences in priorities mentioned above, I offered some conceptualisations and abductions. I concluded that one way of understanding the rather strong egalitarianism that was characteristic for the interviewees' opinions about cultural policy priorities, was that it mirrors their ontological holism. I concluded that many of the interviewees believe in collective agency, that this belief is continuously reinforced by collective aesthetic experiences, and that this belief is an important source of their egalitarian political views. I also suggested that the creative economy rationale that is significantly promoted by the public sector in Norway, is irrational, in the sense that it is primarily concerned with satisfying desires for enchantment among agents in the policy making process. I suggested that the public sector through the creative economy rationale emulates corporate trends of neo-tribalism and totemism, while downplaying more rational conceptions from welfare economics. By contrast, the practitioners that I interviewed expressed values of detachment that are incongruent with corporate totemism. Finally, I suggested that the public sector priority of the intrinsic value rationale has religious

psychological roots. At the same time, these religious roots cannot be acknowledged by the public sector, because it is important for the public sector in Norway to appear rational. The practitioners that I interviewed, by contrast, often used spiritual and religious analogies to describe the values of classical music. I suggested that the intrinsic value rationale could be interpreted as a form of religious atheism, where the supernatural roots have been cut off by enlightenment, but where deep-rooted psychological belief-systems still support the notion of artistic values as incommensurable with other values.

Several avenues for future research can be identified. The Norwegian case that has been explored in this thesis should be examined further, and it should also be accompanied by studies of other countries and regions. There is also a potential with regards to future research into legitimation for public funding of other arts sectors, and the ways in which this funding is legitimised by practitioners. We should have in mind that the results presented in this thesis are limited to the Norwegian case, and to *one* specific musical genre.

Some of those forms of rationales where I was unable to draw clear conclusions about the opinions expressed in policy documents and among the 37 interviewees, should be further explored. One example is the geographic equality rationale. What became clear during the interviews, was that I was doing these interviews in a period where the geographic equality rationale received more attention than normal, due to the publication of the aforementioned expert committee report.¹²⁹ The viewpoints expressed by the practitioners show that geography and classical music is a complex topic. For example, the major institutions perform in their home venues, they tour regionally and internationally, and their performances are distributed digitally. An interesting question is how the political sphere and the musicians will balance between these “distribution” channels in the future. Another example is the question about the relationship between the *equal opportunity* perspective and the *equal factual consumption* perspective in cultural policy. It seemed clear that from the perspective of most of the practitioners in this study, equal opportunity was regarded as the relevant objective in terms of cultural access. But it is not clear that the Norwegian public sector holds the same view, or whether the Norwegian public sector would like to see equal actual attendance at classical music concerts, from different demographic groups.

Future studies should also address some of the theoretical and conceptual aspects of cultural policy research that have been examined in this thesis. Typologies of public funding rationales for the arts should be discussed and developed further. In addition, there is a need for theorisations that provide understandings of the ways in which societies collectively finance artistic endeavours. In addition, future studies should discuss the different roles that might be attributed to the practitioners within the classical music sector. They might for example be regarded as aesthetic experts, creative workers, prophets or craftsmen. In a global and digital world, it is to be expected that their roles will continuously change. Researchers should provide the public with conceptualisations for these changing roles.

There is a potential for studies that address the *processual* aspects of cultural policy making. This thesis has examined values and priorities that are expressed by the public sector in Norway, and practitioner perspectives related to these values. However, the thesis has not significantly examined the policy making *process*. Cultural policy is produced in complicated processes that involve stakeholders such as voters, artists, cultural institutions and the political sphere. These processes are constituted by negotiations between competing values, desires and beliefs. Future studies should explore the ways in which desires and beliefs among stakeholders within the classical music sector extend into cultural political documents and budgets.

Finally, there is a case to be made for analyses of cultural policy that combine aesthetic and political analysis.¹³⁰ As we have seen, in the case of classical music, public authorities implicitly and continuously make political decisions through funding of a specific musical repertoire, although it is formally the major institutions themselves that do the programming. Musical meaning is not arbitrary. Cultural policy analysis would become more complete if it were able to supplement policy analysis and stakeholder analysis with structural and social analyses of the aesthetic material that the public sector supports through public budgets.

NOTES

1. At the time of writing, the Norwegian ministry with responsibility for cultural affairs is called The Ministry of Culture. This name was adopted in 2010. The ministry has had the following names from its inception in 1982: The Ministry of Culture and Science (1982-1989), The Ministry of Church and Culture (1990), The Ministry of Cultural Affairs (1991-2001) and The Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs (2002-2009). In this thesis, the abbreviation MC applies for all of these names. An overview over these names, and an overview over the people who have served as cultural ministers, is available on the government webpages (Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation 2013).
2. The term “classical music” is difficult to define. I use the concept in terms of *musical content*, not in terms of the *institutions* that *perform* this musical content. The thesis is about public funding rationales for classical music as such, not funding rationales for the institutions that perform this music. The latter form of rationales clearly *derive* from the former, though. With regards to musical content, Johnson (2002) states: “Musicologists use it [the term classical music] to refer only to the music of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven). A more popular use has it denoting music from a wider historical period (say, from around 1600 to the present day) now associated with performance in a concert hall or opera house. More recently, commercial classical radio stations have used the term in a still broader way to include almost anything scored for orchestral or acoustic instruments, as opposed to the electrically amplified or generated sounds of popular music” (Johnson 2002, p. 6). In this thesis, I presuppose a wide interpretation of the term. This means that the term involves the whole period from early music to contemporary, avant-garde music. However, I do not have any ambition of providing an intensional definition of the term.
3. Palgrave Macmillan has a book series called “New Directions in Cultural Policy Research”. The series includes books that I refer to later in this thesis (e.g. Wesner 2018, Hylland and Bjurström 2018a): Palgrave Macmillan states the following on their webpages, and in the introduction to the books in the series: “Since its emergence in the 1990s in Australia and the United Kingdom and its eventual diffusion in Europe, the academic field of cultural policy studies has expanded globally as the arts and popular culture have been re-positioned by city, regional, and national governments, and international bodies, from the margins to the centre of social and economic development in both rhetoric and practice.”
4. Among cultural political objectives, Mangset states that “Democratising culture has been the most important objective of, and rationale for, a modern cultural policy in many countries since WW2.” (Mangset 2018, p. 3). He further concludes: “Altogether, it must be fair to say that the success of the cultural democratisation policy has been

- limited. The relative failure of cultural democratisation has contributed to a legitimisation crisis for public cultural policy in some countries, especially in France (...). Why should public authorities continue to conduct an active public cultural policy if democratisation of culture is futile?” (Mangset 2018, p. 4). Larsen concludes that both in Norway and Sweden, “democracy is very much part of cultural policy rhetoric, and more so now than ever” (Larsen 2013, p. 467). However, Larsen does not discuss to which degree the associated democratic objectives are achieved.
5. Formally, the full name of this organisation is currently *Creo – forbundet for kunst og kultur*, which can be translated into *Creo – the union for arts and culture*. Formerly, this organisation had the name *Musikernes fellesorganisasjon*, which translates approximately into *The union of musicians*. The present organisation, *Creo*, is still dominated by musicians, with regards to the representation of artist groups.
 6. In cultural policy studies, Agee’s (2009) suggestion is not always followed. For example, Duelund asks the following research question about Danish cultural policy: “Is the Danish nation state (...) too small to look after the interest of culture and the overall objectives of artistic freedom, cultural diversity, education and equal cultural opportunities during the transition to the global market economy and colonisation of the cultural and artistic opportunities for self-expression?” (Duelund 2003, pp. 68–69). Habermas’ concept of *colonisation* is here used already in the research question itself. This might induce readers to question the genuine openness of the inquiry. The theoretical tool seems to have been selected *a priori*. Another publication where Agee’s suggestion is not followed, is Bjørnsen (2009). In this study, the stated aim is to examine “(...) the extent to which the civilising mission has been and still is a key rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy” (Bjørnsen 2009, p. 13) The formulation “and still is” suggests that the answer is going to be “high extent”. If we follow Agee (2009), Belfiore (2009) and Arnestad (2010), the question should have been asked in a more open way.
 7. Clearly, there are also instances of *institutional* challenges associated with the grounded theory method. For example, Luckerhoff and Guillemette quote an academic who told them the following: “Professors from my department said that this method was only for experienced researchers because of the absence of a theoretical background and of the difficult suspension of theory” (Luckerhoff and Guillemette 2011, p. 400) But the problems of employing grounded theory in cultural policy studies are more significantly related to the nature of the research questions that are asked within this research area. As Wesner observes, grounded theory “(...) is yet to become better known in cultural policy research” (Wesner 2018, p. 8). It should be pointed out, however, that grounded theory is often concerned with emotional topics, and it is primarily *people-oriented* (e.g. Glaser 1965, Glaser and Strauss 1967). Cultural policy, on the other hand, is not only cultural, but also *political*. Correspondingly, cultural policy *studies* is not only concerned with *people*, but also with *texts* and *ideologies*.
 8. Mangset observes that cultural policy research is “(...) often perceived as *too* close to government and *too* instrumental.” (Mangset 2013b, p. 5, emphasis in original). If Mangset by “too close to government” means “dependent on government”, then there is a reason to be concerned. The intimacy between the researcher and the researched

might cause stakeholder groups to question the independence of the researcher, and to accuse the researcher of *advocacy research* (Belfiore 2016). Correspondingly, if he by “too instrumental” means that researchers provide *normative* considerations about what the *objectives* of cultural should be, then there is also reason to be concerned. Deciding on cultural political *objectives* is clearly a role for cultural politicians, not for cultural policy researchers. However, it is difficult to see that intimacy with the major political institutions in and of itself should be regarded as a problem. Intimacy does not in itself entail dependence or advocacy. Intimacy should be regarded as a strength, because intimacy ensures the possibility of retaining clear empirical reference. The problem is if the researcher is *de facto dependent* on prominent stakeholders, or if the researcher engages in *advocacy research*, i.e., makes recommendations about which cultural policy *objectives* that the public sector should prioritise.

9. One symphony orchestra that differs considerably from the other symphony orchestras, is the Norwegian Radio Orchestra, which was established in 1946 as an institutional part of NBC (Grøndahl 1996, p. 16). This orchestra has a staff of musicians that is typical for symphony orchestras, but the repertoire has traditionally differed from that of typical symphony orchestras, due to the responsibilities that this orchestra has had, and still has, within broadcasting. The orchestra, or members from the orchestra, participate regularly in NBC’s TV and radio productions. The NBC considered terminating the Norwegian Radio Orchestra around 2000, but after some political turbulence, the orchestra was allowed to continue its operations, although with increased requirements for income generating activities (Kleppe *et al.* 2010, p. 79). At present, the orchestra consists of around 55 musicians, which is considerably less than the number of musicians in the professional symphony orchestras, but the orchestra still makes considerable contributions to classical music life during TV and radio productions, and through regular concerts, mainly in various venues in Oslo. However, the orchestra falls somewhat outside of the general discussions about rationales for public funding of classical music, due to the orchestra’s position as an integrated institutional part of the NBC. When it comes to rationales for the public funding of NBC as a public broadcaster, this is a research area with rather different considerations from the ones that apply to the major art institutions (cf. Larsen 2011; 2014; 2016).
10. The heavy institutionalisation is not only prevalent on state level, but also applies on the regional level. As one county states: “Traditionally, the field of art has been characterised by strong hierarchies. What is at stake, is the power to define what is high and what is low, what is on the inside, and what is on the outside. When push comes to shove, this is about access to positions and resources. This can make cooperation difficult. At the same time, it is easy to see that the degree of organisation varies significantly within the different arts and cultural expressions. For example, while there is a welter of organisations within the field of music, the field of visual arts has relatively few organisations.” (Buskerud County 2011, p. 16).
11. With regards to the concept of “rhythmic music”, MC states: “The concept of rhythmic music does not have a precise content. In this white paper, it [rhythmic music] includes pop, rock, jazz, folk music, world music and all subgenres, including blues and folk songs.” (Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs 2008, p. 7). Some within the classical

music sector might contest this provisional definition of the term “rhythmic music”, by claiming that classical music is also “rhythmic”. Clearly, classical music is also “rhythmic”. Technically, a more adequate term than “rhythmic music” might be “sharply syncopated music” or just “syncopated music”. Classical music also has an abundance of syncopes, but the *sharp* syncopes are mainly found in the musical genres that MC lists. For example, Danielsen describes in a popular music analysis how “the pulse of the syncopated sixteenths has spread across the bar as a kind of counter-rhythmic echo” (Danielsen 2006b, p. 120). Sharp syncopes are essential for *groove* (Roholt 2014), which is essential in several popular music genres. Traditional classical music, on the other hand, rarely or never syncopates as sharply as a sixteenth. These sharp syncopes were analytically important for Horkheimer and Adorno, who stated: “A jazz musician who has to play a piece of serious music, Beethoven’s simplest minuet, involuntarily syncopates, and condescends to start on the beat only with a superior smile” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, p. 101). However, although the term “syncopated music” is probably a more precise technical term than “rhythmic music”, the term “syncopated music” might have been regarded as both too technical and too politically contested for a WP.

12. This formulation is from the English version by *Lovdata*, which is a foundation that provides information to the public about the judicial system. *Lovdata* was established by the Ministry of Justice and the Faculty of Law at the University of Oslo in 1981. Formally, *Lovdata* is a private foundation, but according to its statutes, the Ministry of Justice has the right to appoint the chairperson (*Lovdata* Foundation 1981, §6). The translations that are provided by *Lovdata* can therefore be regarded as state-sanctioned translations.
13. Hylland and Stavrum point out that the prioritisation of music within ACN has increased significantly over the years, at the expense of the other art genres: “In the years between 1965 and 1995, the musical share of the funding was between 6 and 10 %, with a couple of exceptions (...). Today, more than a third of the economic support allocated from the Cultural Fund is support for music or music related activities.” (Hylland and Stavrum 2018, p. 74) It should be noted that only a limited proportion of this support is granted to *classical* music projects, although there are no official numbers available for this proportion.
14. The electoral system is currently being evaluated by an expert committee that is to make its recommendation to the national government by the end of 2019 (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2017). The appointment of this committee was partly due to a previously approved regional reform, which re-organised the hitherto nineteen counties into eleven larger regions (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2016). This regional reform is relevant in a cultural political perspective, due to culture being identified as an area within which some responsibilities might be transferred from the state to the regional level from 2020, when the new regions will become operational (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2018).
15. The translations in the thesis are predominantly my own. This applies to political documents, many of the interviews, academic literature cited, and various non-academic publications. In those cases where authorised English versions of academic

literature can be found, I consistently cite these, and not the ones in a Scandinavian language. Unfortunately, however, many publications cited are only available in Norwegian. I must make a general reservation on the precision of the translations. Professional translator services have not been available during the project.

16. It is not obvious that it is phenomenologically accurate to use concepts such as *production* and *consumption* about cultural expressions such as classical music. Putting these concepts in quotes or not, might entail a value statement. It can be noted that in a UNESCO report, the concepts of *production* and *consumption* are put in quotes, in the case of the arts: “The conditions governing their ‘consumption’, distribution and ‘production’ are the concern of the public authorities” (UNESCO 1969, p. 43). However, the report also omits quotes in some other instances: “(...) money has also to be found for the production of a certain number of contemporary works” (UNESCO 1969, p. 29). In several prominent contemporary studies, quotes for the concepts “production” and “consumption” of arts are omitted without reflection on the phenomenological aspects of doing so. For example, Throsby (2010), who makes a clear distinction between *economic* and *cultural* value, refers to “production, distribution and consumption of the arts and culture” (Throsby 2010, p. 8) without putting these words in quotes. My intention is not to make an implicit value judgment by omitting quotes for these words. I simply found that it is difficult to find alternative words that are short, and that do not contain implicit value judgments.
17. Most notably, this applies to health care care (Gambling 1987, Baumol 1993; 1996; 2012; Hartwig 2008; 2011, Bates and Santerre 2013, Colombier 2017, Atanda *et al.* 2018) and education (Wellman 2010, Chen and Moul 2014, Nose 2017, Kimball and Luke 2018). But the concept of the cost disease has also been used to study economic challenges within areas such as transport (Sarriera and Salvucci 2016, Sarriera *et al.* 2018), defence (Borge *et al.* 2018), media (Preston and Sparviero 2009) and library services (Baumol and Blackman 1983).
18. On a more detailed level, we can observe that the economic challenges are inextricable linked to repertoire. As Peacock points out: “The problem with orchestras and operas is the relative inflexibility in the repertoire caused by the preferences of audiences for 19th Century music, which requires large forces which cannot be reduced in size without a perceived fall in the quality of performance.” (Peacock 2000, p. 198). Pompe *et al.* found that “(...) performing more of the standard repertoire increases attendance” (Pompe *et al.* 2013, p. 226). The popularity and centrality of the 19th century music entails that the symphony orchestras are *de facto* required to employ approximately hundred musicians, which is roughly the number of musicians required to perform the standard repertoire. What this means is that the symphony orchestras might in some cases be forced to focus heavily on the standard repertoire, in order to make ends meet. As one interviewee remarked: “(...) there are orchestras like the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, for example, they just end up on a trail playing Tchaikovsky 4 one week, Brahms 1 the next week, Tchaikovsky 4 the next week, and then they go out to some, you know, some, I don’t know, hall in the middle of nowhere and play Tchaikovsky 4 again, and (...) they just play the same stuff, because they did some audience surveys, and their audience wrote in and said, ‘we really like this piece’. So, they just play that

piece all the time. It's like classical music has this, you know, top 10 of, you know, whatever, so then they just play that top 100 all the time, because they just need to sell tickets. And I know that it is incredibly frustrating for some of the people who are playing there, because there is so much great classical music out there, that they don't get to play, because they are so stuck (...)." (Margaret, wind player). The requirement of focusing on the standard repertoire has also made the major institutions somewhat less relevant as ensembles for composers who are not yet established, and for avant-garde composers. As one interviewee pointed out, "The most common ensembles nowadays are more in the likes of *sinfoniettas*. That is sort of the instrument for composers who are starting out (...)" (Arthur, string player).

19. Notably, Baumol and Bowen (1966) focus primarily on *substitution* effects, and not on *income* effects. The lack of focus on income effects has been discussed by Cowen and Grier (1996, p. 7). Cowen and Grier's (1996) implicit claim is that a lack of focus on income effects might lead to an overestimation of the challenges represented by the cost disease. Technological progress has a positive income effect, in that it provides the population with increased purchasing power, which in turn can be used to purchase cultural products and tickets to performances. As Cowen puts it: "Even if the performing arts are less productive than other economic sectors, they will experience the benefits of positive income effects." (Cowen 1996, p. 208).
20. The reason why the aggregated *willingness to pay* tends to be higher than what is demonstrated through markets, is that markets have *market failures*. These market failures prevent a hypothetically free market from revealing the true preferences of the citizens. Therefore, according to standard economic theory, taxation and subsequent public funding of arts institutions might result in higher overall utility.
21. Bourdieu does not refer to *data* as source of this claim. However, there is a long intellectual history behind it. For example, Socrates states: "(...) isn't this why the rearing in music is most sovereign? Because rhythm and harmony most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the soul and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with them; and they make a man graceful if he is correctly reared, if not, the opposite (...)" (Plato, *The Republic*, 401d-e).
22. Some researchers have concluded that "status crystallization is lower" in Norway than in France, and that the "stratification system is more open" (Birkelund and Lemel 2013, p. 214). Consequently, there might be a higher number of alternative routes that lead to increased social status in the Norwegian society than there are in France. There are also easily observable differences between the French and the Norwegian society, for example with regards to GDP per capita, demography and geographical aspects, although I do not examine these closer.
23. This example applies to *artists*. Zangwill's claim is that "It is not remotely plausible that every choice the artist makes is extrinsically determined by social conditions." (Zangwill 2002a, p. 209). Clearly, although Zangwill's example is focused on the case of artists, his claim can also be regarded as relevant when it comes to the perspective of *audiences*. For example, if we follow Zangwill, we might consider it implausible to claim that every choice related to musical consumption is socially conditioned. Many social scientists agree with Zangwill. A prominent example is Elias, who, in his inquiry about Mozart,

- accepts the relevance of Mozart's social situation, but simultaneously acknowledges the *genius* of "(...) the great master (...)" (Elias 1993, p. 59).
24. There might also be other reasonable choices of starting points for a historical overview. This choice depends on how cultural policy is defined. Methodological discussions about these questions are provided in numerous publications (e.g. DiMaggio 1983, Solhjell 2004, Scullion and García 2005, Mulcahy 2006, Røyseng 2014). In the Norwegian case, however, it is beyond doubt that 1814 is at least *one* of the natural starting points. This is illustrated well by the discussion in Solhjell's (2004) article. What Solhjell does, is to discuss whether it is plausible or not to talk about a Norwegian cultural policy all the way back to 1814. What this means, is that he seems to view it as self-evident that 1814 is one of several starting points. This is understandable. 1814 is important in Norwegian history because it is the year when Norway became independent from Denmark, and the year that the Norwegian Constitution was written.
 25. Among the exceptions to the cultural *laissez faire* were the first state stipends to composers. The decisions to grant these stipends was made in 1848 and 1849. Dahl and Helseth write that "(...) In music policy, this is considered a milestone" (Dahl and Helseth 2006, p. 49). Notably, the decisions were supported by experts committees. Artistic expertise was thereby formally acknowledged by the state.
 26. A WP from the 1974 was literally called "New cultural policy" (Ministry of Church and Education 1974). This WP was clearly influenced by a WP from Sweden with the same name. In turn, the Swedish WP was influenced by discussions in UNESCO about directions and measurements of cultural policy (Vestheim 2018).
 27. Notably, many activities that from an anthropological conception of culture might be considered "cultural", still fell outside of cultural policy as a political sector. It is unrealistic to include all cultural practices, in the widest sense, in the term cultural policy. For example, banking might be regarded as a "cultural" expression in a wide conception of the term "culture", but nobody would seriously suggest that an institution such as the *Central Bank of Norway*, which is publicly owned, should be governed by the Ministry of Culture. What this shows is that at some point, if the term "culture" is used in a very broad sense, the term *cultural policy* becomes meaningless. Similar observations have also been made by others. For example, Eräsaari concludes that the ontology of cultural policy is hard to grasp, and that cultural policy therefore "(...) has to describe itself as a range of practices and assemblages obeying the idea of some sort of *polyphonic complexity of cultural voices*." (Eräsaari 2009, p. 57, emphasis in original).
 28. It should be noted that the term *national* can be used in two rather distinctly different ways. On the one hand, the term *national* can be used in to denote that the public governance of culture is dominated by the *state level*. If we use *national* in this conception, and describe a cultural policy that is *national*, then the counterparts of national cultural policy are constituted by cultural policy on other levels of government, such as regional and municipal cultural policy. Alternatively, the term *national* can be used to denote national *identity*. For example, the term national in the identity sense might entail direct or indirect promotion of music that in some way is perceived to *sound* Norwegian, such as Grieg's iconic piano concerto in a-minor, which from an

- early stage was associated with fjords and waterfalls (Østerberg 1997a, p. 143). Conceptions of musically related identity might also be race-related. For example, Elgar's music was by some English people perceived to reflect the "soul of our race" (Crump 2014, p. 205). Mangset and Hylland examine national cultural policy both as oriented towards support of the national *state*, a "national state in its creation", and towards support of Norwegian *identity*, but they do not clarify the distinction between these two conceptions of the national dimension (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 69). In analyses of rationales, however, it is important to distinguish between the national dimension as *state level dominance* on the one hand, and the national dimension as *identity politics* on the other hand, because clearly, these are two significantly different conceptions. The example that Mangset and Hylland refer to from the classical music sector, and the citizenship of the musicians that are recruited to the major institutions (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 311), is clearly focused on the *identity* dimension. It is probably plausible to sum up Mangset and Hylland's discussion as follows: 1) The question of national identity has been formative in Norwegian cultural policy, and 2) The state level has been more important than the other political levels in the promotion of this national identity.
29. Concepts such as *typology*, *taxonomy*, *classification* and *classification scheme* mean different things, although the relationship between them is somewhat ambiguous. As Toshkov notes: "It is quite ironic that the study of definitions, concepts, and classification – which should be a paragon of clarity – is marred by such conceptual confusion!" (Toshkov 2016, p. 96, exclamation mark in original). As he points out, "(...) classification can refer to the *process* of classification but also to the *product* of this process" (Ibid.). I refer to previous suggestions as *typologies* throughout this section, not as *classifications*. I do this to demarcate clearly against the *process* of classification. This is in congruence with Marradi's recommendation. As Marradi notes, regarding the labels *typology* and *classification*: "We strongly prefer the former label, as we consider [it] semantically unwise to use the same term for an operation and its product." (Marradi 1990, p. 134).
30. In some studies, the term *instrumental* is used in a rather descriptive and value-free manner (e.g. Vestheim 2007; 2008). But in most cases, if a researcher uses the term "instrumental cultural policy", this signals that the study is value-laden. For example, Belfiore claims, in a value-laden study, that within the arts and humanities, there is a "(...) persisting intellectual dominance of a narrow instrumental rationality with a distinctive economic flavour in framing value discussions" (Belfiore 2015, p. 99). By contrast, she suggests that cultural policy should focus on "what makes the arts *intrinsically* valuable to society" (Belfiore 2004, emphasis in original). Vestheim makes the following comment to Belfiore's expectations of cultural policy: "One might ask whether Belfiore's expectations are at all relevant for cultural policy, or for democratic public policy in general. Policy is per definition instrumental, in the sense that the objectives of policy is to offer services or benefits to the citizens. Culture has, in this perspective, no intrinsic value, it only has value *for* somebody, i.e., for the citizens. It thereby automatically becomes an instrument, not a goal in itself." (Vestheim 2018, p. 118, emphasis in original).

31. Bennett suggests that the “arm’s length principle” in cultural policy is a “potent expression of *laissez faire* traditions” (Bennett 1995, p. 204). This view is supported by Hetherington (2017). It is beyond doubt that the arm’s length principle (Hillman Chartrand and McCaughey 1989) has informed the governance of certain cultural institutions, and most notably the arts councils in various countries. This also applies to the Norwegian case (Mangset 2009; 2013a; 2013c, Hylland and Stavrum 2018). But the arm’s length principle is not a cultural policy rationale. It is a governing principle.
32. The typologies discussed are primarily relevant in the perspective of *adult* citizens. Classical music performances are primarily produced for adults. If we look at rationales for public funding of classical music pedagogy for children, this is a completely different area of research. As one municipality puts it: “To argue for increased focus on art activities for children and youth is easy, because international research points to massive benefits in terms of cognitive functions, which in turn are related to learning.” (Larvik Municipality 2018, p. 10). However, the children and youth perspective is not addressed in this thesis. It should also be mentioned there are other kinds of typologies than those who are concerned with rationales for public funding. For example, a well-known typology by Hillman Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) provides an overview over potential *roles* played by the public sector. They conclude that the public sector might take the role as facilitator, patron, architect or engineer. However, this typology says little about *rationales* for public funding.
33. In the case of classical musicians who work in Norway, but who are not Norwegian citizens, these do not have voting rights in national parliamentary elections. However, they do in most cases have voting rights in local and regional elections. This is a general rule that applies to foreigners living in Norway (Lovdata Foundation 2002, § 2).
34. Hylland and Mangset use the phrase “specific form of relevance” (Hylland and Mangset 2018, p. 166). One interpretation of this phrase might be that Hylland and Mangset are of the opinion that research should be more *prominent* in cultural policy than in other political areas. Alternatively, we might interpret the phrase as claiming that research should play a *different* role in the policy making process in cultural policy than in other policy sectors, i.e., not necessarily a more *prominent* one. Considering their full book chapter, it seems to be the former interpretation that is the correct one.
35. As we saw in the quote above, Hylland and Mangset conclude that researchers might be “contributors to cultural policy” (Hylland and Mangset 2018, p. 166). It is possible that the term *contributors* is intended to entail that researchers factually and frequently express their normative views in research reports or in oral encounters between researchers and representatives for public institutions. But there is clearly a difference between providing advice about which *measures* the public sector should prioritise to reach its politically defined goals, and providing advice about what *the goals* in themselves should be.
36. Abbing holds the same view, and writes: “The fact that art subsidies often have little effect or are counterproductive but are nevertheless maintained, plus the fact that price differentiation measures and vouchers are rarely used, suggests that other interests must

- be at stake. Paul, Peter, Anna, and Martin's [Abbing's artist informants] motives in promoting art subsidies may very well be selfish." (Abbing 2002, p. 225).
37. The term "ideology" is here used as in everyday parlance, not as in the Marxist conception of the term.
 38. Arguably, some other professions might have some commonalities with the arts. For example, numerous studies have been conducted on political views held by researchers (e.g. Klein and Stern 2005, Gross and Fosse 2012, Klein *et al.* 2013, Solon 2015, Shields and Dunn 2016). Researchers is a group of workers that might have some aspects in common with artists. However, there is not enough space to review these within the confines of the thesis. I therefore limit the review to the relatively few studies of the artist perspective, and to those policy views that are primarily confined to the *cultural* political sector.
 39. It is not *a priori* necessary to generate *primary* data material, in order to answer defined research questions in a satisfactory manner. As numerous researchers have pointed out, secondary material might be valuable, or even sufficient (e.g. Thorne 1994, Hammersley 1997; 2010, Heaton 2008, Notz 2005, Parry and Mauthner 2004, Moore 2007, Sherif 2018, Urick 2018, Ruggiano and Perry 2019). According to Bishop and Kuula-Luumi (2017), the reuse of secondary data has now become mainstream and accepted. For example, if I would have been able to obtain transcripts from interviews conducted in previous studies (e.g. Nijzink *et al.* 2017, Daniel 2014b, Wesner 2018, Kleppe *et al.* 2010), that might have been helpful for my research aims. An organisation such as *The UK Data Archive* stores qualitative interview transcripts that can be used repeatedly. An equivalent organisation in Norway is *The Norwegian Centre for Research Data*, which also archives qualitative interview transcripts. However, I was not able to acquire *any* such secondary material, neither from Norway nor from other countries. On a different note, it should also be mentioned that neither audio files nor interview transcripts used in this thesis have been archived for later use. This is due to agreements that were made with the the interviewees prior to the interviews, and which were formulated in the participant information sheet. However, it is possible to argue that future empirical research projects within cultural policy studies should aim to make anonymised versions of the empirical material available for secondary use.
 40. When it comes to software, the literature is most often very specific in its references to *Skype* as the primary video conference application (e.g. Cater 2011, Hanna 2012, Deakin and Wakefield 2014, Janghorban *et al.* 2014, Lo Iacono *et al.* 2017, Quartiroli *et al.* 2017). This might have to do with the fact that *Skype* is owned by Microsoft, and that Microsoft's software is frequently used by researchers. As a case in point, Loughborough University has currently an official agreement with Microsoft about software use. However, there are also numerous other applications that are available, and which might be preferred by interviewees. Morris writes: "The interviewee should be allowed to choose the venue and method of interviewing – face-to-face, telephone, *Skype* or email" (Morris 2015, p. 74). We might substitute "*Skype*" with "video call" in this quote, in order to make his point more general. Some interviewees might prefer other video call applications than *Skype*. On a different note, I did not offer e-mail as interview method for my interviewees.

41. One of the interviewees in this study also expressed this point: “(...) an orchestral musician does not necessarily have personal ambitions, other than securing his employment. Very few of them aim for a soloist career. If you work as a third viola in the opera, your career choices ahead might be sort of limited. But you can still have valuable ideas about cultural life in Norway.” (Arthur, string player).
42. As examples of purposive sampling, Palys mentions stakeholder sampling, extreme or deviant case sampling, typical case sampling, paradigmatic case sampling, maximum variation sampling, criterion sampling, theory-guided sampling, critical case sampling and disconfirming or negative case sampling (Palys 2008, pp. 697–698). Patton mentions extreme or deviant case sampling, intensity sampling, maximum variation sampling, homogeneous samples, typical case sampling, critical case sampling, snowball sampling, criterion sampling, theory-based sampling, confirming and disconfirming cases, stratified purposeful sampling, opportunistic and emergent sampling, purposeful random sampling, sampling political important cases, convenience sampling and combination or mixed purposeful sampling (Patton 2002, pp. 230–242).
43. The question of representativeness and generalisability of results, is quite rarely discussed in explicit ways in cultural policy studies. In that respect, the research area is rather typical for social inquiry in general. As Bryman puts it: “The concern to be able to generalize is often so deeply ingrained that the limits to the generalizability of findings are frequently forgotten or sidestepped.” (Bryman 2012, p. 176). What this entails, is that it frequently remains unclear whether the researcher intends to claim generalisability or not. A case in point is Daniel’s (2014a) study referred to previously. Daniel states: “While a small sample and specific to two regional city locations, one of the key findings to emerge is that artists in this region, in general, lack direct knowledge of arts and cultural policy and strategies in place to foster and support creative practice.” (Daniel 2014a, p. 562). He thus seems to first say that the sample is too small for generalisations to the population of artists, but then subsequently makes a generalised conclusion about “artists in this region”.
44. I also considered analysing *visual* elements, which might certainly convey political meaning and political values (Ball and Smith 1992, Barnhurst and Quinn 2014, Rose 2016, Banks 2018). However, as Björkvall (2012) has pointed out, in a practical analytical context, visual analysis often entails that the number of texts should be confined to a rather low number. In order to address the main research question in a satisfactory manner, I needed a larger sample of texts. In addition, I considered using *content analysis*, which has become a frequently used analytical method in the social sciences (Mayring 2000, Weber 2008, Breuning 2011, Schreier 2012, Krippendorff 2019), and which allows conversion of large amounts of text into quantitative research results. However, I concluded that the research aims could not be reasonably addressed through quantitative analysis of texts, due to the interpretive and non-quantifiable nature of the research questions. Neuendorf claims that “content analysis may be as simple – or as complex – as the researcher determines it to be” (Neuendorf 2017, p. 5). However, I concluded that there is a limit to content analysis in terms of interpretive depth.

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45. To use a Norwegian example, we might consider the hypothetical statement “Norway is a part of Europe”. In some contexts, it will be reasonable to interpret this statement in the literal, geographical sense: Norway is located on the Scandinavian peninsula, which in turn is located in Europe. In other contexts, however, it is clearly reasonable to interpret this statement as not simply a descriptive statement of a geographical fact, but as a normative statement where it is implied that Norway *should* become a member of the EU. It is not always a trivial task to mine out such intentions from a cultural political text. According to Hugoson, cultural policy is “somewhat different to the policies of other sectors, such as education or foreign policy” (Hugoson 1997, p. 323). He claims that one of the characteristics of cultural policy is that there is a “rhetoric of abstract goals” (Ibid.). On the one hand, the public sector wants cultural policy to remain relevant for the general public, but on the other hand, the public sector does not want to establish a too firm control: “If the goals were removed, cultural policy might appear as an area without importance for the public. If the goals were clarified, culture might become a sector where governments tried to establish full control” (Hugoson 1997, p. 338). Some degree of ambiguity is to be expected (Gray 2015).
 46. Whether it is theoretically possible to understand the *literal* meaning of a text, is debatable (Récanati 2006, Searle 2012a). It is also debatable whether it is realistic to think of anybody who will consider political texts the *only* constituents of cultural policy. Derrida has been translated into saying that “There is nothing outside of the text” (Derrida 1976, p. 158). Perhaps somebody might claim that there is no cultural policy outside of cultural political texts. As Bush puts it, in Derrida’s conception, “language, at least in part, constitutes things” (Bush 2009, p. 48). However, according to Ball, “(...) A policy is both contested and changing, always in a state of ‘becoming’ of ‘was’ and ‘never was’ and ‘not quite’” (Ball 1993, p. 11). But although the ontology of cultural policy is unclear, it seems clear that cultural policy documents are important parts. As Blomgren and Johannisson point out, with regards to the regional and municipal level: “The cultural plans constitute a significant representation of the perception of cultural policy held by regions, municipalities, cultural life and the civic community.” (Blomgren and Johannisson 2015, p. 10).
 47. A comprehensive representation of cultural policy might include other sources than only texts. For example, one might argue that architectural and musical expressions might be regarded as political, although they are not expressed textually. It is not obvious that what is written in political texts represent real political priorities of those who hold political power. However, within the confines of this thesis, it has not been feasible to analyse policy in the most comprehensive understandings of the term.
 48. Notably, however, priorities in cultural policy are not only decided *within* the documents themselves. In some cases, priorities are communicated by the publication of a WP or CP, in and of itself. For example, the publication of a WP dedicated to policies for popular music in 2008 (Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs 2008) might in and of itself be interpreted as an important cultural political decision.
 49. An overview over *forms* of policy documents on state level is available on the government webpages (Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation 2016). Some might argue that the sample in this thesis should have included *The*

Culture Report, which I briefly examined in Section 2.5. *The Culture Report* is an extensive report that covers a range of cultural political topics. The work with the report was led by a former minister of culture, and the report provides a range of normative suggestions about cultural political objectives. In other words, the report does not simply recommend *measures* that can be used to achieve a *priori* defined political goals. The report does in itself recommend such goals. In that sense, the report is not simply a descriptive report from an expert committee. It is a publication that can be regarded as an intermediary between a descriptive expert report and a normative politicised program. For example, the report implicitly declares its support for an anthropological conception of culture (e.g. Ministry of Culture 2013, p. 63), which is something that a report from a politically *neutral* expert committee would by definition not do. That also means that it is possible to analyse the report as a political publication alongside other state level cultural political publications such as WPs, GDs and BPs. However, I have not systematically analysed the report, because the report is primarily a set of *recommendations* to MC, and not a politically committing document. The report is a *Norwegian Official Report* (Norwegian: Norsk Offentlig Utredning, NOU). As Mangset and Hylland point out: “In contrast with a white paper, an NOU does not commit a government or a ministry politically.” (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 296).

50. With regards to policy *process*, there is a significant difference between cultural political documents on the three levels of government. The state level is the most transparent level, in the sense that the processes leading to the publication of WPs are usually documented through formalised consultation processes. By contrast, CPs on regional and municipal level are most often results of much more informal processes. For example, Stavanger Municipality, which partially funds the Stavanger Symphony Orchestra, writes in a CP: “We have invited to active and early early participation through the planning process, and participation from the cultural sector has been central in the work with the plan. Vision, objectives and perspectives have been produced in a series of dialogue seminars with a broad spectrum of representatives from the cultural sector in Stavanger.” (Stavanger Municipality 2018, p. 3). This process is typical for the regional and municipal levels of cultural policy making in Norway, and there is in most cases a limited amount of written material that documents these regional and municipal processes. However, in this thesis, I primarily focused on the *end products* of the processes, namely policy documents. Therefore, the informal nature of cultural policy processes on the regional and municipal levels of government in Norway, did not represent a methodological challenge.
51. There are currently 422 municipalities in Norway, a number that will be reduced to 356 in 2020 (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2019b, p. 87). There has been a steep increase in the number of CPs produced on the municipal level after 2000. I came to around 100 municipal CPs in total, through search on the municipal webpages. Many of the CPs are from municipalities with relatively small populations (e.g. Askim (2017), Bø (2010), Førde (2013), Giske (2016), Gjerdrum (2014), Hammerfest (2017), Høylandet (2015), Inderøy (2013), Levanger (2015), Lyngdal (2014), Nesodden (2016), Norddal (2016), Røros (2017), Røyken (2015), Sula (2017), Surnadal (2017), Øvre Eiker (2010) and Øygarden (2013)). I did not study

- these in detail, because their focus on the *professional* arts tends to be rather limited. However, the large number of CPs from municipalities with small populations is remarkable in itself. The high number of CPs might in part be a result of the *Act of Culture* (Lovdata Foundation 2007) examined in Chapter 1. Although the *Act of Culture* does not *require* municipalities to produce formal CPs, it might still induce them to do so. Presumably, the large number of CPs on the municipal level can also in part be explained by the economic context referred to in Chapter 1, and which makes it economically possible for municipalities to employ cultural administrators.
52. The civil servant that is claimed to have received these revelations was Johs. Aanderaa, whose first name *Johs.* has traditionally been commonly used in Norway as a shortened form of the common Norwegian name *Johannes*. *Johannes*, in turn, translates into the English name *John*.
 53. In some cases, it seems rather clear that formulations stem primarily from individuals in the bureaucracies, and not from political representatives. For example, in a regional CP, it is stated: “A central tendency in our time is what is described as individualisation. Strong group identities evaporate, and they are replaced by individuals who define and redefine their own identities and belongings. In this process we tell the world something about who we are, and which preferences we have, through our consumption or cultural products.” (Buskerud County 2009, p. 5). A correspondingly advanced formulation can be found in a municipal CP: “Discourse, criticism and public conversation contribute to the promotion of the relevance and societal role of the arts. Policies for the arts should facilitate a strong public discourse about art and the societal relevance of art, through support for more critics, professional criticism on different levels, and critical discussion in all formats.” (Bergen Municipality 2018b, pp. 14–15). These seem to be more reflective remarks about culture than we can reasonably expect from regional and municipal *political* representatives. In the examples quoted above, these are formulations from *descriptive* segments of the respective policy documents, and it is unlikely that these formulations in themselves had much influence on *normative* political decisions. But in some cases, we might also assume that the values of individual civil servants and local cultural bureaucrats are reflected in more *normative* segments of policy documents.
 54. According to Neuman, thematic analysis is *inherent* to qualitative inquiry: “A qualitative researcher organizes data into categories of themes, concepts, or similar features. He or she develops new concepts, formulates conceptual definitions, and examines the relationships among concepts.” (Neuman 2007, p. 330) What Braun and Clarke’s (2006) do in their article, however, is to make describe this procedure in an explicit manner.
 55. As Kvale and Brinkmann warn (2009, pp. 189–199), interviews might generate large amounts of audio material, and it requires a significant amount of work to transcribe interviews. Therefore, it has become common to use software to transcribe interviews (Anderson 1998, Matheson 2007, Fletcher and Shaw 2011). The transcription software used by Loughborough University, NVivo, does at the time of writing not support transcriptions of Norwegian language audio. Neither was I able to find other suitable software for this task. Thus, I did not make a *deliberate* choice to transcribe

manually, but I was forced to do so, due to lack of available transcription software. The interview material was made up by a document of approximately 217 000 words, which is still a manageable amount for manual transcriptions. It should also be mentioned that Norwegian dialects are quite varied. Presumably, the owners of NVivo, *QSR International*, will within a few years launch a version of NVivo that includes audio transcription possibilities for the Norwegian language. However, even when that module becomes available, we can expect that there will still be challenges with Norwegian audio transcriptions, at least in studies where a variety of Norwegian dialects are represented, such as in this thesis.

56. It is possible to interpret cultural policy and cultural policy rationales from a strict welfare economics perspective. As Baumol has pointed out, there are “(...) analytic tools already available in other areas of applied economics” (Baumol 2011, p. 17), tools which might also be used in analyses of cultural policy. But most studies within the perspective of economics are rather theoretical (e.g. Baumol and Bowen 1966, Ringstad 2005, Throsby 2010, Hjorth-Andersen 2013), in the sense that they rarely connect specific policy formulations to economic concepts. There is a gap between theory and empirical reference, due to the abstract nature of concepts from welfare economics. For example, a central concept for the legitimation of public economic engagement is the existence of *public goods*. A pure public good can be defined as follows: “First, everyone in the society ‘consumes’ the same amount of the public good; second, the marginal cost of serving another consumer of the public good is zero; and third, my consumption of the public good does not decrease the amount of the good available for you to consume.” (Quirk 1983). The standard example is lighthouses (Coase 1974). It is difficult to *exclude* ships from using lighthouses, and thus, it might also be a challenge to *fund* the operations of a lighthouse. Generally, economic theory tells us that the free market will tend to produce public goods in a lower amount than the amount that is optimal for aggregated utility. The public sector might therefore decide to intervene in the market by subsidising lighthouse services, in order to increase overall utility. There might be an element of public goods in several forms of cultural services, but it is very difficult to find examples of policy documents where a government *explicitly* makes use of the economic theory of public goods to legitimise public funding of cultural services. Therefore, it is also difficult to use the theory of public goods to *analyse* cultural policy documents. These analytical difficulties also apply to other economic-theoretical concepts, such as *externalities*.
57. The motivational effects that Røyseng refers to might be considered analogous to “groupy” mechanisms (Howe and Friedman 2014 Lange and Euler 2014, Larsen 2017). As Swedberg puts it, “(...) some theoreticians are very sexy and charismatic (...)”, and “(...) old theories are considered boring and new ones interesting (...)” (Swedberg 2014b, p. 189). This probably has to do with consecration and positioning mechanisms within academia (Gustin 1973, Lamont 1987, Angermuller 2013). What McGuigan refers to as “French theorists of guru status” (McGuigan 2004, p. 140) seem to continuously represent new and exciting alternatives for academic “groupies” who are, to use Røyseng’s phrase, “looking for new theoretical heroes”.

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58. Mangset also provides a practical example of this issue in a review of a specific publication, where Mangset states: “One ends up questioning how productive the analytical tools that were presented in Chapter 1, really are for the empirical analysis (chapters 2-5). Would one not end up with approximately the same results even if one used a different theoretical-analytical starting point? (...) [Boltanski / Thévenot’s ‘orders of worth’] seem to have been added on to the analysis, as if [the researcher] has had to push the data a bit, so that [the researcher] could make them fit.” (Mangset 2017, unpaginated).
59. One might claim that the grand theories of Foucault have not only *influenced* cultural policy studies, but that they are *constitutive* of the research area as such. Hall remarks that “Cultural studies is a discursive formation, in Foucault’s sense” (Hall 1999, p. 98). Wang concludes that “cultural policy studies was developed from cultural studies” (Wang 2017, p. 210), and according to Belfiore, cultural studies is the research program “from which Cultural Policy Studies originates” (Belfiore 2018, p. 13, capital letters in original). Some might therefore argue that concepts such as “discourse” and “discursive formations” are *paradigmatic* concepts in cultural policy studies. Notably, the cultural studies perspective has been far less relevant within *Norwegian* cultural policy research. As Mangset has pointed out, “cultural studies” has been most influential in the UK, The United States and Australia (Mangset 2010b, pp. 27–28). Mangset also criticises cultural studies for taking side for specific social movements, because, in his view, the cultural studies perspective might engender “naive idealisation of interest group organisations in cultural life” (Ibid., p. 29). But in the variant of cultural policy studies that is underpinned by cultural studies, it is possible to argue that Foucault’s concepts are paradigmatic.
60. Schaanning explains his point by a comment on an anthology about pedagogy, with the following remarks: “It does not get any better in the other article on methods, called ‘Critical analysis as work tool’. It most of all looks like the mandatory methods chapter in PhD theses. Here [in this article], there are also many airy formulations about ‘discursive formations which continuously circulate in society’, ‘the circulating attributes of discourse’, ‘discursive currents’, ‘battles that are fought on the existence of discourse’ etc. Or what should one say about the claim that discourse analysis emphasises ‘those power relationships and ideological processes that often circulate as unconscious discursive processes in linguistic practices’? It does indeed sound magnificent, and really academic. But I would like to know what ‘unconscious discursive processes in linguistic practices’ are, and how these circulate (a favourite expression among the authors). It is a pity that [researcher] must pickle the article into such academic newspeak, since [researcher] otherwise has a lot of sensible things to say about the fact that the activities in the kindergarten increasingly are regarded as preparation for school.” (Schaanning 2013, p. 111).
61. According to Bourdieu, a *field* is a “space of conflict and competition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 17). A prominent sociological book on music in Norway is *The Field of Music*, written by Østerberg and Bjørnerem (2017). The title of this book refers to Bourdieu’s concept. Notably, however, the concept of *field* is only *presented*, and not *employed* in the analyses in the book. By using the concept of *field* in the title

of the book, and subsequently omitting the concept from analytical use, the book demonstrates in practice how difficult it is to add value to empirical analyses by using the term *field* as an *a priori* analytical tool. Another prominent Norwegian publication which has used the concept of *field*, and which has significantly informed this thesis, is Mangset and Hylland (2017). Mangset and Hylland define *field* by referring to Bourdieu's conception (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 75). Unlike Østerberg and Bjørnerem (2017), Mangset and Hylland (2017) use the concept of *field* extensively. There are approximately 30 instances of the term *field* in their book. However, their use of the concept is rather confusing. For example, they state that within Arts Council Norway (ACN), "the size of the music field has increased". We understand from the context that in this quote, the term *field* is to be understood in the way that this term is used in common Norwegian parlance, where the term *field* (Norwegian: felt) means something close to a term such as *sector* (Norwegian: sektor), and where *conflict* is not inherent in the concept. What they are saying with this quote, is that music over the years has increased its proportion of the funds granted by ACN, at the expense of other art genres. In another quote, however, some readers might assume that the term *field* is intended to entail that *conflict* is inherent in the term. Mangset and Hylland state: "The public film censorship has been among those fields where the criticism against public intervention in cultural expressions has been most prevalent." (Mangset and Hylland 2017, p. 306). The question is: Are Mangset and Hylland (2017) referring to public film censorship as a "space of conflict and competition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 17), or do they refer to the field of film more neutrally, as a *sector*? It is not easy to know. Neither is it easy to understand which conception that applies in the occurrences of the term *field* in Stavrum's (2014a) analysis of the *dance band field* in Norway, where the concept is used both in the title and also extensively throughout (a search on the term "field" (Norwegian: "felt") gave 1653 hits). Stavrum states: "The concept of *field* is not simply a descriptive concept that is used to talk about specific empirical observations (...), it is also an analytical concept with a specific meaning." (Stavrum 2014a, p. 15). However, it is difficult for us as readers to understand which of the occurrences of the term *field* that should be interpreted in Bourdieu's conception, and which of them that are to be understood in the meaning of the more neutral term *sector*. Østerberg and Bjørnerem (2017), Stavrum (2014a) and Mangset and Hylland (2017) unfortunately seem to be victims of Bourdieu's conceptual vagueness, which in turn was probably a deliberate strategy that Bourdieu used to "bolster and generate his own academic and intellectual distinction" (Jenkins 2002, p. 169). Both in the case of Stavrum (2014a), Østerberg and Bjørnerem (2017) and Mangset and Hylland (2017), the use of the term *field* weakens publications which are otherwise brilliant, in many respects, and which have all significantly informed the work with this thesis. One conclusion that I made, based on the considerations above, was that I should avoid using a term such as the *field of classical music*, because that would probably have confused both myself and the readers more than it would have served to illuminate.

62. Bourdieu significantly derives his analyses from Foucault's work (Bourdieu 1996, Cronin 1996, Brook 2018). It is therefore possible to regard the Foucault-Bourdieu fundament as *one* theoretical fundament in cultural policy studies. According to Searle

(2012b), both of these theorists *deliberately* obscured their texts. As Searle (2012b) stated in a lecture: “I once had a conversation with a famous French philosopher who is a friend of mine, and I said to him: ‘Why the hell do you write so badly?’ (...) and he said, ‘look, if I wrote as clearly as you do, people in Paris wouldn’t take me seriously (...) they would think it is childlike, it is naive’. This was Michel Foucault. (...) And he said, ‘In France, you have got to have ten per cent incomprehensible. Otherwise people won’t think it’s deep, they won’t think you are a profound thinker.’ (...) I told this story to Pierre [Bourdieu], and he said ‘it is worse than ten per cent, more like twenty per cent’.” (Searle 2012b, transcribed from audio). According to Elster “the ideas of Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu retain an immense and immensely pernicious influence on French scholarship in the social sciences and in philosophy.” (Elster 2011, p. 162). Elster, who subscribes to methodological individualism (Elster 1982), is concerned that these theorists “(...) do not recoil from the subtlety of postulating a diabolical plan to which there corresponds no devilish planner.” (Elster 1983, p. 105).

63. Another observation that supports Mangset’s point, is how little that seems to be required from academic journals as *legitimation* for using a specific concept or theoretical system in a cultural policy analysis. For example, Nijzink *et al.* (2017) simply state: “In this study, the theoretical framework of Boltanski, Thévenot and Chiapello was used in the analysis (...)” (Nijzink *et al.* 2017, p. 598). With almost no elaboration on the *legitimations* for this choice, the only reasonable interpretation of the choice seems to be that they are relying on the charisma of the theorists, and that this charisma is also accepted and acknowledged by the journal editors. Later in the article, they state: “The orders of worth are relevant for our empirical research because they accurately address the different tensions in the creative industries (policies).” (Ibid., p. 601). However, what is unclear is whether they knew about this relevance *a priori*, or if they adopted the orders of worth as analytical tool *a posteriori*. As an example of the relevance of the theory, they state: “For example, when the municipality of Groningen argues that it is ‘important to create room for entrepreneurs, for experiments and for networks’ (...), it implicitly refers to the market world (entrepreneurs), the industrial world (experiment) and the projective city (networks).” (Ibid., p. 604). But it is difficult to see that their claimed *fit*, between their observations on the one hand, and Boltanski and Thévenot’s theoretical framework on the other hand, in any way adds to the *value* of their empirical findings. In my opinion, it would have been more interesting to know how the authors *themselves* would have preferred to classify their findings, than to observe how well their data fitted with the *a priori* theoretical system that they decided to make use of.
64. In this case, the term *critical* does not seem to allude to the Frankfurter school (Horkheimer 1982, Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, Habermas 1991 etc). On the contrary, the term is used as in everyday parlance, and seems to be used to underline that the researchers aim to abstain from making value judgments, in terms of Rudner’s C. Hylland has made the same point in an analysis of the cultural policy of the Progress Party: “It is (...) an *obvious* analytical ideal, but also a challenge, to keep an examination of this cultural political rhetoric and practice free of normative judgment.” (Hylland

- 2011, p. 52, my emphasis). This is congruent with Weber's (1949) ideal. In the same way as Hylland (2011), I also aimed to comply with this ideal. But it seems unreasonable to claim, as Hylland does (Hylland 2011, p. 52), that it is *obvious* that this ideal should guide the study of cultural policy.
65. Hylland and Stavrum refer to Bourdieu in the continuation of the quote above, as an example of a sociologist of art. They seem to hold the view that Bourdieu's sociology of art is less normative than the normative judgments that some church musicians engage in, when these church musicians praise certain hymns, and prioritise these hymns in their professional work. But the sociology of art is not inherently a value-free research paradigm. In fact, it might be argued that the sociology of art inherently *rejects* the very notion of value-freedom. As Wolff puts it: "The importance of the sociology of art (...) consists in its critique of the ideology of timelessness and value-freedom (...)." (Wolff 1993, p. 143). Still, the quote by Hylland and Stavrum illustrates well their *intention* to aim for value freedom in their analysis.
 66. The value question has been most discussed within sociology (Becker 1967, Seubert 1991, Black 1995, Burawoy 2005, Bruun 2007, Sztompka 2009, Hammersley and Traianou 2011, Brook and Darlington 2013, Black 2013, Kadakal 2013, Hammersley 2017, Betta and Swedberg 2017). But the value question has also been discussed extensively in political science (Farr *et al.* 1990, Taylor 1994, Gerring and Yesnowitz 2006), economics (Ng 1972, Myrdal 1972, Heilbroner 1973; 1984, Rothbard 1997, Gunning 2005, Su 2012, Colander and Su 2015, Reiss 2017, Dalen 2019) and philosophy (Rudner 1953, Searle 1964, Lacey 1997; 1999, Putnam 2002, Anderson 2004, Lekka-Kowalik 2010). When it comes to cultural studies, it is possible to argue that this research program is *inherently* value-laden (Zylinska 2005, p. 4, Gilbert 2006; 2008). There is a "value-laden nature of cultural studies" (Byram 1989, p. 62), and there is "something *at stake* in cultural studies" (Hall 1999, p. 99, emphasis in original). A central focus of cultural studies is "resistance against power" (Winter 2014, p. 250), which is clearly a value-laden concept.
 67. As Blomgren puts it, "(...) my impression is that most cultural policy researchers focus on the point of view of institutions or the artist and on the negative influence from the market or from the politicians. Examples of this are the debates of instrumentalisation in cultural policy and the critique against it for damaging the true arts and arts for arts sake. I am not saying that it is wrong to be critical against instrumentalisation but I look forward to more critical studies that focus on the institutions, organisations and the artists' role in cultural policy and studies on the citizens and politicians role in cultural policy." (Blomgren 2012, p. 528). Notably, the term "critical" in this quote should not be conflated with the way that McGuigan uses the term when he calls for "critical cultural policy analysis" (McGuigan 2004, p. 29). Blomgren's "critical" stance seems to entail a call for value-free analysis, and a rejection of Becker's (1967) suggestion that researchers should take side. By contrast, McGuigan (2004), in his use of the term *critical*, clearly alludes to critical theory, which is inherently value-laden, with regards to Rudner's C.
 68. As Weber suggests in the parenthesis of the quote, value-free analysis might in some cases entail analysis of value-laden *evaluations*, i.e., *value-free analyses of value-laden*

statements. There seems to be some confusion about *forms* of value freedom in social science. For example, Blomkamp writes: “(...) my analysis is based on the view that film policy is not a neutral, value-free domain (...)” (Blomkamp 2011, p. 343). The conclusion that “film policy is not a neutral, value-free domain” is certainly congruent with Weber’s (1949) analytical ideal, in terms of value freedom. In fact, it is difficult to imagine *any researcher* who would disagree with Blomkamp’s conclusion. But the ideal in Weber (1949) is that an *analysis* of film policy might, and *should*, be conducted in a value free manner. Blomkamp seems to argue that since film policy is not value free, neither should her *analyses* of film policy be value free. But that is a fallacious argument. An *analysis* of film policy can be value free, even though film policy in and of itself is not. In an equally confusing manner, Denzin states: “In the social sciences today, there is no longer a God’s eye view that guarantees absolute methodological certainty. All inquiry reflects the standpoint of the inquirer. All observation is theory-laden. There is no possibility of theory- or value-free knowledge.” (Denzin 2009, p. 153, Denzin 2017, p. 12). As we have seen in this section and the previous one, it is technically correct that all observations are theory-laden, and that all inquiry is value-laden. But despite its technical correctness, Denzin’s statement misleads. It fails to differentiate between the different ways that theory can be used in inquiry, and it fails to differentiate between the different ways in which an inquiry can be considered value-laden. As Black puts it: “Indeed, if value-free social science is impossible, social science should have a more honest and accurate label such as social ethics or social policy. But it [value-free social science] is possible. And anyone who believes otherwise is badly mistaken about the meaning of value-free social science.” (Black 2013, p. 766). The quotes above, from Blomkamp (2011) and Denzin (2009, 2017) demonstrate the confusions about the meaning of value-free social science.

69. Arguably, this might apply to the term *neoliberalism*, which is frequently considered a useful concept in the *critical* version of cultural policy studies (e.g. Blomkamp 2011; 2012, McGuigan 2005; 2014; 2016, Stanziola 2010, Hesmondhalgh *et al.* 2014, Hadley and Belfiore 2018), and which is also frequently used in critical studies within related areas of inquiry, such as research and education (e.g. Belfiore 2015, Torres 2009, Thornton 2014, Busch 2017, Kezar *et al.* 2019, Green 2014, Giroux 2013, Rustin 2016). Neoliberalism might occasionally be used as a strictly *analytical* concept. An example is Røyseng (2019). However, this is rare. As Thorsen and Lie point out, “practically everyone who writes about neoliberalism does so as part of a critique of neoliberal ideology” (Thorsen and Lie 2009, p. 2). For example, Street refers to the “cynical instrumentalism of the neoliberals” (Street 2013, p. 296). Other concepts are *predominantly* used as intrinsically value-laden. Examples include *colonisation* (Habermas 1985, Duelund 2008), *instrumentalism* (e.g. Belfiore 2012, Wesner 2018), and *fetishism* (e.g. Adorno 1997, Bourdieu 1996). Thus, while these concepts might be useful tools in the *critical* version of cultural policy studies, they are arguably less useful in studies of cultural policy which aim to be value-free, in terms of Rudner’s C. It is also questionable whether concepts from public economics, such as *subsidies* or *intervention*, are plausible to use in analyses of public policy which aim for value-freedom. For example, Abbing, who generally expresses a somewhat sceptical view of

public sector funding of the arts, uses these concepts heavily (Abbing 2002). Arguably, these terms presuppose that the unregulated market is an *initial* state. The terms *subsidies* and *intervention* suggest that the public sector does something with this initial state, and they therefore have *negative* connotations. In other words, these terms suggest that the researcher is *a priori* sceptical to the public sector taking an active role, and that the researcher therefore conducts a value-laden form of inquiry. There is no reason to assume that a free market situation is an *initial* starting point for human societies, neither anthropologically nor economically. Using terms such as *intervention* or *subsidies* might therefore entail that a heavier argumentative burden is put on the shoulders of those who are proponents of publicly funded art, than on those who oppose it. I therefore avoided these concepts in the empirical analyses in Chapter 4.

70. There are significant gender inequalities (Scharff 2017) and organisational hierarchies (Lehmann 2002) in the classical music sector. However, considerations about hierarchies and inequalities *within* classical music institutions are not systematically addressed in this thesis. I focus on the perceived *societal* role of the classical music sector. It is primarily this wider societal role of the sector that legitimises public funding, not the *internal* dynamics of the sector itself.
71. One economist expressed his concern in the following way: “I find it very hard to explain to myself why my listening to another performance of *la Boheme* deserves the enthusiastic participation of my fellow taxpayers. I don’t understand the merit of extending (at great cost) a season of performances, mostly of the narrow standard operatic or symphonic repertory, especially in this age of lavish and radical staging, beyond what the (relatively affluent) present day ticket buying audience is willing to pay for.” (Roger W. Weiss, quoted in Horowitz 1989, pp. 13–14).
72. It might be reasonable to assume that Norwegian cultural policy for the classical music sector is economically regressive. Audience research consistently shows that high income earners are overrepresented (e.g. Vaage 2018, p. 13). Frey (2011) warns, however, that the regressive element should not be overestimated. His point is that it is relatively expensive for the richest people to consume lengthy performances, due to the richest people’s high opportunity cost of time: “It is in general not the richest part of the population that benefits from publicly supported art but the (upper) middle class, which has sufficient time available for consumption.” (Frey 2011, p. 374). Linder (1970) has also pointed out some of the same mechanisms.
73. In the WP that most specifically addresses the question about inclusion, MC is ambivalent with regards to the role of financial barriers to cultural participation. MC states that it is possible that ticket discounts might be relevant for cultural attendance, but also states that research shows that free tickets in itself does not attract underrepresented demographic groups (Ministry of Culture 2011, p. 71). It is unclear which research MC refers to in this case, but it is possible that this is research that shows that the demand for classical music performances is rather inelastic (e.g. Seaman 2006 Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 2011). On a different note, we can observe that the Norwegian public sector rarely commissions research that systematically *examines* the distribution effects of cultural policy. In other words, the public sector does not seem to be interested in finding out whether cultural policy is actually progressive or

regressive. As it is pointed out by Heclø, “a policy, like a decision, can consist of what is *not* being done” (Heclø 1972, p. 85, my emphasis). Clearly, MC *could* have decided to ask for this information in its commissioning of the large and previously mentioned *Culture Report* (Ministry of Culture 2013), but MC chose not to do so. Neither has MC systematically investigated this question in other publications. What this might entail, is that the question of economic distribution is not at the core of Norwegian cultural policy.

74. Sola is a municipality with approximately 26 000 citizens, and it is a neighbouring municipality to Stavanger, the unofficial oil capital of Norway.
75. It is a fact that many artists have low incomes (e.g. Solhjell 2000, Abbing 2002). This also applies to classical musicians (e.g. Heian *et al.* 2015, p. 75). Some explicitly value-laden studies argue for increased support for artists, due to the low incomes and financial struggles of artists. For example, Wesner declares that she is “continually arguing for artist-focused policy approaches” (Wesner 2018, p. 183). However, I have not considered the overall equality rationale in cultural policy to include legitimization that is funded on economic equality *for artists*. The equality rationale in this thesis is concerned with *general* forms of equality rationales oriented towards the society as a whole, not equality rationales that are aimed at specific professional groups, such as artists.
76. Robert’s critical remarks about new cultural venues are to some extent mirrored by similar remarks in *The Culture Report*. In *The Culture Report*, it is stated: “The municipal investments in the cultural venues in the recent years appear in many cases to be underpinned by Florida-inspired analyses of culture as a source of population growth and economic development. These developments have been underpinned by state programs for urban development. At the same time, the evidence base for this kind of policy is contested.” (Ministry of Culture 2013, p. 71).
77. An additional issue that complicates the geography dimension is related to *digital distribution*. BPO has been at the forefront, but other institutions have also made their performances digitally accessible on video through their websites (Eidsvold-Tøien *et al.* 2019, p. 144). Whether this digital distribution represents a form of *decentralisation* of culture or not, is up for discussion. As Mangset and Hylland (2017) point out, dematerialisation of cultural experiences due to digitalisation changes the landscape of cultural production and cultural policy in numerous ways (Mangset and Hylland 2017, pp. 392–393). In the case of classical music, cultural policy clearly faces a challenge of comparing the value of *physical* cultural attendance with the value of *live digital* consumption. Notably, in the reports that the major institutions are expected to submit, they are asked for numbers on *physical* attendance, but not numbers on *live digital* attendance. As Walmsley points out, “(...) digital engagement of arts audiences is still in its infancy and empirical scholarly research in this niche field is notably scarce and sketchy.” (Walmsley 2016, p. 67). This might change, though. As it was written in a recent report submitted from an expert committee to MC: “A large report on the consequences of digitalisation for the creation and performance of art is needed.” (Ministry of Culture 2015, p. 182). A report on the consequences of digitalisation for the music sector *has* been produced (Eidsvold-Tøien *et al.* 2019), but this report

- primarily concentrates on other genres than classical music. The report does also not offer reflections on the relationship between physical and digital cultural attendance, or the cultural political relevance of digital musical consumption. The question is whether watching a live classical music performance on a TV set can be defined as “cultural participation” in the same way as going to the concert hall (Taylor 2016).
78. AP is owned 50/50 by Tromsø and Bodø municipalities. The orchestra has bases in these two cities, and commutes between them. Bodø and Tromsø are the two largest cities in Northern Norway. The orchestra performs orchestral repertoire and opera, although there are no singers in its permanent staff. It is funded seventy per cent by the state, ten per cent by each of the two municipalities that formally own the orchestra, and the remaining ten per cent by the three northern-most counties Nordland, Troms and Finnmark.
 79. As Berge points out, “The idea or belief that the arts are particularly well suited to promote Norwegian foreign interests is richly reflected in the foreign cultural policy discourse.” (Berge 2018, p. 145).
 80. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is up for discussion who constitute the epistocracy in the case of cultural policy. The expert committee referred to in this case, consisted of four researchers and three bureaucrats. None of these were researchers specialising in culture or cultural policy (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2018, p. 17).
 81. BPO is defined as a *national* institution by the state, but what is referred to by this interviewee is the hypothetical situation where only Oslo-based institutions would be defined as *national*. The requirement that a cultural institution should be based in Oslo, in order to have the possibility of being defined as *national*, on the part of the state, was suggested by the aforementioned expert committee (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2018, p. 126). Some interviewees expressed a certain bewilderment with regards to the public prioritisation of institutions with national status. As one interviewee put it: “I can’t comment on the specifics of what they [OPO] do, I just understand that they get a hell of a lot more money than us, and don’t appear to achieve much more, apart from paying some bigger salaries to conductors, and going on more overseas tours (...) and Bergen [BPO] are playing this thing with like eight horns or whatever, and, you know, they are playing two concerts in a half full, you know, and that doesn’t seem like a very smart (...) but it just seems like they *can*, because if they deliver a minus, it just gets topped out without (...) do you see what I mean?” (Pseudonym not provided due to confidentiality considerations).
 82. It seems to be a rather general view among artists that prestige declines in cases where funding is transferred from the national level to the local level. As Abbing points out: “It turns out that the central government is able to give prestige, much more so than the local government.” (Abbing 1996, p. 144).
 83. There is also a completely different dimension of geographical equality that is occasionally mentioned in regional and municipal CPs. Having a large population of artists is sometimes perceived as a goal, in and of itself. For example, Tromsø Municipality asks itself, self-reflectively, whether Tromsø should be regarded as an “art city” or not, and answers its own question in the following way: “If the question is whether art is produced and made available in Tromsø, the answer is yes. If the question

is whether Tromsø is an artist friendly city that facilitates art production, the answer is less positive.” (Tromsø Municipality 2012, p. 26). Correspondingly, Aust-Agder County laments the fact that the county is close to the bottom when it comes to the number of artists living there: “Even though there are active artist communities, and artists who are able to make a living from their arts in our county, there is a lack of measures that attract artists who would like to work and live here.” (Aust-Agder County 2015, p. 39). This is a dimension of cultural policy that can be understood in two different ways. First, the artist population goal can be understood as a proxy for *real* cultural benefits from having a large artist population in a region. This is perhaps the most plausible way of interpreting the artist population perspective. The classical musician is in this case seen as a resource person from which the community can benefit. This is for example the perspective that is expressed by Sogn og Fjordane County, as a rationale for employing professional musicians in combined positions as performers and music educators (Sogn og Fjordane County 2018, p. 21). Secondly, it seems to be the case that some counties and municipalities consider it a political goal, in and of itself, to have an artist population in that county or municipality. In other words, the very *existence* of an artist population in a county or municipality is perceived as a cultural political goal. However, I have confined my analyses to those aspects of geographical equality that are concerned with the general citizen and societal perspective.

84. Clearly, it is difficult to provide an intensional definition of the term “core repertoire”. We are left with the “family resemblance” approach (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 32). But it is also common in *other* art genres that the canonical works are defined in terms of “family resemblance”. For example, Malraux, the first French minister of culture, concludes that art museums “define the masterpiece not so much by comparison with its rivals as with reference to the ‘family’ to which it belongs” (Malraux 1974, p. 21). As DeNora has put it: “The belief that we know greatness when we see it is a pervasive part of our common sense.” (DeNora 1995, p. 189). As a case in point, BPO exemplifies the core orchestral repertoire with works by (Richard) Strauss, Mahler, Bruckner, Shostakovich and Prokofiev (Bergen Philharmonic 2014, p. 9), in a self-evaluation report that corresponds to the quoted self-evaluation report by OPO (Oslo Philharmonic 2015b).
85. It is not easy to determine what is the musical-aesthetic equivalent of Donald Duck. Film music is one possible equivalent, but there might be other and better ones.
86. Bjørnsen’s full formulation is the following: “Audience development is (...) about integrating large groups (including those with demographic characteristics different from the core audience) into established measures and institutions. Practically speaking, this means, for example, that the two largest groups with non-European background in Oslo, which are people from Pakistan and Somalia (...) can and should consume what is offered by the established institutions in the capital, such as the National Theatre, the National Museum [of Art, Architecture and Design], The [National] Norwegian Opera [and Ballet] and The Oslo Philharmonic. A gigantic task. For that matter, it would also have been a gigantic task if the target group were the white working class in Oslo and Akershus.” (Bjørnsen 2010, p. 117).

87. The three ministries were *The Ministry of Trade and Industry*, *The Ministry of Local and Regional Government* and MC.
88. In legal terms, there is no organisation called *Cultiva*, but the organisation is regularly referred to as such (e.g. Kristiansand Municipality 2013). The legal name is *Kristiansand kommunes energiverksstiftelse*, which might be translated into *The Energy Foundation of Kristiansand Municipality*. The foundation's share capital stems from incomes that Kristiansand Municipality gained from sales of shares within the energy sector. The capital of the foundation is currently approximately NOK 1,1 billion (Cultiva 2019, §4).
89. Innovation Norway is an organisation that is owned 51 per cent by the Norwegian state, and 49 per cent by Norwegian counties. Its aim is to engage in industry development in the whole country (Innovation Norway 2018). From 2017 and onwards, Innovation Norway receives annual grants from MC (Ministry of Culture 2018c), as part of the state implementation of policies for the creative industries.
90. AP reported that they performed 72 contemporary Norwegian works and 38 contemporary foreign works, but these numbers are not realistic, if they refer to *musical works*. Presumably, these numbers refer to *performances* of contemporary Norwegian and contemporary foreign works, respectively. In any case, the number for contemporary *Norwegian* works is higher than the number for contemporary *foreign* works.
91. BPO states in the self-evaluation report from 2014 that “everybody” can apply to the assistant conductor program (Bergen Philharmonic 2014, p. 7). This suggests that citizenship does not matter. However, more recently, the orchestra stated that candidates “must have Norwegian citizenship or have an affiliation to a Norwegian music academy” (Bergen Philharmonic 2019).
92. Correspondingly, in the Norwegian case, the foundation of Arts Council Norway (ACN) was influenced by cultural concerns or “cultural panics” (Solhjell 2005, Fidjestøl 2015). To civilise people through culture was regarded, by some, as a reasonable mission for cultural policy.
93. I refer to chapter number and section number, because there does not seem to exist any paginated version of this government declaration.
94. Several interviewees referred to WW2, although they in some cases did so implicitly. As Buch puts it, “(...) the question of Beethoven in Auschwitz is terrifying” (Buch 2003, p. 219). Østerberg anecdotally refers to “(...) Schubert experts with their bibles hardbound in skin from jews” (Østerberg 1991, p. 166). Several interviewees referred to such anecdotes from WW2 as a reason to be cautious about the civilising effects of classical music.
95. The National Competence Centre for Culture, Health and Care was established in the aftermaths of the WP called *Future Care* (Ministry of Health and Care Services 2013, pp. 85–86). The competence centre has an overview over art and health related research on its webpages. In this overview, music dominates completely among the art forms (National Competence Center for Culture, Health and Care 2019). On a different note, the competence centre also contributed to the establishment of *The Nordic Journal of Arts, Culture and Health*, which has its first issue scheduled for November

2019. This journal's intended focus seems to be somewhat broader with regards to emphasised art forms.
96. There is a classical distinction between shamanic and mechanistic forms of music therapy. Streeter writes: "Music therapy is both a science and an art and there is mystery in both, but a concept which involves mysteries having the power to invest people which music is, I believe, a view which is questionable in the professional working practice of a music therapist who must inevitably keep their spiritual or religious orientation a private matter, rather than use it in influencing the therapy of a client who may or may not share their convictions." (Streeter 1999, p. 10). Stige, a prominent representative of the Norwegian music therapy profession, states: "I find it remarkable that the majority of the [Parliamentary] committee does not distinguish between music therapy and other forms of musical practice, and that the Ministry of Health and Care neither does so in a related letter. The contrast to the language that otherwise dominates in health services, is staggering. In other [health-related] contexts, there is a focus on precision, quality and competence." (Stige 2017, unpaginated online version). As Tsiris writes, some music therapists "(...) view spirituality as suggesting mysteries and esoteric thinking which can be detrimental to the profession (...)" (Tsiris 2017, p. 315). Stige's criticism of the Parliamentary committee might be regarded as a reflection of these concerns.
 97. Skjervheim (1976b) uses the term *antinomical*, not the term *incommensurable*. However, he uses the term *antinomical* in a way that is roughly equivalent with the way that the term *incommensurable* is used in other cultural policy related publications, such as Hylland and Bjurström (2018a). Adorno made a similar point as Skjervheim: "The antinomy of planning and culture results in the dialectical idea of absorbing that which is spontaneous and not planned into planning, of creative space for these factors and of a strengthening of their possibilities." (Adorno 2001, p. 127).
 98. An almost identical formulation has also been adopted by the three northernmost counties in their most recent joint cultural platform (Finnmark County *et al.* 2018, p. 5).
 99. As Zangwill puts it: "Aesthetic pleasure, and aesthetic experience more broadly, is a fundamental part of the human psyche – like the concerns of friendship or family." (Zangwill 2002b, p. 450) This is a good analogy. Most people will immediately agree that their friends and family members have "intrinsic value", even though they might reveal in real life situations that there is a limit to how much they are willing to spend on for example life-saving medical treatment for their friends or family members. It is not inherently hypocritical to declare that a family member has "intrinsic value" in that case. Conversely, an airport will rarely be described as having "intrinsic value". If a government legitimises public funding of the building of an airport by referring to the "intrinsic value" of the airport, we can reasonably assume that this is an argument that is going to be regarded as inadequate by the general population.
 100. Another potential form of incommensurability might be represented by notions of links between aesthetics and morality. Discussions about such links are well-known from philosophical aesthetics (e.g. Kant 1914). Røyseng finds that Norwegian cultural policy is informed by a "goodness regime" (Røyseng 2012). In the case of policies for theatres,

she finds that “the beautiful and the good are largely expressed as two sides of the same coin” (Røyseng 2006, p. 170). Most of my interviewees firmly rejected this connection. As mentioned previously, WW2 was used by some as a reference. Anecdotes about links between classical music and atrocities committed during WW2 seemed to serve as a definitive proof that classical music does not make people more virtuous. It is possible that the classical music scene in Norway has been morally harder hit by the experiences from WW2, in the consciousness of its practitioners, than what is the case with theatres, and that the morality rationale for public funding of the sector is therefore weaker.

101. Østerberg has reviewed the same quote, which stems from Norwegian composer Fartein Valen, although Østerberg’s quotation of Valen differs slightly from the one provided by Martin, the interviewee. Østerberg (1997b) provides the following quote of Valen’s statement about his compositions: “I guess the most important thing is that they have been written” (Østerberg 1997b, p. 147). Østerberg further concludes that Valen is “(...) exemplary for the new composer type: Distinguished and retracted he works with compositional problems that do not immediately affect musical life; at most in the long run”. (Østerberg 1997b, p. 156). With the words “at most”, Østerberg seems to suggest that Valen did not really care whether any human beings would ever hear a performance of his music. Valen received a stipend in 1935 as the first avant-garde composer in Norway. This means that the state funded the production of his music. Public funding made it financially possible for him to compose, but it is not clear that he thought it was important that contemporary or future human beings would be able to experience *performances* of the music that he wrote with state support.
102. The eco system metaphor has also been adopted by Kleppe *et al.* (2018), who state: “In the tradition after Pierre Bourdieu and others, it has become common to refer to a delimited part of cultural life as a ‘field’. One talks about the field of literature, the field of music – or the field of theatre and dance. An alternative analogy or metaphor that we would like to use in this report, is the term *eco system*.” (Kleppe *et al.* 2018, p. 14, emphasis in original). Considering the analytical problems of using the term *field*, analytical problems which were examined in Section 3.4, their decision might be considered a good one.
103. On a different note, it is interesting to observe how dominant the *organic* forms of classical music are in the standard repertoire. For example, although computers are frequently used by contemporary composers, computer-assisted compositions only constitute a miniscule proportion of the repertoire of the major Norwegian classical music institutions. More organically composed musical works dominate. As an example of such an organic work, we might mention works such as Brahms’ violin concerto. Brahms himself was not a world class violinist. What he did when he composed the violin concerto, was to continuously consult with the most acclaimed violin virtuoso of the time, Joachim, throughout the composition process (Østerberg 2003, p. 182). To paraphrase Kirk and Miller (1986), performers do not tolerate all compositions equally, and neither do the audiences. Correspondingly, in the piano repertoire, it is also the organically composed repertoire of the performer-composers that dominates (Hinson and Roberts 2014). This shows that a composition must be idiomatically composed, if it is going to become part of the standard repertoire. Clearly, idiomatic

- composition requires a significant amount of craftsmanship. Still, as pointed out by Vasquez *et al.* (2017) the research on idiomatic composition practices is "remarkably low in quantity" (Vasquez *et al.* 2017, p. 178) Analogously, if a social theory is going to become part of a standard theoretical repertoire, we can assume that it must rely on the form of theorising craftsmanship that Swedberg (2012b) describes. In other words, "(...) a social scientist has to develop an intimate sense for what actors feel and think" (Swedberg 2012b, p. 16), in the same way as a composer has to develop an intimate sense for what *performers and audiences* feel and think.
104. As Swedberg puts it: "One becomes good at theorizing through practice. At first one may be nervous about it, but after a while one becomes more confident." (Swedberg 2014a, p. 17). In other words, bad theorising can result from two different sources, namely lack of *a priori* knowledge of theory, and lack of *practice* in employing or playing with this *a priori* theory. In that regard, Swedberg's conception is very different from theorising within the grounded theory framework. Swedberg has allowed me to quote him on the following remark from informal correspondence: "Grounded theory is fine – but often expressed without duly emphasizing that you don't just go out and do research, and theorize; you need to know quite a bit of theory and theorizing before you do that (which you learn by training yourself)." (Swedberg 2019).
105. A more artistically related example is provided by Elster, who, for the sake of methodological illustration, examines the puzzling reported development where Broadway shows increasingly receive standing ovations. As Elster notes: "We may play around with different hypotheses until one of them emerges as the most promising, and then look around for a theory that would justify it." (Elster 2007, p. 16). Elster then goes on to suggest a possible explanation of the puzzling observation: "When people have to pay seventy-five dollars or more for a seat, many cannot admit to themselves that the show was poor or mediocre, and that they have wasted their money. To confirm to themselves that they had a good time, they applaud wildly." (Ibid., p. 17). Furthermore: "The person who paid seventy-five dollars for a ticket to a Broadway show cannot easily fool himself into thinking he only paid forty dollars. He will normally, however, be able to find some attractive aspects of the show and persuade himself that these are more important than the ones in which it is deficient." (Ibid., p. 45). What Elster does is to play around with possible explanations that can make the puzzling observation less puzzling.
106. Hylland (2011) concludes about the cultural policy of the Progress Party: "In Norway, the Progress Party has been a *dominating* opposition party within cultural policy. The most vocal opposition of the prevailing cultural policy has significantly been expressed by the Progress Party. The resistance and argumentation against the cultural policy of the Progress Party has frequently been focused on two areas – immigration policy and cultural policy." (Hylland 2011, p. 52, my emphasis). Consequently, it is to be expected that the Progress Party is used as a reference point for Norwegian art practitioners when they comment on political issues.
107. Boudon (2012) is of the opinion that Durkheim was *de facto* a methodical individualist: "Durkheim endorsed implicitly also the principle of methodological individualism, notwithstanding his more or less obscure statements on the relations between the

- individual and social levels, in modern vocabulary: on the micro-macro link” (Boudon 2012, p. 13). However, Durkheim’s example works well for the purpose of illustration. On a different note, Opp concludes that “collectivists always invoke the micro-level to make their macropropositions ‘understandable’” (Opp 2011, p. 231, cf. Opp 2009). What this might suggest is that researchers who declare that they subscribe to collectivist ontology might not always *de facto* believe so strongly in it.
108. Østerberg made a similar point when he suggested that the empirical findings presented in Hedström (2005), which relies on methodological individualism, in accordance with the analytical sociology research program, have a “neoliberal tendency” (Østerberg 2009, p. 157). Birkelund responded to Østerberg’s remark: “(...) Østerberg has a peculiar remark, wondering whether analytical sociology is coloured by political currents. I would assume that those who work with this have quite different political standpoints. Presumably, most of them will also contend that their political views should not be important for their research, with the exception of choice of theme (at least for some of us).” (Birkelund 2009, p. 160). This is an interesting debate, and it would be interesting to know whether researchers who subscribe to methodological individualism lean more to the political right than other social scientists. However, there does not seem to exist empirical studies of this issue. On a different note, Østerberg positions himself far from Mises, both in terms of methodology and ideology. For example, Østerberg (2011) states that Mises “(...) shut his eyes for, or did not understand, that all people are conditioned by their social and historical situation, and that the weak or bad sides of the ‘mass’ that he [Mises] despised, might come to an end under more free conditions.” (Østerberg 2011, p. 103).
109. Surprisingly, there are not so many studies that investigate this issue. Several studies examine how people experience collective agency and morals (e.g. Kashima *et al.* 2005, Copp 2007, Jenkins *et al.* 2014, Cova 2016, Michael and Szigeti 2019), but these do not address the possible correlation between views on agency on the one hand, and political leanings on the other. Iyer *et al.* (2012) examine the relationship between psychological dispositions, political views and morality views among self-identified libertarians. But this study does not discuss views on *social ontology* held by the participants in the study. Neither have I been able to find other empirical studies that examine the relationship between views on social ontology and views on policy.
110. As Searle has put it: “There is a big difference between two violinists playing in an orchestra, on the one hand, and on the other hand, discovering, while I am practicing my part, that someone in the next room is practicing her part, and thus discovering that, by chance, we are playing the same piece in a synchronized fashion.” (Searle 1995, p. 25). The main point is that “the individual intentionality that each person has is derived *from* the collective intentionality that they share” (Ibid., emphasis in original). Østerberg and Bjørnerem (2017) make a similar point: “The performance and celebration of the musical canon can become analogous to what Durkheim, in his analysis of religion, called representing rituals (...). In particular, the concerts within the classical tradition can through their significant traits of celebration of the past have a function as a ritual that strengthens the community within those who gather around this music.” (Østerberg and Bjørnerem 2017, p. 164).

111. Notably, the creative economy rationale has, in many cases, limited *practical* effect for practitioners in the classical music sector in Norway themselves. Many of them have permanent positions in orchestras, district groups of musicians, and the music education system (Mangset 2004). Still, market trends find their way into the sector in various ways, which is something that musicians might experience in their daily work.
112. UNESCO writes: “‘Cultural industries’ refers to industries producing and distributing cultural goods or services as defined in paragraph 4 above” (UNESCO 2015, p. 7, Article 4, Paragraph 5). In paragraph 4 it is stated that “‘Cultural activities, goods and services’ refers to those activities, goods and services, which at the time they are considered as a specific attribute, use or purpose, embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of the commercial value they maybe have.” (UNESCO 2015, p. 7, Article 4, Paragraph 4, my emphasis). Influential reports subsequently refer to this definition.
113. A well-known example of the role of economists in cultural policy is Keynes’ role in Arts Council England (Moggridge 2005, Pinnock 2006, Upchurch 2004; 2011; 2016). Economists have historically had a prominent position in policy-making in Norway as well. Bjerve writes about the role of Norwegian Nobel laureate Frisch in the mid 20th century: “The vision that Frisch had about himself as the ‘heavy artillery’ and the pupils as ‘the infantry’ in the battle for a more rational economic policy, fits reasonably well with how things really worked.” (Bjerve 1995, p. 34). Bjerve concludes, however, that Frisch and his “infantry” was most prominent in the development of economic models that were used by the ministries, while they had less influence on welfare economic aspects: “(...) economics and the economists may not have promoted welfare as much as Frisch had expected. The vision about politicians and experts sitting together to calculate an optimal policy was, after all, only a dream.” (Bjerve 1995, p. 34).
114. In the case of the UK, Ramsey and White have stated that the focus on the creative industries was a success for the Department of Culture, Media and Sports, in that the mapping reports “(...) gave the department credibility with the Treasury.” (Ramsey and White 2014, p. 82). However, Ramsey and White (2014) also conclude that the success was only short term: “This Faustian pact with the Treasury worked well for the DCMS [Department of Culture, Media and Sports] for a while, but the logic of the creative industries approach was likely to be inimical to the arts over the long term.” (Ramsey and White 2014, p. 82).
115. The term *cluster* might be regarded as an implicit reference to works by Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and Porter (1998a, 1998b), who are well-known for the use of this term. The prominence of these scholars might function as a form of rhetorical support for political documents. However, it seems unlikely that the term *cluster* has any significant economic-analytical relevance for non-commercial cultural sectors.
116. When it comes to the situation where cultural workers feel estranged by the creative economy rationale, it is interesting to observe that this issue has been most explicitly addressed by The Norwegian Sámi Parliament. The Sámi Parliament provides some interesting reflections on the relationship between art and industry: “Cultural policy is founded on the notion that culture has intrinsic value and a great set of expectations:

strengthen sámi belonging and identity, contribute to vital communities and maintain our cultural heritage, to name a few. Industrial policy is about creating value, with a set of objectives and tools to strengthen the economic potential of organisations. Culture and industry therefore do not always speak the same language, and challenges might appear when a complex cultural sector is expected to adapt to a more rigid industrial understanding, which is created for completely other sectors. It is also important to acknowledge that not all cultural actors will or should fit into the industry category. In order to build strong creative industries, the first challenge is to make cultural actors feel at home within the concept of industry. Industry is about creating sustainable and long-term employment that is not dependent on public support.” (Sámi Parliament Council 2013, p. 30).

117. The statement “oil goes down” refers to recent declines in oil prices. Norway has had vast incomes from oil exports during several decades. However, some hold the view that the oil industry is an industry of the past, due to environmental concerns and a downward trend in oil prices, and they are therefore of the opinion that industries based on oil resources should be replaced by something else. The notion that culture should take over for oil is likely to induce head-shaking among professional economists. Still, the argument that “culture is the new oil” might in some contexts work as a politically persuasive phrase for cultural advocates, and it might be used strategically by artists as a form of “defensive instrumentalism” (Belfiore 2012).
118. In the case of *Cultiva*, which was mentioned briefly in Chapter 4, this foundation is in an own league when it comes to the amount of money available to spend on creative industries development, with NOK 1,1 billion in funds (Cultiva 2019, §4). However, the conceptual ambiguity seems to have made it virtually impossible to know what the foundation is supposed to achieve. As it is formulated in the statutes of the foundation: “The objective of the foundation is to secure employment and good living conditions in Kristiansand by supporting projects and the establishment of art, culture and knowledge organisations, or organisations that contribute to innovation, development and competence building in creative hubs in Kristiansand. Knowledge institutions that develop creativity and innovation can receive grants from the foundation. Institutions or organisations that receive support must perform its activities on a high level, and be useful for the local community.” (Cultiva 2019, §3). Some artists have expressed their frustration with this vagueness, and concluded that Cultiva simply does not care about artists (Jakhelln 2011).
119. Jenkins has suggested that the need for enchantment might be rooted in human nature. As he puts it: “The historical record shows that disenchantment – no less than power and discipline – provokes resistance in the shape of enchantment and (re)enchantment. It is thus sensible to ask, is a disenchanted world even a possibility? There is a discussion to be had here about the place of enchantment – specifically spirituality, desire and playfulness – in whatever it is that we call human nature (...)” (Jenkins 2000, p. 29). It is therefore not surprising that some have observed how employees oppose disenchanted forms of production. As Casey concludes: “Employees spiritually questioning the modus operandi of contemporary production organizations may use their dissident spiritualizing practices and ‘charisma’ toward new demand-setting in

- organisational life (...) many practitioners are already making such demands in emergent, not yet fully articulated forms". (Casey 2004, p. 77).
120. Possibly, what the for-profit sector corporations might be doing through new forms of tribalism, is to benefit from the force of perceived kinship and blood bonds. This is because religious communities historically have been inextricably linked to kinship. Perceptions of kinship and blood bonds might increase solidarity, and thereby also productivity and profits among the corporations that are able to emulate kinship. As Simmel pointed out: "The original religious community was the tribe, and all of the obligations that derived from kinship were simultaneously components of religious life. Even if the tribal god receded into insignificance and eventually fell into almost total obscurity, the essence of the tribal religion continued to assert itself in the lasting sacredness of the blood bond." (Simmel 1997, p. 158).
 121. It should be noted that the author of this management book, which became a best-seller (Dagens Perspektiv 2003), recognises that his perspective is contested in corporate circles: "Some had strong objections against the book's tendencies towards superstition. Away with astrology, God and palm readers from Poland! That was their advice. The most critical consultant thought that Hania's prophecy '*contradicts the real message of the book*': Why do we need visions, values and all the rest, if occult forces nevertheless fix everything? I am really not sure, but I think he has misunderstood. It is nice with radar, computer screens and satellite systems to navigate, but it is also nice to know that the stars can help with the navigation, if we dare to look up. You see, we do not live in a digital world. Most of all, we live in a wondrous one." (Jensen 2002, p. 217).
 122. Another potential abductive hunch supporting the enchantment perspective, is the significant use of *visuals* in Norwegian political documents related to the creative economy (Ministry of Trade and Industry *et al.* 2007, Ministry of Culture *et al.* 2013). The parallel to Jensen's (2002) extensive use of visuals is interesting. However, the visual aspect will have to be addressed in other studies than this thesis.
 123. In *The Culture Report*, it is stated: "State level cultural policy has, since the 1990s, developed towards a stronger emphasis on the intrinsic value of professional art, and the objective of artistic quality. The emphasis on high culture has been sustained by the current government, while it simultaneously has called for a wider conception of culture in state cultural policy through measures to eliminate "genre discrimination" within music and other cultural fields." (Ministry of Culture 2013, p. 59). This statement might be interpreted as an implicit claim that state level cultural policy in Norway deliberately conceals intentions of financially prioritising high cultural forms, and that the concept of "intrinsic value" is a rhetorical tool in this concealment.
 124. Notably, Røyseng only refers to *authorities* in this quote, not to the conception of artistic value by *people* in general. For some, art might be something entirely profane. For others, art might be inextricably linked to the supernatural in some form, or to the religious. It should also be underlined that Røyseng does not explicitly link the presumed supernatural underpinnings of Norwegian cultural policy to the term *intrinsic value*.

125. This might also apply to the avant-garde, and not only to the traditional classical music sector. Although the avant-garde is rather rational and technologically oriented (Born 1995), it does not seem unreasonable to use religious analogies to describe the avant-garde. As one musicologist illustratively described avant-garde composer Boulez: “The music ensemble that we heard is called Ensemble InterContemporain. They specialise in contemporary music. And the music was in part made by completely new software, new computers that Boulez got developed in a research institute in Paris that he himself founded. He conducts the music himself, he has composed it, and he performs, I mean, he stands as a high priest in the centre of the performance (...)” (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation 2016).
126. Article 68 in the Constitution states: “The Storting shall as a rule assemble on the first weekday in October every year in the capital of the realm, unless the King, by reason of extraordinary circumstances, such as hostile invasion or infectious disease, designates another town in the realm for the purpose. Such a decision must be publicly announced in good time.”
127. As Mangset has pointed out: “Most artists in ‘Smallville’ and ‘Countryside’ recognise the strong attraction and the artistic superiority of ‘Metropolis’, but some express a more ambivalent attitude. They tend to deny the central position of ‘Metropolis’ and point to ‘Super-Metropolis’ (Paris, London, New York) as the *real* artistic centre. In search of artistic inspiration they bypass Oslo without much notice, and instead choose to visit international cultural centres like Paris and London. This may be a regional strategy against the arrogant and patronising attitude of the national ‘Metropolis’ (Oslo). In their regional rhetoric ‘Countryside’ and ‘Smallville’ artists may try to downgrade Oslo to ‘Middleton’ or ‘Smallville’-status, at the same time that they express their own regional patriotism.” (Mangset 1998, p. 71). The question is, however, whether institutions such as OPO can maintain their “national” status solely based on their artistic superiority. It is likely that OPO is going to attract better musicians and conductors than the other professional orchestras in the future, due to general megatrends of urbanisation. But the question is whether OPO is able to persuade the general public that their artistic superiority, in and of itself, can support their *national* funding status, regardless of the fact that the orchestra rarely tours in Norway beyond their own region.
128. Østerberg concludes that Grieg’s music, which is the most well-known Norwegian classical music internationally, describes a Western Norway that no longer exists in the industrialised Norway: “It is international industrial capital that dominates the modes of production, and the international entertainment industry (‘entertainment’ equals ‘reproduction of labour’) that dominates the collective consciousness. Glenn and Kent are as ‘natural’ names in aluminum Norway as Vegard and Kjetil, and the electric guitar as familiar as the Hardanger fiddle. Western Norway, which was perceived to be the most Norwegian of the Norwegian, exists to a lesser degree than it ever did. Everybody notices that Oslo-Norway is ‘characterless’; it is a region where cultural insecurity is continuously demonstrated through arrogance, affected language and trashy behaviour. The Oslo version of Norway has been overwhelmed by the powerful influence of various cultural and capital centres. In this situation, some might regard ‘Western

Norway' as a bulwark; [they might believe that] this is [a place] where we have something that is Norwegian for real. [I am] sorry, [but] that is just a pipedream. Grieg's music is part of this pipedream." (Østerberg 1997a, pp. 143–144).

129. The interviews were conducted in the period from April 2017 to March 2018. The report was submitted from the expert committee to the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation on 1 February 2018.
130. McCormick (2012) has made a similar remark, although her remark was made with regards to the sociology of music: "Music does not only facilitate, but itself constitutes, a social action. It would follow that musical performance must be acknowledged as sociologically significant and cultural meaningful in its own right. The time has come for the sociology of music to become literally, and culturally, musical." (McCormick 2012, p. 17).

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 INTERVIEWEES

Alexander, 70s, large town a, composer	Kenneth, 40s, large town b, wind player
Alfred, 60s, city b, wind player	Lillian, 30s, large town c, wind player
Andreas, 70s, city a, church musician	Margaret, 40s, city b, wind player
Anne, 50s, city b, string player	Maria, 60s, town d, church musician
Arthur, 50s, city c, string player	Martin, 70s, city a, pianist
Benjamin, 40s, city b, composer	Nina, 40s, large town b, wind player
Charlotte, 50s, large town b, wind player	Noah, 30s, town a, pianist
Daniel, 40s, large town c, string player	Nora, 40s, large town c, singer
David, 60s, town b, composer	Oliver, 30s, city c, string player
Elias, 50s, city a, pianist	Richard, 30s, city d, string player
Ellen, 30s, city c, singer	Robert, 50s, city a, composer
Emma, 50s, city b, string player	Roger, 50s, city a, string player
Frank, 30s, city a, singer	Samuel, 30s, city d, guitar player
Hanna, 60s, town c, pianist	Sebastian, 30s, city b, string player
Harry, 40s, city d, string player	Simon, 50s, city d, string player
Helen, 50s, city a, wind player	Thomas, 40s, large town c, wind player
John, 40s, large town d, string player	Tom, 40s, city b, wind player
Jonathan, 40s, city d, string player	William, 50s, city b, string player
Julie, 40s, city d, string player	

The list above contains the pseudonyms, age groups, city size and primary instrument of the interviewees. The interviews were conducted in the period from April 2017 to March 2018.

With regards to pseudonyms, it is possible to use different strategies (e.g. Moore 2012, Allen and Wiles 2016). The names that I have used are largely “international” names,

in the sense that they are commonly used in many of the countries from which musicians are frequently recruited to the classical music sector in Norway. I decided to select those “international” names that are also commonly used in Norway. This choice made it possible to achieve two goals. First, it made it possible to achieve *phenomenological adequacy*, in the sense that it is likely that the names listed might realistically be names of classical musicians working in Norway, whether these musicians are Norwegians or not. In addition, this selection of “international” names made it possible to maintain anonymity, with regards to the national background of the interviewees. For example, the biblical name “Thomas” is common in many of the countries from which classical musicians in Norway are recruited, but it is also a popular name that Norwegians choose for their newborns. It is likely that many classical musicians in Norway have the name “Thomas”, but it is not possible to determine the nationality of the musician, even if we know that this person has the name “Thomas”.

When it comes to age group, it might provide a certain degree of relevance to know which age group an interviewee belongs. For example, some readers might reflect on the possibility of different forms of rationales being emphasised by practitioners from different age groups, although that has not been my focus. At the same time, due to the relatively small size of Norway’s population, and the corresponding small size of the classical music sector in Norway, providing the *exact* age was not a realistic option, due to anonymity considerations.

“City”, “large town” or “town” indicates that the interviewee comes from a city with more than hundred thousand citizens, between twenty thousand and hundred thousand citizens or below twenty thousand citizens, respectively. The letters attached to the cities, large towns and towns are random, with regards to size. For example, there are four cities in Norway with more than hundred thousand citizens: Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger. Based on the information from the list, readers will know that “Anne” and “William” come from either Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim or Stavanger (“city” entails more than hundred thousand citizens), and that they come from the same city (b). But the list does not

provide information about which of the four cities “Anne” and “William” come from. This is due to anonymity considerations.

Finally, the list provides the primary instrument or professional functions of the interviewees. It should be noted, however, that some of the interviewees work in combined positions. It is not uncommon that roles such as composing, conducting and performing are combined.

APPENDIX 2 PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET



Participant Information Sheet

Investigator:

Ådne Meling
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Loughborough
LE11 3TU

E-mail: A.Meling@lboro.ac.uk

Telephone: +47 98468468

What is the purpose of the study?

The aim of this study is to examine how the arts and culture sector legitimises public support for arts and culture in Norway. Previous research has described various positive outcomes of arts and culture that serve as rationales for policy makers. However, this study aims to find out how strong each of the rationales are, from the perspective of interviewees, policy documents and budgets.

Who is doing this research and why?

This study is part of a student research project supported by Loughborough University. The research is being conducted by Ådne Meling, phd candidate in social sciences at Loughborough University, as part of his phd project.

Are there any exclusion criteria?

No.

What will I be asked to do?

To participate in one interview session with investigator Ådne Meling

Once I take part, can I change my mind?

Yes. After you have read this information and asked any questions you may have, you will be asked to complete an Informed Consent Form, however if at any time, before, during or after the sessions you wish to withdraw from the study please just contact the main investigator. You can withdraw at any time, for any reason and you will not be asked to explain your reasons for withdrawing.

However, once the results of the study are published, it will not be possible to withdraw your individual data from the research.

Will I be required to attend any sessions and where will these be?

One interview session, which will take place at a mutually convenient location.

How long will it take?

It is expected that the interview session will last between 60 and 90 minutes.

What personal information will be required from me?

You will be asked about your work related to arts and culture. You will not be asked to share any personal information, and the work-related information you share will be anonymised.

Are there any risks in participating?

No.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

Your name and participation will be kept strictly confidential. Steps will be taken to ensure confidentiality and data security during collection, storage and analysis of data. Interview files will be password protected and your real name will not be linked to any files. The audio files will be deleted when they have been transcribed. The interview transcript will be kept for the duration of the project.

I have some more questions; who should I contact?

You can contact the investigator, phd candidate Ådne Meling (A.Meling@lboro.ac.uk). Alternatively, you can contact his supervisors professor dr Eleonora Belfiore (E.Belfiore@lboro.ac.uk) and reader dr Line Nyhagen (L.Nyhagen@lboro.ac.uk), both employed at Loughborough University.

What will happen to the results of the study?

The results will be written up in a phd thesis. The findings will be presented at academic conferences and to interested non-academic audiences.

What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted?

If you are not happy with how the research was conducted, please contact Ms Jackie Green, the Secretary for the University's Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee:

Ms J Green, Research Office, Hazlerigg Building, Loughborough University, Epinal Way, Loughborough, LE11 3TU. Tel: 01509 222423. Email: J.A.Green@lboro.ac.uk.

The University also has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle Blowing which is available online at <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/committees/ethics-approvals-human-participants/additionalinformation/codesofpractice/> .

APPENDIX 3 INFORMED CONSENT FORM



INFORMED CONSENT FORM (to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read)

Taking Part

Please initial box

The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me. I understand that this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been approved by the Loughborough University Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee.

I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form.

I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation.

I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study, have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, and will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing.

I agree to take part in this study. Taking part in the project will include being interviewed and recorded (audio).

Use of Information

I understand that all the personal information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the statutory obligations of the agencies which the researchers are working with), it is judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or others or for audit by regulatory authorities.

I understand that anonymised quotes may be used in academic publications and other research outputs.

Name of participant [printed]

Signature

Date

Researcher [printed]

Signature

Date

APPENDIX 4 INTERVIEW GUIDE

I. Preparations

Self-presentation and presentation of the project.

Check the sound and internet connection quality.

Has the interviewee read and understood the participation information sheet?

Does the interviewee have any questions about the participation information sheet?

Ask for signature on the informed consent form.

Ask for permission to record audio.

Underline that the study is anonymous, and that there are no correct or incorrect answers.

2. General questions about public support

Do you think the public sector should support classical music?

Some say classical music is art for an elite. Do you agree?

There is a range of arguments that are put forward for public funding of arts. Which arguments do you think are the most important ones for why classical music institutions and performances should be financially supported by the public sector? (Probe further if the interviewee brings up arguments such as art for art's sake, social or economic impacts, access to culture etc.).

If you had the opportunity to give advice to policy makers about policies for classical music, what kind of advice would you give?

How do you think the public sector can measure the value that is generated for society by the public funding of classical music?

3. The level of support

Norway has a higher degree of public funding than some other countries. How do you think the Norwegian society benefits from this, compared to those countries?

What do you think the classical music sector in Norway would have looked like without the public funding?

What do you think about the current level of public support for the arts in general, and for classical music specifically?

(If the interviewee is of the opinion that the current level of funding is too low): Are there any forms of public spending that you think should be reduced, or do you think that the general level of taxation should be increased?

4. Forms of public support

How do you think the public sector should value live performances compared to the value of people listening to classical music recordings?

How do you think the public sector should balance the support to different institutions within classical music?

How do you think the public sector should balance the support to classical music with support to other kinds of music?

How do you think classical music institutions that receive public funding should balance between different forms of classical musical repertoire?

5. Other issues

Which kinds of competence do you think are necessary for policy-makers who make decisions about public funding of the classical music sector?

Do you think those who make decisions about public funding of the classical music sector should be experts? In which ways?

Do you have knowledge about other countries' policies for the classical music sector? Do you think Norway can learn something from these countries, in terms of policies for classical music?

In your impression, are your colleagues politically interested? Do you discuss topics related to public funding of classical music and other political issues with them?

What do you know about the political positions of your colleagues, related to cultural policy and to other political areas?

6. Ending

Thank you for your participation.

Do you know of other classical musicians who might be interested in participating in this study?

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